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ACCESS TO NETWORKS: ECONOMIC AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONNECTIONS
Daniel F. Spulber† & Christopher S. Yoo††
A fundamental transformation is taking place in the basic approach to
regulating network industries.  Policy makers are in the process of aban-
doning their century-old commitment to rate regulation in favor of a new
regulatory approach known as access regulation. Rather than controlling
the price of outputs, the new approach focuses on compelling access to and
mandating the price of inputs. Unfortunately, this shift in regulatory policy
has not been met with an accompanying shift in the manner in which regu-
latory authorities regulate prices.  Specifically, policy makers have continued
to base rates on either historical or replacement cost.
We argue that this fundamental shift in regulatory approach demands
an equally fundamental shift in the approach to setting prices.  Economic
theory suggests that regulatory authorities should base access prices on market
prices.  In addition, because compelled access to most telecommunications
networks requires that competitors be permitted to place equipment on the
network owner’s property, access requirements constitute physical takings for
which market-based compensation must be paid.  Although the unavailabil-
ity of market-based determinants once justified basing prices on some measure
of cost, the shift in regulatory policy (especially when combined with the emer-
gence of direct, facilities-based competition made possible by technological
convergence) has caused the justifications for refusing to set rates on the basis
of market prices to fall away.
We then use these insights to analyze access pricing with respect to three
emerging regulatory issues: (1) access to unbundled network elements man-
dated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, (2) access to utility poles com-
pelled by the 1996 amendments to the Pole Attachments Act, and (3) open
access to digital subscriber line (DSL) and cable modem networks providing
high-speed broadband services.
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Access is becoming a potent conceptual tool for rethinking our worldview as
well as our economic view, making it the single most powerful metaphor of
the coming age.
Jeremy Rifkin1
INTRODUCTION
One of the most striking economic developments of the last dec-
ade has been the increasing importance of telecommunications net-
works.  Scientific breakthroughs have allowed the information and
communications sectors to expand to more than eight percent of the
nation’s total economy,2 having grown at roughly twenty percent each
year, a rate more than five times faster than the overall economy.3
Telecommunications companies also played a starring role in a signifi-
cant number of megamergers that have transformed the business en-
vironment4 and also served as a driving force behind the spectacular
rise and equally spectacular fall of the NASDAQ index.  The increase
in the importance of the telecommunications sector has been
matched by an increase in its volatility, with substantial overcapacity
and the shakeout of companies interpreted by many as a classic boom-
and-bust cycle.5  Perhaps most dramatically, the failure of WorldCom
has produced the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.6  As FCC Chair-
man Michael Powell noted, these developments have left the telecom-
munications industry in a state of “utter crisis,” with banks worldwide
contemplating industry write-offs of up to half-a-trillion dollars and
telecom operators and vendors in the United States laying off half-a-
million workers in a year and a half.7
The importance and the instability of the telecommunications
sector highlight the importance of understanding how this sector is
regulated.  Not only does government policy play a key role in shaping
returns and investment incentives, a growing number of commenta-
tors have suggested that regulation has played a decisive role in pre-
cipitating much of the turmoil that has wracked the industry of late,
1 JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS 15 (2000).
2 See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ECON. AND STATISTICS ADMIN., DIGITAL ECONOMY 2002,
at 26 (2002), available at http://www.esa.doc.gov/508/esa/pdf/DE2002r1.pdf.
3 See id. at 25, 27 tbl.3.4 (reporting that the information technology sector was re-
sponsible for between twenty-five and thirty-two percent of annual GDP growth between
1996 and 2000).
4 Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin, Inc., 100 Largest Announcements in History,
MERGERSTAT REV. (Jan. 2000), LEXIS, Mstrev File.
5 See, e.g., Bill Atkinson, No Recovery on Horizon for Telecoms, BALT. SUN, Mar. 28, 2002,
at 1C; Andrew Cassel, What Really Battered WorldCom?  End of Telecom Boom, PHILA. INQUIRER,
July 24, 2002, at C1; David Hayes & Suzanne King, Telecom: From Boom to Bust, KAN. CITY
STAR, July 21, 2002, at A1.
6 Yochi J. Dreazen & Ryan Chittvim, Upheaval at Worldcom, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2002,
at A6.
7 Too Many Debts; Too Few Calls, ECONOMIST, July 20, 2002, at 59, 59.
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having shaped both the recent wave of mergers8 and the WorldCom
bankruptcy.9  The direct link between regulation and industry per-
formance makes understanding the economic implications of current
regulatory policy all the more imperative.
For more than a century, telecommunications regulation was
marked by a remarkable degree of segmentation and invariability.  Be-
cause each communications service was available only through a sin-
gle technology, each medium of communications could be governed
by its own, discrete regulatory system that did not have to take into
account the impact of other technologies.  In addition, because policy
makers tended to regard each medium as a natural monopoly, they
subjected telecommunications networks to the now-classic regime of
common-carriage regulation, in which state and federal regulatory au-
thorities imposed nondiscrimination and mandatory service require-
ments, monitored quality, supervised investments, and restricted
competitive entry.  Most importantly, this approach focused on the
rates that telecommunications providers could charge end users for
purchasing outputs.  The primary policy issue centered on whether
such rates should be based on historical cost or replacement cost.10
Two emergent forces have begun to destabilize this century-old
regulatory consensus.  First, scientific advances are rendering differ-
ent communications media increasingly interchangeable, allowing in-
termodal or platform competition.  Not only has the emergence of
competition between technological platforms provided consumers
and firms with a dazzling variety of ways to access network services; it
has also begun to put pressure on the historical regulatory distinction
among voice, video, and data communications, in which each type of
service was governed by a separate regulatory regime.11
The second driving force is the fundamental shift in regulatory
approach exemplified by the enactment of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.12  The 1996 Act was designed to introduce competition
into local telephone service by compelling every incumbent local tele-
phone company to interconnect with its competitors on reasonable
and nondiscriminatory terms and to provide them with unbundled
8 See Jim Chen, The Magnificent Seven: American Telephony’s Deregulatory Shootout, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1503, 1514–38 (1999).
9 For example, noted telecommunications expert Peter Huber has argued that Wash-
ington created WorldCom on the grounds that “[m]uch of the telecom industry’s current
woe can be traced to government accountants who set interconnection tariffs at levels com-
pletely divorced from economic reality.”  Peter Huber, Washington Created WorldCom, WALL
ST. J., July 1, 2002, at A14.
10 See infra Part I.C.4.b.
11 See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy,
19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 285–90 (2002).
12 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
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access to every element of its network.13  Initially hailed as a major
deregulatory change,14 it increasingly appears that, rather than repre-
senting a shift towards deregulation, the 1996 Act marked a shift to-
wards a different style of regulation known as “access regulation.”
Rather than regulating the terms under which consumers purchase
outputs, access regulation instead regulates the ability of competitors
to obtain inputs.  The 1996 Act is part of a broader shift in regulatory
philosophy that spans at least six network industries.15  As Jeremy
Rifkin aptly acknowledges, we do indeed live in “the Age of Access.”16
These two forces have economic and constitutional implications
that should fundamentally transform the manner in which policy mak-
ers approach network industries.  Somewhat surprisingly, regulatory
authorities have not adequately accounted for these forces.  Instead,
they have reflexively adhered to the cost-based approaches associated
with traditional rate regulation without adequately considering
whether these shifts require an equally fundamental change in regula-
tory approach.  Because of the protracted nature of the legal proceed-
ings regarding the implementation of compelled access, these issues
have not yet been fully addressed by the courts, with the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC17 and National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co.18 representing only a
few rounds of what will undoubtedly be a protracted series of major
court decisions addressing these issues.
The debates about access to telecommunication networks have
been further obscured by academic writings that have made networks
seem like increasingly complex and exotic phenomena.  Many of the
basic concepts about networks remain poorly defined and misunder-
stood.  In addition, networks tend to be characterized by sunk costs as
well as economies of scale and scope that many theorists believe distin-
guish the economic analysis of networks from other forms of produc-
tion.19  A burgeoning literature argues that networks are susceptible
to unique types of market failures, so-called network externalities,
which in turn require regulators to intervene in ways not required in
other industries.20
13 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)–(3) (2000).
14 See, e.g., Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing S. 652, 32 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 218 (Feb. 12, 1996) (praising the Act for “providing a roadmap for der-
egulation in the future”); Congress Maps a Telecom Future, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 1996, at 14
(calling the overall thrust of the Act “clearly deregulatory and pro-competitive”).
15 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Grand Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1340–46 (1998).
16 See RIFKIN, supra note 1, at 3.
17 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
18 534 U.S. 327 (2002).
19 See infra notes 107–10 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 118–20 and accompanying text.
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This Article is designed to place the issues surrounding access
pricing on a sounder economic and legal foundation that takes into
account the full import of the changes in technology and regulatory
theory.  Part I demystifies networks as an economic phenomenon by
offering a more precise definition of what constitutes network access.
As we will explain in greater detail later, network access is properly
viewed as third-party use of the transmission services provided
through the network.  Economic analysis indicates that efficiency
would best be promoted if access to those network services was based
on market value.  Reliance on market-based pricing mechanisms
tends not only to allocate goods to their highest and best use; it also
provides the proper signals to parties who consider investing in net-
work technologies.
Rather than basing access prices on the market value of the net-
work services provided, regulators continue to employ access-pricing
methodologies that focus on the cost of the inputs used to establish
the physical network.  For the reasons we further explain in Part I, we
find this approach to be quite problematic.  Over time, competition
tends to drive the market prices of outputs and the costs of produc-
tion together so that ideally the purchase cost of inputs would re-
present a good approximation of the earning potential—and thus the
market value—of those inputs.  In practice, however, both purchase
cost and market value are moving targets.  Improvements in produc-
tion technology, innovations in goods and services, shifts in consumer
demand, entry and exit by producers, and changes in factor prices are
likely to cause the market value of inputs to deviate from their initial
cost.  The greater the rate of change of technology and other forces,
the greater this disparity is likely to be.  Given the unpredictability of
such changes, the deviations from market value caused by basing ac-
cess prices on the cost of the inputs used to create the network will
tend to lead to gluts or shortages and will eventually induce entrants
to over- or under-invest in certain types of network capacity.  Further-
more, basing access prices on input costs ignores the fact that the
whole is typically greater than the sum of its parts.  So long as a firm is
efficient and creative, the value of the services it provides is likely to
exceed the cost of the inputs it uses.  Frictions such as transaction
costs and asymmetric information, which are present in practically any
market, are likely to create further discrepancies between market
prices of inputs and factor costs.
The only plausible justification for basing regulated prices on
costs incurred was that the absence of external markets caused by the
lack of technological substitutes made it impossible to base rates on
market prices.  By stimulating direct facilities-based competition, the
emergence of platform competition and the shift to access regulation
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have made market-based pricing both feasible and desirable.  Part I
closes by refuting arguments advanced by other scholars suggesting
that network industries are somehow prone to unique forms of mar-
ket failure that justify adhering to cost-based pricing.  Economies of
scale and scope, sunk costs, and network economic effects do not gen-
erally cause market prices to deviate from levels that promote effi-
ciency and do not change the basic analysis.
Part II describes the constitutional implications of the emergence
of platform competition and the shift to access regulation by evaluat-
ing the limits that the Takings Clause places on the regulation of ac-
cess pricing.  Because rate regulation simply restricts the terms and
conditions under which parties may contract for finished goods and
services, it represents the type of adjustment of economic burdens tra-
ditionally subject to the more permissive analysis applied to nonpos-
sessory takings.21  Access regulation, in contrast, typically requires
network owners to permit third parties to place equipment on their
property.  As a result, access regulation necessarily falls within the Su-
preme Court’s physical takings jurisprudence, which mandates that
the government reimburse property owners for the market value of
their property without regard to the economic impact of the regula-
tion or whether the regulation in question furthers important public
interests.  Therefore, just compensation for compelled access exactly
corresponds to economically efficient prices for compelled access.
Part III applies the analytical framework developed in the preced-
ing Parts to three emerging policy problems: (1) unbundled access to
elements of local telephone networks, an issue that underlay the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC; (2) ac-
cess to networks of utility poles, an issue that formed the basis for the
Court’s decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Gulf
Power Co.; and (3) open access to high-speed broadband systems, en-
compassing both cable modem systems and DSL systems, an issue that
represents the focus of two ongoing proceedings before the FCC.  We
conclude that the steps taken to implement each of these access re-
gimes violate the economic and constitutional principles that we have
identified.  Established principles of economics and constitutional law
instead require that regulators adopt methodologies that base access
rates on market prices.
I
EFFICIENT PRICING OF ACCESS TO NETWORKS
This Part removes some of the perceived mystery surrounding the
economics of network access.  It begins in subpart A by offering a defi-
nition of what constitutes a network and access to a network.  Subpart
21 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978).
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B lays out the basic case for basing access rates on market pricing.
Subpart C discusses the various methodologies for determining mar-
ket prices.  Finally, subpart D reviews the various features of networks
that have led some commentators to suggest that reliance on market
prices in network industries might not constitute the best way to pro-
mote economic efficiency.
In short, conventional economic principles dictate that access
prices should be based on the market value of the incremental net-
work services provided by the relevant input.  Although the absence of
comparable transactions in external markets has historically led regu-
latory authorities to eschew market-based pricing in favor of cost-
based pricing, platform competition and the shift to access regulation
have drained this justification of its vitality.  The emergence of direct
facilities-based competition from alternative telecommunications net-
works has created market-based benchmarks that can serve as inde-
pendent bases for setting rates.  Contrary to the suggestion of some
commentators, distinctive economic features of networks such as sunk
costs, economies of scale and scope, and network economic effects, do
not alter this core conclusion.
A. Defining Access to Networks
At its most basic level, a network is a system of nodes connected by
links.  The nodes of a traditional telecommunications network are the
company’s switches and customer premises, while the links are the
wires that connect them.  In a wireless network, the nodes are the re-
ceivers and transmitters, and the links are the radio spectrum.  Net-
works have many different configurations.  A star-shaped network is a
simple configuration in which there is a single hub and all lines are
spokes.  Hub-and-spoke networks have multiple hubs with high-capac-
ity trunk lines connecting the main hubs and lower-capacity spokes
reaching terminal points.  The high-capacity trunk lines aggregate
traffic and offer cost economies in comparison to a network that pro-
vides connections between every individual point.  Telecommunica-
tions networks have high-capacity trunks or backbones and lower-
capacity distribution lines such as the local loop to the individual
home or business.  Economic life is critically dependent on many
types of privately owned networks: for communications (broadcast tel-
evision and radio, cable television, telephone, broadband data, utility
poles), for energy (electric power transmission and distribution, natu-
ral gas and petroleum pipelines), for transportation (airlines, rail-
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roads, buses, trucks, shipping), and for distribution systems (postal
services, product wholesale services).22
The types of networks on which we are focusing generally are
physical production facilities that encompass factors of production such
as land, capital equipment, and technology.23  Construction of these
facilities requires network owners to invest in substantial fixed assets
that should be viewed in the same way as other types of capital equip-
ment such as manufacturing plants, office buildings, and commercial
structures.  Like other long-term assets, the network’s physical produc-
tion facilities do not vary directly with output in the short term.  More-
over, like other capital investments, the configuration of the network’s
physical assets cannot be changed in the short term.  Given sufficient
time, however, the network’s capital equipment is variable and can be
adjusted to create different capacity levels.  The operation of a net-
work’s facilities often requires variable inputs as well, such as the labor
used to maintain its facilities and to monitor its operations.
In combination, the productive inputs that constitute the net-
work are used to create a stream of services, such as the transmission
and distribution of communications, that are the outputs of the net-
work.  Just as natural gas transmission does not consume the physical
pipeline, usage of a telecommunications network does not consume
the network itself, but instead only temporarily precludes the provi-
sion of services to some other user.  Of course, network use does im-
pose some wear and tear on the network’s physical production
facilities.  The measures of depreciation employed under generally ac-
cepted accounting principles do not accurately indicate the value of
the services provided by the equipment, however.  As a result, the ap-
plicable depreciation rules typically do not properly reflect the equip-
ment’s economic life.
Access to a network refers to the use of the network’s services, which
are the outputs of the network.24  Thus, access to a network does not
22 This Article focuses primarily on telecommunications networks.  Although we sus-
pect that the economic and constitutional concepts that we discuss may have implications
for other network industries, such as energy and transportation, developing those ideas
would require detailed consideration of the technological and regulatory conditions of
those industries and would exceed the scope of this Article.  We therefore reserve any firm
policy conclusions with respect to energy and transportation networks.  We believe, how-
ever, that the definitions of basic network concepts advanced in this subpart have general
application to all network industries.  As a result, we draw on examples from the energy
and transportation industries to help illustrate the definitions that we are advancing.
23 Our focus is on physical facilities in transportation, energy, and communications
networks.  We do not consider other uses of the term networks that refer to interconnected
relationships between people, such as with social or business relationships.
24 Although more general definitions of access exist, they seem too broad to provide
guidance for pricing access to networks. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 13 (7th ed.
1999) (defining access as “[a]n opportunity or ability to enter, approach, pass to and from,
or communicate with”); 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 72 (2d ed. 1989) (defining the
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represent simply a physical connection to the network.  Rather, access
refers to the opportunity to benefit from the services generated by
network usage.  Because the use of network elements by another com-
pany potentially reduces the services that the network owner can pro-
vide, the correct access price depends on what the company could
have obtained by using those network services itself or by selling net-
work services to some other party.  The proper measure of the value
of network access is thus the value of the network services provided,
which in turn is determined by the value of the network’s final output.
B. Making the Economic Case for Market-Based Pricing of
Network Access
1. Market Prices, Regulated Prices, and Efficiency
The consensus economic position is that so long as competition is
sufficiently robust, market prices represent the best reflection of
value.  The market price is the outcome of the forces of supply and
demand.  The supply side of the market reflects the costs to sellers of
providing a good, the demand side reflects the benefits to buyers from
consuming the good.  At market equilibrium, prices are thus deter-
mined by the marginal cost to sellers of providing a good and the mar-
ginal benefit to buyers of consuming it.  Prices are adjusted through
the process of exchange to balance supply and demand and to clear
the market so that prices are further reflections of scarcity—the meet-
ing of consumer wants and supplier capacities.25
Because the services of a network are comparable to the output of
other types of production facilities, they can be allocated by market
processes.  Markets refer to the interaction of buyers and sellers,26
noun access as a “way or means of approach,” such as an “entrance, channel, passage, or
doorway,” or the action of “coming to or towards; approaching,” and identifying the verb
access as “[t]o gain access to (data, etc., held in a computer or computer-based system, or
the system itself)”).  This Article does not consider the notion of access as an entitlement,
as is the case with access to facilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act, or with
access to education or housing under antidiscrimination statutes.
25 Classical economists, such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, well understood that
the determination of market equilibrium prices and value results from the interaction of
supply and demand, at least in the short run.  The classical economists had various cost-
based explanations for the determination of the long-run prices of land, labor, and capital.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, the marginalist revolution that led to today’s neoclas-
sical economy extended the supply-and-demand analysis consistently to output and input
markets, both in the short and long run. See W. STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 81–174 (2d ed., London, MacMillan 1879); CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECO-
NOMICS 114–21 (James Dingwall & Bert F. Hoselitz eds. & trans., Free Press 1950) (1871);
LÉON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS 20 (William Jaffé trans., George Allen & Un-
win Ltd. 1954) (1874); 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 554–61 (4th ed.,
London, MacMillan 1898); MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 298–326 (rev.
ed. 1968).
26 On the role of intermediaries in market allocation mechanisms, see DANIEL F.
SPULBER, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE: INTERMEDIARIES AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM (1999).
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with market prices mediating between what buyers are willing to pay
and what sellers are willing to accept.  Market prices are determined
through the activities of suppliers, customers, and intermediaries such
as retailers and wholesalers.  In the short run, firms increase prices
when demand exceeds supply and lower prices when supply exceeds
demand.  In the long run, suppliers make production decisions by
comparing the prices of goods to their costs and to the prices of alter-
native goods the supplier might provide.  Firms will supply a good at
some price if the cost of each unit provided and the cost at the margin
(the last unit provided) are less than or equal to the market price.
Conversely, consumers make purchasing decisions based on the bene-
fits that they derive from that good and the availability of substitute
goods.  Consumers will purchase a good at some price if the benefits
of each unit consumed at the margin (the last unit consumed) equal
or exceed the market price.  The price will eventually adjust until the
market clears, at which point supply and demand will be in balance
and the benefits to consumers will equal or exceed the costs to suppli-
ers.  The market price equals the marginal benefit of the good and
thus indicates its economic value.
Markets are effective mechanisms for pricing not only physical
products such as automobiles and food, but also services such as trans-
portation or restaurant services.  Many types of services are routinely
purchased and sold.  For example, video rental stores supply their cus-
tomers with entertainment services corresponding to viewing a movie
at home.  Movie theaters provide similar entertainment services that
require viewing the movie at the theater.  Automobile renting and
leasing companies supply customers with transportation services.  Eco-
nomic theory does not distinguish between the market allocation of
physical products and the market allocation of services.  Accordingly,
markets can allocate network-generated services just as they do any
other type of physical product or service.
Market prices promote allocative and dynamic efficiency.  Efficient
allocation of goods occurs when the purchasers of a particular good
are those who obtain the greatest benefit from consumption and the
suppliers of the good are those who incur the lowest cost of produc-
tion.  By allocating the good or service to the person or firm willing to
pay the most, the price mechanism ensures that goods and services
are placed in the hands of those able to put them to their best use.
The price mechanism further ensures that goods and services are pro-
vided by the most efficient suppliers.
Dynamic efficiency is attained when economic actors make effi-
cient investment decisions.  Investment decisions are efficient when
the present discounted value of the marginal returns to invest equals
the marginal cost of investment.  Market prices provide incentives for
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efficient investment decisions because the market prices of services
created by capital facilities are the best measure of the marginal bene-
fit derived by users of those services.  A firm deciding whether to in-
vest in production facilities makes efficient decisions by considering
the market value of the products and services to be created with those
facilities in comparison to the cost of investment.  Similarly, a firm
choosing whether to purchase a good or service or to construct its
own production facilities makes efficient decisions by comparing the
market price of purchasing the good or service with the costs of con-
structing and operating its own facilities.  Because market prices allo-
cate productive capacity efficiently, signaling marginal benefits and
marginal cost, they provide an accurate guide for investment
decisions.
Regulated prices based on costs tend not to reflect accurately ei-
ther the value of a good or service or the economic costs of producing
the good or service.  This results from the failure of regulatory author-
ities to process information about costs and benefits as effectively as
the many buyers and sellers that make up a market.27  Even worse, the
government typically must rely on information provided by the regu-
lated entities, which of course have a vested interest in the outcome.
As a result, it is not uncommon for regulated prices to cause allo-
cative inefficiency.  To the extent that the regulated prices deviate
from market prices, they send incorrect signals to both users and sup-
pliers of access.  For example, regulation that sets the price of network
access below market rates in effect requires network owners to subsi-
dize competitors.  This in turn leads those competitors to adjust the
mix of inputs so that they employ reduced quantities of other inputs
and greater quantities of network access.  In addition, because access
is an input used in the production of other goods and services, pricing
it below market rates can cause competitors to make inefficient deci-
sions about which markets to enter.  Below-market pricing may mis-
lead competitors into believing that the benefits of serving a particular
market exceed the costs by understating the true economic costs asso-
ciated with entering that market.  The result not only creates alloca-
tive inefficiency in the primary market by stimulating excess demand
for network access; it also creates secondary distortions in the markets
for other inputs by increasing or reducing demand for those inputs.
To the extent that the suppliers of access are regulated utilities, cus-
tomers as well as the utilities will bear the burden.
In addition to impeding allocative efficiency, regulated pricing
can also impede dynamic efficiency.28  Pricing access at below-market
27 See F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT 85–88 (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1989).
28 For an earlier discussion of the dynamic efficiency problems posed by access regu-
lation, see Yoo, supra note 11, at 246–47, 268–69.
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levels discourages existing network owners from investing in addi-
tional network capacity.  At the same time, it also discourages compet-
ing companies from investing in alternative capacity, including
substitute network technologies.  This effect underscores the extent to
which access requirements represent a policy anomaly.  The central
focus of competition policy is to prevent monopolies from emerging
and to break them up whenever they occur.  Access requirements, in
contrast, leave the bottlenecks in place and instead simply require the
monopolist to share its facilities.  In addition, by rescuing competing
firms from having to supply the relevant input for themselves, com-
pelled access destroys the incentive to invest in alternative network
technologies and thus deprives providers of emerging substitute tech-
nologies of their natural strategic partners.  As a result, compelled ac-
cess can entrench any supposed bottleneck facility by forestalling the
emergence of alternative network technologies.  This perverse effect is
particularly problematic in technologically dynamic industries, in
which the prospects of developing new ways either to circumvent or to
compete directly with the alleged bottleneck are the brightest.  And
even if a regulatory regime were defensible when imposed, it all too
often endures long after technological change has eroded its
justifications.29
Finally, there is good reason to question the extent to which rate-
making authorities will make the pursuit of economic efficiency their
primary goal.  As demonstrated by the burgeoning literature on pub-
lic choice, governmental institutions are subject to a wide variety of
pressures that can cause them to redirect competition policy towards
noneconomic ends.30  The system of cross subsidies in telephone pric-
ing aptly illustrates how governmentally established pricing can be di-
rected towards political and social goals, and how such pricing is an
imperfect guide to allocating goods and services or making invest-
ment decisions.31  A review of a previous attempt by the FCC to pro-
29 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 286–87 (1982); 2 ALFRED E.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 127 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly
and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 631–32 (1969).
30 See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competi-
tion, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247, 248–52, 256–59 (1985); Fred S. McChesney, Be True to Your School:
Chicago’s Contradictory Views of Antitrust and Regulation, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ANTITRUST 323, 323–33 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995); Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 211–12 (1976);
Posner, supra note 29, at 618–25; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–10 (1971).
31 See, e.g., David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications:
Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 142–45
(1994).
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mote competition through access requirements provides little basis
for optimism in this regard.32
The end result is similar to any system of rent controls, with de-
mand for the service exceeding supply at the regulated price.  Regu-
lated prices do not fully serve their function of rationing user capacity
and stimulating the provision of supplier capacity.  In contrast, market
prices send correct signals to companies that seek access as well as to
utilities that provide access.  Competing companies will have incen-
tives to make economically correct decisions about the amount of ser-
vices to obtain from the network access supplier and the extent to
which they should invest in their own network services.
2. The Difference Between Market Prices and Unit Costs
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the market price of a
good is the best indication of its value.  The market price of a good
can differ from the costs incurred in obtaining the inputs to produce
the good because many forces affect market prices through changes
in demand and supply.  New methods of production that increase effi-
ciency can increase supply at any given price.  Changes in the relative
prices of inputs, including finance capital, wages, land rents, and the
prices of parts and components have complex effects on supply.  The
entry and exit of producers and decisions to expand or contract pro-
duction capacity also impact supply.  The introduction of innovative
products can create shifts in both demand and supply toward these
new products.  Changes in consumer tastes and income, as well as
changes in the prices of substitute and alternative goods, can also
change demand at any given price.  Accordingly, the market prices of
output are unlikely to correspond to the past costs incurred to pro-
duce that output.  Even if individual producers try to anticipate out-
put prices in their decisions, market uncertainty will defeat their
efforts, leading to randomness in profit margins.
Even if market prices were to reflect accurately the costs of the
marginal producer, they would depart from the costs of the in-
framarginal producer.  Costs tend to vary across firms because of dif-
ferences in business methods, management techniques, production
processes, and technological knowledge.  Moreover, output value can
depart from input costs because firms combine inputs in different
ways, creating different products and addressing customer needs dif-
ferently.  Firm heterogeneity strongly implies that the unit costs of any
individual firm are likely to differ from the market price.  Under the
textbook paradigm of perfect competition with identical firms and
32 See Donna N. Lampert, Cable Television: Does Leased Access Mean Least Access?, 44 FED.
COMM. L.J. 245 (1992) (analyzing the leased access provisions in the Cable Act of 1984).
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static demands, efficient entry guarantees that the market price even-
tually equals the unit cost of firms.  This need not be the case when
unit costs vary across firms.
Because of uncertainty regarding changes in output markets,
there are likely to be deviations between output prices and unit costs.
Some firms will earn economic profits and others will suffer economic
losses.  Moreover, firms often change prices in anticipation of devel-
opments because they respond to buyers’ and sellers’ expectations of
future market conditions.33
Even though competitive forces tend to move market prices to-
ward cost through the exit or improvement of inefficient producers,
the past costs of producing a good are likely to differ substantially
from current and future costs.  Costs fluctuate due to changes in input
prices and technology.  Market prices correspond more to current
and forward-looking demand and supply conditions than to past costs.
Traditional cost-of-service regulation at best adjusts prices to reflect
past costs,34 thereby permitting regulated rates to depart substantially
from market prices.  The fundamental reason for this departure is
that the economic cost of inputs used to produce some output is not
the same as the market price or economic value of an output pro-
duced with those inputs.  Thus, market prices are necessarily better
than regulated rates based on the costs of production.
C. Determining Market Price
1. Pricing Based on External Market Transactions
Arguing that regulatory authorities should base network access
rates on market prices leaves open the question of how to determine
the prevailing market price.  Market transactions constitute the most
(if not the only) reliable indicator of individual preferences.35  Thus,
regulators should develop market benchmarks if they choose not to
defer to market mechanisms for allocation.
Under standard valuation techniques, the most reliable indicator
of market price tends to be the comparable sales approach, in which the
price charged for the hypothetical transaction in question is deter-
mined by prices charged in actual market transactions involving simi-
33 “The question of fact is thus whether entrepreneurs as a class receive on the aver-
age more or less than the normal competitive rate of return on the productive services of
person or property which they furnish to the business.  The question does not admit to any
definitive answer on inductive grounds.” FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT
364 (1921).
34 See infra Part I.C.4.a.
35 See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15
ECONOMICA 243, 243–44 (1948).
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lar goods.36  Two types of market transactions can serve as external
benchmarks for comparable sales.  The easiest case occurs when a net-
work owner sells into an external market the same type of access man-
dated by the government.  In that situation, market value
determination is simple because comparable sales can serve as a relia-
ble proxy for the services provided.
In addition, market value may be inferred from the price charged
for access to a substitute transmission technology providing similar
services.  Although the historical balkanization of communications has
long made such determinations impossible, platform competition has
made resort to this type of external benchmark increasingly feasible.
Admittedly, transactions involving substitute technologies can be
more difficult to apply as benchmarks than transactions using the
same type of network.  Differences in network configuration can com-
plicate direct comparisons between alternative technologies.  For ex-
ample, although cable television and digital broadcast satellite (DBS)
systems have emerged as direct competitors, the wire-based distribu-
tion of cable operators is necessarily restricted to a limited geographic
area, whereas the footprint of DBS providers is inherently national in
scope.37  In addition, different network technologies provide different
performance and reliability levels.  As a result, prices must be adjusted
to reflect differences in the type of network before any comparisons
can be drawn.  However complicated such adjustments can be, they
are by no means so intractable as to render transactions occurring on
alternative networks useless as external benchmarks for inferring mar-
ket prices.
The other principal market-based valuation method is the income
capitalization approach.  When commercial property is involved, regula-
tors can use a discounted cash-flow analysis to determine the present
value of the income that the input is projected to earn.38  Because the
earnings are based on the prices charged in the output markets, it is
possible to apply this method even if the input being priced is not sold
in any external markets.  In addition, because the income capitaliza-
tion approach is based on data derived from actual market transac-
36 See, e.g., Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46 S.C.
L. REV. 579, 581–82 (1995); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is
Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 727–28 (1993).
37 DBS’s inherently national scope makes it uniquely well suited to take advantage of
the economies inherent in national distribution of video programming. See Christopher S.
Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Yoo, Rise and Demise]; Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the
Commitment to Free, Local Television: A Public Goods Analysis 37–38 (Vanderbilt Law and Eco-
nomics Research Paper No. 02-09; Vanderbilt Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
No. 02-09, 2002), at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=333702 [hereinafter Yoo, Rethinking Free,
Local Television].
38 See, e.g., DeBow, supra note 36, at 581–82.
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tions, it is still generally regarded as a reasonably reliable means for
determining market value.
2. The Second-Best Solution in the Absence of External Markets
If a market benchmark is not available, then an estimate based on
the economic costs of providing the service may be necessary.  Such
an estimate should approximate the market value of all the inputs
used to create and operate the network, with the understanding that
the market price of network access may be greater or less than that
estimate.  Over time, the market price of access should reflect the eco-
nomic cost of all of the inputs used to provide network services.  In
the short run, however, market prices may deviate from economic
cost.  If network access is scarce, the market price of access would
likely be greater than the replacement cost of the network.  Con-
versely, with a glut of network capacity or obsolescence of network
technology, the market price of access would likely be less than the
replacement cost of the network.  For example, a glut in fiber optic
capacity would likely reduce the price of access to below the cost of
the network.  Accordingly, it is important to distinguish the market
value of a good from the economic costs of providing it.  However, the
economic cost of providing that good, properly estimated, provides a
second-best alternative.
The economic cost of producing a product or service equals the
total opportunity costs of all the inputs used to produce that product
or service.  An input’s opportunity cost refers to the value of the best
opportunity necessarily foregone, that is, the return from the best al-
ternative employment of that input.  The economic cost of producing
network services in telecommunications includes the opportunity
costs of such inputs as capital, land and land rights, wires, utility poles,
towers and fixtures, switches, control systems, construction costs, oper-
ation and maintenance expenses, and management costs.  The user
costs of capital associated with owning plants and equipment is equal to
the foregone return from the best alternative investment of expendi-
tures made for the plant and equipment.
For most productive inputs, the most accurate measure of oppor-
tunity cost is their market value, which is simply the current market
price of the input less the avoidable direct costs associated with pro-
viding it.  The best estimate is based on the opportunity cost of the
input.  For example, if a company owns a plot of land that it could
rent to another company for $500, the opportunity cost of using the
land is $500.
Replacement cost, which refers to the cost of purchasing an input at
current market prices, in turn provides a reasonable approximation of
market value.  Replacement costs are forward-looking costs of con-
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structing the network and include all costs that the utility would incur
to rebuild its system, including capital, land, labor services, and man-
agement.39  Accordingly, the market value of the inputs used to create
a network includes the replacement costs of facilities and equipment,
as well as the user cost of capital evaluated using the market cost of
capital, land and land rights evaluated using current market rents,
and current operation and maintenance expenses.  A good proxy for
replacement cost is the recent purchase cost of the input.  Of course
recent purchase cost is not a perfect measure, as the market price may
have changed since the most recent purchase.  Nonetheless, in the
absence of indicia that more directly measure market value, replace-
ment cost estimates based on comparable transactions provide a work-
able measure of market value.
It is now generally accepted that replacement cost is superior to
historical cost as a measure of market value, because, as noted by then-
Professor Stephen Breyer, “[a] competitive marketplace values assets,
not at their historical price, but at their replacement value—the present
cost of obtaining the identical service that the old asset provides.”40
Historical costs suffer from several well-recognized infirmities.  For ex-
ample, the market value of an input may have increased or decreased
since its purchase.  In addition, historical costs will typically be based
on the book values of plant and equipment (also known as “embed-
ded costs”).  The depreciation schedules allowed under the applicable
accounting rules and tax laws often fail to constitute proper economic
measures of depreciation.  Replacement cost, in contrast, more accu-
rately reflects changes in value.  It is true that replacement cost is not
without its own complications41 and that short-term changes can tem-
porarily cause it to rise above or fall below equilibrium levels.  None-
theless, replacement cost provides a reasonably reliable measure of
the direct costs of providing network services.
The costs of supplying network access also include transaction
costs.  The network operator must devote management and employee
39 Scholars and policy makers disagree as to whether the replacement cost determina-
tion should be based on the network as it is currently configured or on a hypothetical
network employing the most efficient technology and configuration available. Compare
Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 501–23 (2002) (holding that basing
rates on hypothetical networks represented a reasonable construction of the applicable
statute), and Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 262
U.S. 276, 312 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment) (advancing economic ar-
guments in favor of hypothetical networks), with J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER,
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT 419–25 (1997) (arguing in favor
of basing on the replacement cost of existing networks).  Resolution of this debate, while
undoubtedly important in implementing any access regime, falls outside the scope of this
Article, which focuses primarily on the importance of ensuring that any access prices set by
regulatory authorities include some measure of the market demand for access.
40 BREYER, supra note 29, at 38.
41 See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
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resources to handling the provision of network services, including ar-
ranging network connections, monitoring usage, and billing for net-
work use.  In the face of mandated access, the owner of the network
must determine the existing demands for capacity and provide addi-
tional capacity to meet regulatory requirements.  For example, in the
case of pole attachments, the FCC initially required that a utility take
“all reasonable steps” to expand the capacity of its poles, ducts, con-
duits, and even rights-of-way upon request by telecommunications car-
riers and cable operators.42  Moreover, the FCC still requires that
electric utilities verify the amount of space that they would like to re-
serve for themselves.43  This provision of pole attachment services may
also require that utility owners accommodate those telecommunica-
tions or cable TV companies seeking access that is more convenient or
less expensive than producing their own system of poles.44  Transac-
tion costs significantly affect prices and decisions in competitive mar-
kets.  They may appear intangible to regulators and thus may be
difficult for those subject to access requirements to recover.
3. The Efficient Component Pricing Rule
As emphasized thus far, pricing access to a network refers to the
prices attached to the services generated by the entire network.  An
alternative regulatory approach to network access grants users the ser-
vices of particular inputs to the network rather than the output of ser-
vices from the network as a whole.  This regulatory scheme originated
with railroad trackage rights, whereby the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission gave third-party operators access rights to another railroad’s
track.45  The scheme continues in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, which mandates a very different type of network access based on
the use of the services of individual components of the network rather
than the services of the network itself.46  Thus, this approach focuses
on the services of network inputs rather than the outputs.  For exam-
ple, with regards to network components such as the local loop,
switches, or other facilities (called “network elements”), the 1996 Act
42 Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecommunications Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 16075–76 ¶¶ 1161–1163 (1996) (“Local
Competition Order”), rev’d in relevant part sub nom. S. Co. v. FCC, 293 F.3d 1338, 1346–47
(11th Cir. 2002).
43 Id. at 16078 ¶ 1169.  Telephone and video companies that own poles are not al-
lowed to reserve space. Id. at 16079 ¶ 1170.  Unlike the previous provision, this provision
was sustained on judicial review. See S. Co., 293 F.3d at 1347–49.
44 Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 16076–77 ¶ 1164 (“We will not require tele-
communications providers or cable operators seeking access to exhaust any possibility of
leasing capacity from other providers . . . before requesting [the pole owner] to expand
[its] capacity.”).
45 See 49 U.S.C. § 11102(a) (2000).
46 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000).
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requires that incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) provide “non-
discriminatory access . . . on an unbundled basis at any technically
feasible point.”47  Such an access requirement is analogous to requir-
ing that a manufacturer provide another company with the use of a
piece of capital equipment, such as a machine tool.  Incumbent LECs
also have the duty to provide “physical collocation of equipment nec-
essary for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements
at the premises of the local exchange carrier.”48  Collocation corre-
sponds to a manufacturer allowing another company to locate its
equipment in the manufacturer’s factory.
Regulating access to inputs raises some of the same issues as regu-
lating access to the services provided by the network as a whole.  The
best way to price access to inputs is to consider the market price of
similar access.  If a market benchmark for access is not available, it is
necessary to resort to cost-based estimates of providing access to the
input.
It is misleading to assume, as does the FCC, that the cost to the
network of providing the use of an input is confined to the direct cost
of that input.49  The input is part of a network, and accordingly, an-
other company’s use of a network component necessarily has an im-
pact on the output of services using the network.  The network
element’s capacity to provide network services is correspondingly di-
minished, thus reducing the output of services by the network itself.
To take a simple example, a set of tires for an automobile may cost
only $400, but allowing another motorist to use the tires precludes the
owner from using the automobile.  The foregone value of the entire
automobile might then be $20,000.  In the same way, the cost of al-
lowing competing telecommunications companies access to unbun-
dled network elements depends not only on the direct cost of
providing that element, but also on the indirect cost of removing the
services of that element from the incumbent telephone company’s
network.  Accordingly, the cost of providing access to unbundled net-
work elements should be measured in terms of the reduction in over-
all network services that results from another company’s use of a
network element for another purpose.
47 Id.
48 Id. § 251(c)(6).
49 As will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article, the FCC issued regulations
requiring that prices for the unbundled access to network elements be based on each
element’s Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC). See infra notes 409–15
and accompanying text.  This cost notion corresponds with the direct cost that a manufac-
turer would incur in providing another company with the usage of a piece of capital equip-
ment in the manufacturer’s factory.  It does not include any factors designed to capture
opportunity costs.
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The proper cost valuation of making an input available is the di-
rect cost of the input plus the reduction in the value of the output.
Thus, prices set at economic cost of an input must represent the sum
of the direct incremental cost of providing the input and the opportu-
nity costs associated with providing the input to a competitor.  The
analytical methodology for setting input access prices at these levels is
known as the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR),50 which
would set access prices according to the following formula:
access price = incumbent’s per-unit incremental cost of providing access + the
incumbent’s opportunity cost of providing the unbundled input.
Because another company’s use of network elements potentially
reduces the services that the network can provide, the correct price of
those network elements depends on what the company could have
obtained by selling network services.  Thus, the market price of net-
work services—the outputs of the network—should be used as the basis
for determining the value of access to the services of network compo-
nent—the inputs of the network.  In the absence of market prices for
network output, the opportunity cost calculation can be based on the
regulated rates for the incumbent firm’s output.
We acknowledge that allocating the retail markup among multi-
ple products using ECPR (or any other access pricing method) poses
conceptual and administrative problems.  For example, if a competi-
tor were to lease two or more network elements from an incumbent
LEC, it would be improper to include the entire retail markup in the
opportunity cost component for both elements, as this would in effect
allow the incumbent LEC to recover twice for the same markup.  The
retail markup could be divided among the various elements, but do-
ing so would require some method (probably based in cost account-
ing) for apportioning the markup to particular elements.  While this
problem is seen most clearly when the same competitor leases both
elements, the identical problem would arise if two different competi-
tors were to lease the same elements or even two different elements in
the same chain of production.  Although the allocation of foregone
retail margin to particular components is inevitably arbitrary, such
problems are endemic to any system of establishing prices for inputs.
Apportioning the foregone retail margin should not prove any more
50 The ECPR concept originally appeared in Robert D. Willig, The Theory of Network
Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 109 (Harry M. Trebing ed., 1979);
William J. Baumol, Some Subtle Pricing Issues in Railroad Regulation, 10 INT’L J. TRANSPORT
ECON. 341 (1983); and William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to
Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 178–89 (1994) (suggesting that local exchange carriers
be allowed to sell to their competitors necessary inputs at a price that reflects all costs,
including opportunity costs).  For further discussion, see SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39,
at 283–392.  For a model of competition with ECPR pricing, see Daniel F. Spulber & J.
Gregory Sidak, Network Access Pricing and Deregulation, 6 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 757 (1997).
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intractable than the apportionment of common costs that must occur
under any regulatory scheme that relies on compelled access.51  In any
event, the pricing of the element should at least cover its direct incre-
mental cost to avoid cross subsidization.
The market-determined Efficient Component Pricing Rule (M-
ECPR) adjusts the calculation of opportunity costs by using a bench-
mark market price (if one exists), rather than regulated rates, for the
incumbent firm’s output.  It is again likely that regulated rates for net-
work services will not correspond to the market price of competing
alternatives.  Thus, the M-ECPR provides a method of adjusting access
prices to reflect market prices of network services, thus promoting ef-
ficient allocation of network services as well as dynamic efficiency of
investment decisions.52
Any regulatory method that bases access prices solely on produc-
tion costs without taking market demand into account will likely lead
to allocative and dynamic inefficiency.  The cost of providing access is
not simply production cost, but also includes the value to the owner of
the best opportunity foregone.  Thus, access prices must include an
opportunity cost component, preferably based on market prices, to
reflect market demand for access.  Including opportunity costs in ac-
cess reflects the most fundamental economic principles.
4. Traditional, Cost-Based Approaches to Setting Rates in Regulated
Industries
Conventional economic theory suggests that access rates in net-
work industries promote economic efficiency only if they are based on
market prices.  If market-based pricing is unavailable, then the appro-
priate second-best solution is to base rates on the economic costs of
providing access, a concept that embraces both direct incremental
costs and opportunity costs.  The classic rate-making approach taken
by regulatory authorities, however, focuses solely on direct incremen-
tal costs and excludes opportunity costs.  Even regulatory authorities
who are willing in principle to regard opportunity costs in their rate-
making calculus in practice eliminate opportunity costs by positing
that they are zero.  The following discussion analyzes the flaws in both
of these approaches.
51 See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecommunications Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15852–53 ¶ 696 (1996) (“Local Competi-
tion Order”) (proposing two “reasonable” approaches to allocating common costs: use of a
fixed allocator and allocation of “only a relatively small share of common costs to certain
critical network elements . . . that are most difficult for entrants to replicate promptly”),
rev’d in relevant part sub nom. S. Co. v. FCC, 293 F.3d 1338, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2002).
52 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 307–33.
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a. Direct Cost
The overwhelming majority of  regulatory authorities have estab-
lished rates solely on the basis of direct costs.53  The dominant initial
position was the “fair value” principle associated with the landmark
decision in Smyth v. Ames,54 which required that rates be based on the
replacement cost of the assets used to provide the service.55  The
Court based its preference for replacement costs on the recognition
that if the regulated entity constituted a natural monopoly, by defini-
tion no external transactions would exist that could serve as the basis
for market-based pricing.56  At the same time, parties who obtained
service under a regulated rate always had the option of constructing a
substitute facility.  This meant that in the long run, replacement cost
would tend to reflect market demand.  Although in some circum-
stances technological and functional obsolescence could cause re-
placement cost to be a misleading reflection of market value, in the
absence of data based on actual transactions it remained a useful
proxy.57
The primary alternative to the replacement cost approach associ-
ated with Smyth v. Ames was the historical cost methodology associated
with Justice Brandeis’s separate opinion in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission.58  Although Justice Bran-
deis recognized that analyzing the comparable sales approach would
represent the most accurate methodology for determining the utility’s
value for rate-making purposes, he concluded that such prices were
impossible to determine, “since utilities, unlike merchandise or land,
are not commonly bought and sold in the market.”59  Brandeis further
noted that calculating value by capitalizing the utility’s earnings neces-
sarily embroiled regulatory authorities in a “vicious circle.”60  As the
Court later noted, “The heart of the matter is that rates cannot be
made to depend upon ‘fair value’ when the value of the going enter-
prise depends on earnings under whatever rates may be antici-
53 See infra notes 54–76 and accompanying text.
54 169 U.S. 466 (1898), overruled by Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
315 U.S. 575 (1942).
55 On its face, Smyth v. Ames appeared to offer a laundry list of considerations to guide
the rate-making determination. See id. at 546–57.  If placed in context, however, it is clear
that Smyth and its progeny firmly endorsed the replacement-cost approach to rate regula-
tion. See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over
Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 227–28 (1984).
56 See Smyth, 169 U.S. at 544–47.
57 See Siegel, supra note 55, at 221–22, 228–29, 231; supra notes 39–40 and accompany-
ing text.
58 262 U.S. 276, 292–94 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
59 Id. at 292 (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
60 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
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pated.”61  As a result, fair value becomes “the end product of the
process of rate-making not the starting point.”62
In the absence of some market-determined basis for setting rates,
Brandeis believed that rates necessarily must be based on some mea-
sure of cost.63  He recognized that replacement cost might well re-
present the best evidence of present value, as it constitutes a better
reflection of technological improvements.64  In the end, however,
pragmatic considerations led Brandeis to advocate relying on histori-
cal costs.  Determining replacement cost, he concluded, is an inher-
ently speculative endeavor.65  Basing value on replacement cost,
moreover, exposes both consumers and investors to the risks associ-
ated with fluctuations in market prices.66  By comparison, relying on
historic cost results in fewer subjective determinations of value.67
Brandeis’s argument quickly became one of the focal points in
the debate over rate-setting methodologies.68  The Supreme Court has
frequently invoked it to explain why various regulatory authorities
have decided not to use market-based pricing when setting rates.69
Eventually, however, the controversy between historical and replace-
ment cost ended in a somewhat inconclusive draw.  Rather than
resolving this dispute on its substantive merits, the Supreme Court ul-
timately invoked notions of administrative deference and judicial re-
straint to reject the belief that rates must be set in accordance with any
particular approach.  Thus, the Court resolved to uphold any rate de-
termination, regardless of methodology, so long as it fell within a
61 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944).
62 Id.; accord Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 482–84 (2002); Du-
quesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 n.5 (1989); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural
Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1942) (Black, J., concurring); St. Louis & O’Fallon Ry.
Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 504 & n.22, 505 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Jim
Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1556 (1999); Siegel, supra
note 55, at 246–47.
63 See Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 299–300.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 292–302; see also BREYER, supra note 29, at 38–39 (noting that “to deter-
mine the replacement cost of plant or equipment is too complex a task for an administra-
tive process”).
66 See Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 302–08.  To the extent that Brandeis’s opinion
evinces a strong desire to insulate both consumers and investors from the dislocation
caused by market fluctuations, it exhibits some strikingly anti-economic tendencies.  His
position is perhaps explained by the desire to promote classical-style democracy that per-
meates his jurisprudence. See L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The Decline of Devel-
opmental Property, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 596, 634–38 (1988).  A more cynical observer might
suggest that his interest in protecting investors from market fluctuations followed more
from his substantial holdings in commercial paper issued by utilities. See id. at 637–38.
67 See Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 308–10.
68 See Siegel, supra note 55, at 240 n.227.
69 See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 483 (2002); Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 & n.5, 309 (1989); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural
Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1992) (Black, J., concurring).
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fairly broad zone of reasonableness.70  These principles allowed the
Court to sustain a wide variety of rate-making methodologies based on
increasingly complicated versions of historical or replacement cost.71
Eventually, formal rate-making gave way to the imposition of price
caps, in which the maximum rates that utilities could charge in any
particular year did not depend on costs, but rather on the rates set the
previous year, reduced by a fixed percentage to reflect increases in
productivity.72  The rates charged for the initial year in the typical
price-cap scheme, however, were based on historical cost.73  There-
fore, although the utility could adjust prices below the cap, price-cap
methodologies did not cure the basic flaw of failing to reflect demand
considerations.
The unifying thread to these approaches was their commitment
to basing rates on direct cost (whether historical or replacement cost)
and their refusal to take opportunity cost or market-based influence
into account.74  Fortified by this background, regulators charged with
implementing access regimes have tended to follow the traditional
patterns and have based access rates solely on either historical or re-
placement cost.75  As the foregoing discussion reveals, however, regu-
latory approaches that base rates solely on direct costs suffer from a
fundamental conceptual flaw.  Because they fail to reflect the earning
potential of the regulated input, approaches based on direct cost,
70 As the Court noted in Hope Natural Gas, “[I]t is the result reached not the method
employed which is controlling.  It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which
counts. . . . The fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities
is not then important.”  Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 602
(1944) (citations omitted); accord Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 314–16; Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U.S. at 586. See generally Siegel, supra note 55, at 254–59 (describing a standard whereby
“[l]egislative decisions should stand . . . unless ‘so outrageous as to shock the common
sense of justice’”) (quoting Gerard C. Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts, 33
HARV. L. REV. 902, 1056 (1920)).  It should be noted that using reasonableness to evaluate
the sufficiency of compensation is itself somewhat circular. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Coun-
cil, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
71 See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 496–518, 523–25
(2002) (upholding replacement cost methodology as a matter of statutory construction,
but declining to address the overall reasonableness of rates on ripeness grounds); Du-
quesne, 488 U.S. at 310–12 (upholding rates based on modified historical-cost methodol-
ogy); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 761, 768–74 (1968) (upholding rates
based on composite cost data from an entire area rather than prevailing field prices); Hope
Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 596–98, 603–05 (upholding rates based on historical cost).
72 See, e.g., Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Report and
Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4 F.C.C.R. 2873 (1989).
73 Verizon, 535 U.S. at 486 (citing United States Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 188 F.3d 521, 524
(D.C. Cir. 1999) and Alfred E. Kahn et al., The Telecommunications Act at Three Years: An
Economic Evaluation of Its Implementation by the Federal Communications Commission, 11 INFO.
ECON. & POL’Y 319, 330–32 (1999)).
74 Verizon, 535 U.S. at 484 (citing ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION
40–41 (1988)).
75 See, e.g., infra notes 397–403, 496–99 and accompanying text.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 27  6-MAY-03 11:13
2003] ACCESS TO NETWORKS 911
whether historical or replacement, are incompatible with a century of
economic insight.76
The only conceivable justification for failing to base rates on mar-
ket prices is that the absence of comparable transactions rendered
such an attempt inherently circular.  Indeed, as the foregoing discus-
sion reveals, Justice Brandeis and the regulatory authorities and courts
that followed his lead relied on this reasoning to justify their advocacy
of cost-based approaches.77  What modern regulatory authorities have
failed to recognize is the manner in which the emergence of platform
competition and the shift from rate regulation to access regulation
have now made it possible to base rates on market benchmarks.  The
possibility of input substitution allows external markets for inputs to
exist even in the absence of external markets for final goods.  In addi-
tion, the raison d’être of access regulation is to foster competition in
final goods markets.  Any success in doing so will only serve to further
undercut the justification for refusing to base rates on market transac-
tions.  The shift from output to input regulation has also undermined
the previously proffered reasons for rejecting the income capitaliza-
tion approach.  When regulation focuses on the rate charged for an
input rather than for a final good, the regulated price becomes only
one of many factors that determines the good’s overall earning poten-
tial.  As long as the input remains only one component of the overall
good, the income capitalization approach is not tautological.  The de-
gree of circularity will be limited to the percentage of the total cost of
the final good represented by the regulated input.
Equally important is the manner in which technological change
has allowed competition among different network platforms to de-
velop.  The availability of substitute networks employing alternative
means of transmission has in turn created external markets that now
make it possible for regulatory authorities to base rates on prices
charged in actual market transactions.  In addition, the advent of facil-
ities-based competition in turn can lead to deregulation of the rates
charged for the final good, which will eliminate the circularity inher-
ent in the income capitalization approach.
In short, two fundamental changes are transforming the basic ap-
proach to regulating network industries: the development of platform
competition and the shift to access regulation.  These changes under-
cut the rationale underlying rate-making authorities’ decisions both to
76 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 305, 325 (1993) (citing marginalism’s impact on the debate over the use of historical
cost); Siegel, supra note 55, at 251–52 (noting that although some jurists used neoclassical
economics to attack the replacement cost methodology associated with Smyth v. Ames, the
critique ultimately proved too much by also undermining attempts to base rates on histori-
cal cost).
77 See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
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base rates on some measure of direct costs and to exclude from their
calculus components designed to reflect earning potential.  Together,
the development of platform competition and the shift to access regu-
lation have rendered continued adherence to that approach untena-
ble and mandate, as a matter of economic policy, that regulatory
authorities begin to base access rates on market prices.
b. Excess Capacity and Zero Opportunity Costs
Courts that have recognized the importance of ensuring that ac-
cess rates contain some measure of opportunity cost have begun to
employ a different gambit to justify basing access rates solely on direct
incremental costs—by positing that opportunity costs were zero.  In
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,78 for example, the State
of New York replaced a privately negotiated system, in which cable
companies who wished to lay cable television wires across a given
apartment building would pay the building owner a standard rate of
five percent of the revenue realized from that building, with a regula-
tory regime that accorded building owners a grand total of one dollar
in compensation.79  In a decision that was ultimately overturned by
the U.S. Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that
this nominal compensation represented a fair return to the building
owner, given that the equipment in question occupied “an area of the
building for which she does not claim to have any other use.”80  Ac-
cording to the court, then, the opportunity cost of occupying property
not currently employed for other purposes was, in effect, zero.  The
concurring opinion sounded a similar note when it offered that “if the
installation of a cable substantially interfere[d] with the owner’s pre-
sent or future use of the building, we must presume that the [State]
would award reasonable compensation for the taking pursuant to its
regulations.”81
The point is made even more dramatically in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Alabama Power Co. v. FCC,82 sustaining the compensa-
tion regime established under the Pole Attachments Act.  In that case,
the court acknowledged the importance of according the owners of
networks of utility poles the fair market value of access to their poles,
which included the pole owner’s opportunity costs.83  The court none-
78 458 U.S. 419 (1982).  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Loretto opinion is analyzed in de-
tail infra Part II.A.2.
79 See 458 U.S. at 423–25.
80 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 333 (N.Y. 1981),
rev’d, 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
81 Id. at 336 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
82 See 311 F.3d 1357, 1367–71 (11th Cir. 2002).  The Pole Attachments Act and the
Alabama Power decision are discussed in greater detail infra Part III.B.1.
83 See Ala. Power, 311 F.3d at 1368–69.
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theless sustained a regime that based rates solely on direct incremen-
tal costs on the ground that one person’s use of the network does not
necessarily preclude another person’s use.84  Thus, so long as excess
network capacity exists, the grant of a right of access does not fore-
close any opportunities to sell space to other interested firms.  The
court concluded, then, that the opportunity costs of allowing another
party to access the network was zero.  Therefore, the court held that
access rates need not include compensation for opportunity costs un-
less 1) the network was at full capacity, and 2) other parties sought
access, or the network owner had a higher-valued use for that
capacity.85
These opinions ignore certain aspects of networks’ infrastructure
investments that make excess capacity inevitable.  Capacity in network
industries is notoriously “lumpy” in that it can only be efficiently ad-
ded in large, discrete quantities.  In addition, if the needs of network
users are to be met, such capacity must necessarily be added before it
is actually needed, a problem that is particularly acute for carriers of
last resort who are obligated to provide service to anyone who requests
it.86  The tendency towards excess capacity is exacerbated further by
the manner in which excess capacity can enhance network reliability
and provide insurance against unforeseeable variability in demand.87
These qualities make excess capacity a feature that is endemic to all
networks.  In addition, these courts have fallen into the same trap as
computer system managers that have allowed additional users free use
of what, at the time, appeared to be excess capacity.  That is, this ap-
proach overlooks the fact that use of what appears to be excess capac-
ity imposes real costs by hastening the need for additional capacity.
The fact that the use of the facility does not consume the facility is of
no consequence.  As we have pointed out earlier,88 this is a quality
that is inherent in all physical networks and, to some extent, in capital
assets generally.
Finally, even assuming for the sake of argument that the costs
associated with allowing access to a building were zero, it does not
necessarily follow that nominal compensation is sufficient to make the
building owner whole.  Economic analysis indicates that the price
charged by the building owner would be determined in part by the
amount that other potential users of the same resources might be will-
84 See id. at 1370.
85 See id. at 1369–71.
86 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 119–27; William J. Baumol & J. Gregory
Sidak, The Pig in the Python: Is Lumpy Capacity Investment Used and Useful?, 23 ENERGY L.J. 383,
385–86 (2002).
87 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 126–27; Baumol & Sidak, supra note 86, at
386–89.
88 See supra Part I.A.
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ing to pay.  The price would also be determined by the value of that
access to the person purchasing it.89  In other words, the assumption
that networks with excess capacity face zero opportunity costs ignores
the fact that market value is determined in part by demand-side con-
siderations that are independent of any supply-side, cost-oriented con-
siderations.  The mere fact that access to the facility has value to the
party seeking access gives the facility’s owner both the incentive and
the ability to insist on receiving more than nominal compensation.
The facts of Loretto provide an apt illustration of these basic con-
cepts.  The value of the right to attach a cable wire to an apartment
building is not determined by the costs of constructing a half-inch
strip across the roof and down the face of an apartment building, as a
rate-making approach based on historical or replacement cost might
suggest.  In addition, the fact that attaching a cable television wire to a
building does not consume the building does not mean that the right
to attach has no real value absent proof that the building owner had
some other use for the same space.  Our analysis indicates instead that
the value of the right to attach the cable wire to an apartment build-
ing is determined by the value of the services that are provided
through those wires.  Indeed, it is no surprise that the pricing arrange-
ment negotiated among the parties—before the state began regulat-
ing such access—was based on a percentage of the value of the
services provided by the cable company.90
D. Demystifying Network Economics
Fundamental economic principles thus indicate that efficiency
would best be promoted if network access prices were based on the
market value of the relevant inputs.  If direct, market-based indicia are
not available, regulatory authorities should use a methodology such as
ECPR that includes the direct costs as well as the opportunity costs of
providing the input.  That said, some markets contain features that
can cause them to fail to produce outcomes that promote efficiency.
In particular, barriers to entry by new competitors may constitute a
cause of market failure, particularly if the incumbent is a monopolist.
The existence of barriers to entry can provide a monopoly incumbent
with the market power to distort prices away from efficient levels.
Some commentators have suggested that network industries possess
89 To use a concrete example, the fact that a summer home may be unoccupied dur-
ing the winter would arguably justify regarding the home as having excess capacity.  It does
not follow, however, that the government would be justified in forcing the owner to rent
the home to another person who wished to occupy it during the winter for only a nominal
fee.  The rent that normally would be charged would depend upon the number of other
possible renters as well as the amount that the owner could obtain by refusing to contract
at a particular price.
90 See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
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features, such as sunk costs, economies of scale and scope, and net-
work economic effects, that may deter entry in ways that can cause
market outcomes to deviate from efficient levels.91
The analysis that follows refutes those arguments.  As a prelimi-
nary matter, the standard discussions of entry barriers assume that
they are an exogenous feature of technology.92  In fact, companies
choose their technology, by carrying out research and development
and by choosing production methods and product features.  Because
many aspects of technology are endogenous, it is thus likely that com-
petitors will find their way around technological impediments to en-
try.93  Moreover, most of these features, which are not unique to
network industries, are easily taken into account by traditional price
mechanisms.  Because these network features do not serve to deter
entry, potential competition by new entrants will discipline established
firms and is likely to lead to competitive pricing and innovation.  Even
if entry barriers exist, multiple incumbents could compete with each
other, leading to competitive prices.
1. Economies of Scale and Scope
Economies of scale and scope exist in networks, but they do not
prevent markets from allocating the services that networks provide.
Economies of scale exist for a single-product firm if unit costs decline as
a function of output.94  For a multiple-product firm, economies of
scale mean that total production costs exceed the total of each output
multiplied by its marginal cost. Economies of scope exist if a company
achieves cost economies by producing goods in combination rather
than separately.
Networks certainly exhibit economies of scale.  Large-scale net-
works can employ advanced high-capacity switches.  Moreover, a firm
building and operating a large network benefits from economies of
scale because it can spread the overhead costs associated with con-
struction and maintenance over a larger set of activities.  Economies
of scale may also be present because of volume-surface relationships,
so that the volume of a conduit can be expanded with a less-than-
proportional increase in the surface.  Moreover, the unit costs of ca-
pacity in a transmission line decline because the necessary cost of con-
structing the conduit remains fixed regardless of the number of
transmission wires placed inside the conduit.  Therefore, telecom
91 See infra notes 96, 107–10, 115–26 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968).
93 See Daniel F. Spulber, Competition Policy in Telecommunications, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 477, 495–97 (Martin E. Cave et al. eds., 2002).
94 Much of the discussion in this section draws upon Spulber, supra note 93, and
Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Spulber, Deregulating].
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companies find that the incremental cost of installing additional fiber
capacity during initial installation is less than the actual unit cost of
installing fiber capacity.
Because networks can use common facilities to provide multiple
services, networks also contain economies of scope.  For example, the
same switch can provide multiple services such as call waiting and call
forwarding.  A network’s economies of scope can also derive from its
structure.  For example, if a network’s products are viewed as connec-
tions between pairs of network users, rather than operating a point-to-
point network, then traffic can be aggregated in trunk lines with
points reached by distribution or feeder lines.  By realizing economies
of scale in the trunk lines, the firm achieves economies of scope in the
production of multiple connections.
Economies of scale and scope exist in practically any industry.
For example, in the automobile industry, the unit cost of producing
an automobile is lower the more automobiles a manufacturer pro-
duces.  Producing only a few cars requires making them practically by
hand.  Producing many cars allows a manufacturer to develop a large
plant that benefits from automation as well as specialization and divi-
sion of labor, as recognized by Adam Smith.95  Economies of scope
also explain why an automobile manufacturer can save costs by pro-
ducing many types of cars—the company shares the common costs of
manufacturing, engineering, and management across multiple prod-
uct lines.
Contrary to the suggestions of some scholars,96 the presence of
cost economies in manufacturing does not prevent markets from allo-
cating goods and services that are produced with economies of scale.
Multiple producers can have economies of scale and scope and com-
pete with each other in supplying goods and services.  For example,
automobile manufacturers compete with each other to sell cars un-
hindered by the presence of cost economies in manufacturing.  There
is no a priori reason that markets for telecommunications services
should differ in any way.  Multiple networks can operate with econo-
mies of scale and scope and still compete to supply services to custom-
ers.  Market prices thus continue to be an accurate measure of value.
95 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 3–16 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776).
96 For the classic argument that economies of scale constitute barriers to entry, see
JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 53–113 (1956).  For an application of this
argument to local telephony, see Glenn A. Woroch, Local Network Competition, in HANDBOOK
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS, supra note 93, at 641, 693, 708 (arguing that “the
strong scale and scope economies inherent in production of network services, and the
huge sunk investments that are necessary for facilities-based supply” are barriers to entry
into local exchange telecommunications, but noting that technological change can also
help entrants).
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Sufficient scale relative to the size of the market results in a natu-
ral monopoly.97  A given industry is said to exhibit natural monopoly
characteristics if the cost function derived from the underlying tech-
nology is “subadditive,” that is, if a single firm can supply the entire
market at lower cost than could two or more firms.98  If the technol-
ogy of local telephone service were to exhibit natural monopoly char-
acteristics, then a single firm could construct and operate that
network at a lower cost than could two or more firms.  Multiproduct
cost functions are said to exhibit natural monopoly characteristics if
and only if the cost function derived from the underlying technology
is subadditive across products.  That is, cost functions exhibit natural
monopoly characteristics when the costs incurred by a single firm pro-
ducing the entire set of products are less than the costs that would
result if the same production were divided between two firms.
Whether existing telecommunications network technology falls within
this definition is a matter of controversy.99
97 Economies of scale can result from many different technological factors, such as
specialization of function and division of labor permitted by increased output.  Fixed costs,
which do not vary with output fluctuations, are a source of economies of scale that is partic-
ularly significant in the telecommunications industry and other industries that require net-
works, such as railroads, oil and natural gas distributors, and electricity and water service
providers. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 22.  For a network system, fixed costs are
the “costs of facilities such as transmission lines, which are not sensitive to the level of
transmission on the lines.” Id.  Economies of scale at a given output level are not necessary
for natural monopoly.  A natural monopoly can exist at an output level at which the cost
function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.  For further discussion, see DANIEL F.
SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 117–18 (1989).
98 The concept of natural monopoly is generally credited to John Stuart Mill, who
emphasized the problem of wasteful duplication of transmission facilities that can occur
with utility services. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 107 (George
Routledge & Sons 1900) (1848).
99 For statistical studies showing that telecommunications network costs are not
subadditive, see David S. Evans & James J. Heckman, A Test for Subadditivity of the Cost Func-
tion with an Application to the Bell System, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 615, 620 (1984) (showing that
AT&T’s costs were not subadditive); Richard T. Shin & John S. Ying, Unnatural Monopolies
in Local Telephone, 23 RAND J. ECON. 171, 181 (1992) (finding that the local exchange carri-
ers costs were not subadditive prior to the AT&T antitrust divestiture).  Estimating telecom-
munications network costs can be problematic for regulated companies because data are
obtained from regulatory accounting information.  Also, the data are often presented at an
aggregate level that is not suited to the evaluation of cost functions.  Paul L. Joskow &
Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Net-
work Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1260–61 (1999).  The estimation of cost functions
using standard econometric techniques is difficult at best, because an established legacy
system built up over decades is not likely to be optimized.  Engineering cost models that
make assumptions about system configurations need not describe the costs of existing sys-
tems.  Moreover, the notion of comparing the costs of two identical systems serving the
same geographic area is likely to be counterfactual.  For a review of the literature analyzing
whether costs in the cable television industry are subadditive, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Duo-
polistic Competition in Cable Television: Implications for Public Policy, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 71–75
(1990).
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The existence of a natural monopoly does not necessarily pre-
clude competitive entry, however.  For example, even if a particular
telecommunications technology were to exhibit natural monopoly
characteristics, providers could still achieve efficient retail prices if
they were required to compete through periodic auctions for the right
to serve the market.100  Moreover, proponents of “contestability” the-
ory have demonstrated that so long as entry and exit are easy, the
potential for new entry can drive prices towards competitive levels
even if the technology makes it most efficient for a single firm to serve
the entire market.101  Thus, even if the incumbent firm prices at cost,
there will still be situations in which it cannot set a price that sustains
its position against entry.
Moreover, natural monopoly technology need not impede com-
petition, because the technology of entrants can differ from that of
incumbents.  The standard textbook definition of natural monopoly,
which underlies most public policy discussions, presumes that incum-
bents and entrants have the same cost function and  the same underly-
ing technology.102  Under this theory, there is not enough room in
the market for more than one firm, and an entrant could add little to
productive capacity.103  It is unrealistic, however, to assume  that the
incumbent and the entrant will employ the same technology.104
Given the rapid pace of technological change in telecommunications,
an entrant can operate a network with a different configuration than
the incumbent’s.  For example, an incumbent might operate a tradi-
tional telecommunications network with twisted copper wire—a cen-
tury-old technology—while an entrant might offer wireless service.
Other transmission technologies including coaxial cable television sys-
tems, fiber-optic cable, various land-based wireless systems, and satel-
lite-based systems, have different cost and performance properties.
Transmission networks’ various functions, including telephony, mo-
bile communications, data transmission, and video, suggest that differ-
100 See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 56–57 (1968) (argu-
ing that, with enough bidders and absent collusion, periodic auctioning of monopoly
franchises can yield competitive pricing); Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regula-
tion in the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. 98, 110–13 (1972) (applying Demsetz’s
analysis to the cable television market and critiquing the emerging pattern of regulation);
Mark A. Zupan, The Efficacy of Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Television: Some
Systemic Evidence, 32 J.L. & ECON. 401 (1989). But see Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Build-
ing for Natural Monopolies—In General and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73, 90–91
(1976) (challenging Posner’s proposal).
101 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF IN-
DUSTRY STRUCTURE 6–7 (1982).
102 See, e.g., id. at 17 (defining natural monopoly as an industry in which all of the firms
have the same cost function).
103 See id. at 4–8.
104 See  Spulber, Deregulating, supra note 94, at 34–41.
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ent transmission technologies are suited to different uses.105  As a
result, entrants that offer specialized networks targeted to particular
applications are likely to utilize different technologies than the incum-
bent.  Moreover, the entrant can target specialized market segments
without duplicating the incumbent’s system.106  Competition from In-
ternet telephony, cable telephony, and wireless provides alternatives
to the traditional telephone system.  Thus, competitive markets for
network services can form, and market prices continue to be an accu-
rate measure of value.
2. Sunk Costs
The substantial sunk costs in establishing telecommunications
networks, particularly the traditional wireline network, do not prevent
markets from allocating network services or prevent market prices
from representing an accurate measure of value.  Sunk costs are pre-
sent in most industries, to an extent, and are generally accepted as
reasonable business risks with few implications on the performance of
market transactions.  For example, expenditures for research, devel-
opment, and marketing are generally regarded as sunk investments.
Moreover, most forms of manufacturing entail sunk costs in the form
of capital equipment, whether used for manufacturing automobiles or
extracting crude oil.  These costs in no way prevent market allocation
of the end products.  In other words, the method of manufacture does
not alter the ability of market transactions to allocate a good or ser-
vice.  The telecommunications industry works similarly, although it re-
quires nonrecoverable expenditures in plant and equipment—namely
wires and switches.
Commentators and judges often argue that sunk costs prevent
competition in telecommunications services and hence cause market
failure.107  In particular, sunk costs are an entry barrier if entrants
need to make irreversible investments in capacity while incumbents
have already incurred these costs.108  These commentators and judges
105 See id. at 47–49.
106 See Spulber, supra note 93, at 477; Spulber, Deregulating, supra note 94, at 47–49.
107 On the view that sunk costs constitute a barrier to entry, see BAUMOL ET AL., supra
note 101, at 291–92; William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Fixed Cost, Sunk Cost, Entry
Barriers and Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q.J. ECON. 405, 418–19 (1981); see also Victor P.
Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426, 432–36 (1976) (argu-
ing that sunk costs justify regulatory intervention).  For the argument that sunk costs create
a barrier to entry in the telecommunications industry, see United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673
F. Supp. 525, 538 (D.D.C. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Jerry A. Hausman, Competition in Long-Distance and Telecommunications Equipment Markets:
Effects of the MFJ, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 365, 367 (1995). But see David L.
Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Competition in the Long-Distance Market, in HANDBOOK OF TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS, supra note 93, at 509, 520–21 (criticizing Hausman’s
conclusions).
108 See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 546–47 (2002).
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argue that the incumbent need only price goods or services to recover
operating expenses and incremental capital expenditures, because it
has already overcome the irreversible investment costs of entry.109  An
entrant, in contrast, must anticipate earnings exceeding operating
costs, incremental investment, and the irreversible costs of establish-
ing its facilities before deciding to enter.110  Richard Posner points
out, however, that nonrecurring costs of entry are “irrelevant if there
are small firms in the market that can grow to be large firms.”111
Moreover, “there is grave doubt whether there are important non-
recurring costs of entry—barriers to entry in the true sense.”112  Pos-
ner further notes that the capital required for entry is not a barrier
because this cost should be comparable to that of firms already in the
market.113
Potential entrants into an industry have many ways to reduce the
risks associated with nonrecoverable expenditures, including con-
tracting with customers before making irreversible investments and
entering into joint ventures or mergers with incumbents.114  Further-
more, in competitive markets, duplication of investment often occurs.
The entry of excess or insufficient capacity can take place as a conse-
quence of uncertainty regarding costs, technology, or market de-
mand.  Temporary overcapacity is part of the competitive process and
certainly does not indicate the presence of market failure.  Indeed,
periods of excess capacity, often observed in a variety of industries,
demonstrate that sunk costs are unlikely to deter vigorous competi-
tion.  The same reasoning applies to the telecommunications indus-
try—in the absence of regulatory intervention that favors or penalizes
incumbents.
Technological change further mutes the impact of sunk costs on
entrants.  Entrants commit capital resources in those markets or mar-
ket segments in which they expect to earn competitive returns on
their investments.  The sunk costs involved in establishing a telecom-
munications system, given currently available technologies, are no dif-
ferent from irreversible investments in any other competitive market.
Concern over sunk costs in telecommunications may be due to the
substantial level of investment needed to establish a traditional tele-
communications network, in particular due to the ubiquity of the reg-
109 See, e.g., Baumol & Willig, supra note 107, at 418–19.  According to George Stigler,
barriers to entry are long-run costs that are imposed on entrants but not on incumbents.
STIGLER, supra note 92, at 67.
110 See Baumol & Willig, supra note 107, at 418–19.
111 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 92 (1976).
112 Id.
113 See id.
114 The following discussion is based on SPULBER, supra note 97, at 610–24, and
Spulber, Deregulating, supra note 94, at 46–49.
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ulated Bell System monopoly.  This is a quantitative difference but
hardly a qualitative one; entrants can invest smaller amounts to create
networks targeted at particular customers and specific services.
As in natural monopoly analysis, the argument that sunk costs are
a barrier to entry also depends in part on the similarity of the incum-
bent’s and entrant’s technology.  Yet, an entrant need not duplicate
the incumbent’s network.  An entrant with lower operating costs
could be assured of recovering at least the difference between the in-
cumbent’s operating costs and the entrant’s own operating costs,
which could well be sufficient to recover the costs of entry.  This sce-
nario is likely because technological change in telecommunications,
such as the application of microprocessors in switching, potentially
lowers the costs of operating networks.  By differentiating its offerings
through branding, customer service, and location, an entrant gains
incremental revenues to cover the costs of entry.  New technologies
offer enhanced performance, such as the mobility of wireless services
and the increased bandwidth of coaxial and fiber-optic systems, thus
allowing competition with established networks.
Technological change has even altered the need to sink costs into
a telecommunications network.  For example, wireless technologies
avoid customer-specific, irreversible investment for the “last mile” to
the customer’s location, because wireless transmission towers can be
relocated.  Thus, even if substantial sunk costs are required to
reproduce the incumbent’s wireline network, a wireless alternative
may be an effective competitor without the same sunk costs.  Accord-
ingly, sunk costs in telecommunications need not impede the market
allocation of telecommunications services.
3. Interconnection and Network Economic Effects
Although network compatibility and interconnection confer clear
benefits, these benefits do not prevent markets from allocating net-
work services so that market prices continue to be an accurate mea-
sure of value.  Network interconnection is necessary for a call placed
by a customer served by one network to reach a customer served by
another network.  Because the number of connections enhances the
value of a network, interconnection is in the interest of network
operators.
Network industries typically require an extensive set of intercon-
nections.  Local networks have access to most, if not all, long distance
and international networks.  Wireless services connect to both local
and long distance networks.  Customers can access the Internet
through local telecommunications networks, wireless systems, digital
subscriber lines (DSL), and broadband cable.  The Internet—itself a
network of networks—represents a vast number of interconnections.
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The terms of such interconnections are established through market
agreements and through regulated charges.  Given this set of inter-
connection agreements, access to the services of a network implicitly
entails access to the connections offered by the network.  Customers
may obtain some of these connections as part of the network service,
or they may pay for individual connections, just as retail telecommuni-
cations customers purchase local and long-distance services separately.
Accordingly, network interconnectivity enhances the ability of com-
petitive firms to provide network services, and does not conflict with
market pricing of these services.
At the same time, a growing number of scholars have raised the
concern that network owners may be able to use interconnection (or,
more accurately, the refusal to interconnect) as an anticompetitive
weapon.115  These concerns center on the fact that many networks de-
termine their value by the number of people connected to them.  The
classic example is the telephone system,116 because the more people
with whom one can communicate through a particular network, the
more valuable that network becomes.  Therefore, the value of network
access depends not only on the access price charged, but also on the
number of users with access to the network.  Economic literature re-
fers to this characteristic as a network economic effect.117
Some economists consider network economic effects to be a kind
of externality.118  Proponents of this view suggest that network users’
inability to capture all of the benefits generated by their usage repre-
115 See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Com-
patibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 436 (1985).  For an argument that network externalities
may justify regulation against monopolies in telecommunications, see WILLIAM H. MELODY,
BUILDING THE REGULATORY FOUNDATIONS FOR GROWTH IN NETWORK ECONOMIES 6 (World
Dialogue on Regulation for Network Economies, Discussion Paper No. 0201, 2002), at
http://regulateonline.org/pdf/wdr0201.pdf.
116 As one group of commentators has noted:
Telecommunications is a network industry with the characteristics of a club.
Both the cost of, and the value of, club membership depend on the num-
ber of subscribers.  Access to the network is the telecommunications
equivalent of club membership.  A new member of the club provides bene-
fits to existing members who can now call an additional subscriber.  This
means the private value of membership will differ from the social value.
The existence of such “network externalities” gives rise to a prima facie case
for subsidisation of new membership.
ROBERT ALBON ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS AND POLICY ISSUES 53 (Govt. of
Australia, Productivity Commission Staff Information Paper, 1997), at http://
www.pc.gov.au/ic/research/information/teleeco/teleeco.pdf.  The report continues:
“However, the consensus in the literature is that the network externality is no longer an
important issue for basic telecommunications services.” Id.
117 See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Eco-
nomic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998) (reviewing the economic literature).
118 See, e.g., Katz & Shapiro, supra note 115, at 424; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 96–100 [hereinaf-
ter Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition].
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sents a positive externality that will cause overall network utilization to
drop below efficient levels.119  These theorists also suggest that net-
work externalities can turn network access into a competitive weapon.
By refusing to interconnect with other networks, network owners can
force users to choose one network to the exclusion of others.  Forcing
users to commit to one network naturally leads users to flock to the
largest network, thus creating or reinforcing a monopoly position.120
The classic example of this phenomenon is the development of
the Bell System.  During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the
Bell Telephone Company was able to use its initial telephone patents
to establish a near monopoly over local telephone service.121  The ex-
piration of those initial patents in the 1890s allowed competition to
emerge that caused the Bell System’s market share to be cut in half.
The Bell System attempted to reassert its dominance by refusing to
interconnect with these upstarts.  This effort ultimately failed, because
the independent companies that comprised the other half of the in-
dustry were able to forestall any negative network economic effects by
allying with one another to form a network similar in size to the Bell
network.  The Bell System changed course and instead refused to al-
low independent phone companies access to certain patents that were
essential to providing improved long distance service.  Once it
reemerged as the dominant player, Bell was able to use its refusal to
interconnect to forestall the emergence of meaningful
competition.122
In addition, some scholars argue that network effects can ad-
versely affect technological adoption and product selection decisions.
In this view, network externalities can cause a different market failure,
known as technology lock-in, in which markets adhere to previous
technology commitments notwithstanding the arrival of new, more ef-
ficient network technologies.123  If users cannot capture all of the ben-
efits created by their adoption of new technology, they may refrain
from making a technological change, even when doing so would in-
crease total welfare.  The most commonly cited example of this phe-
119 See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 100.
120 See id. at 110–11.
121 See Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United
States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290, 291 (John E. Kowka, Jr. & Lawrence J.
White eds., 1989).
122 See id. at 291–92.
123 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 941–43 (1986); Katz &
Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 108; see also THOMAS C. SCHELLING,
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 92–96 (1978) (identifying the effects of what he calls
critical mass on many types of economic and social behavior); H. Leibenstein, Bandwagon,
Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumer’s Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 190–99 (1950)
(describing the effects of perception of other consumers’ desires in consumers’ behavior).
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nomenon is the persistence of the conventional typewriter and
keyboard layout (called QWERTY, after the arrangement of letters in
the upper left-hand corner), despite the emergence of the supposedly
more efficient Dvorak keyboard layout.124  Another example is the
emergence of VHS as the standard format for videocassettes, despite
the supposed technical superiority of the Beta format.125  These con-
siderations have led some to argue that compelled access is necessary
to ensure that the early leaders in any network technology, as well as
the owners of large networks, do not use their position to stifle tech-
nological innovation.126  They also lead  some commentators to ask
whether basing access rates on market prices would in fact promote
efficiency.
These arguments suggest that network industries may be uniquely
susceptible to market failures that may prevent the price mechanism
from playing its usual role in generating efficient outcomes.  If net-
work externalities prevent markets from functioning efficiently, then
it might follow that the market equilibrium price of network access
somehow is distorted as well.127
Although formal models developed by proponents of the network
externality view have demonstrated that such market failures are possi-
ble, we believe that claims of widespread market failure are exagger-
ated.  A critical review of the economic literature reveals that network
externality theories are subject to several conceptual limitations.  The-
oretical models simply demonstrate that a particular type of market
failure is possible.  Determining whether such a market failure is likely
depends upon a close empirical evaluation of whether the precondi-
tions underlying any particular theory actually exist.  To date, network
externality theorists have been unable to establish that any of the clas-
sic examples of supposed technology lock-in are either true or can
properly be regarded as cases of market failure.  Moreover, wide-
spread innovation, in a variety of industries casts serious doubt on the
lock-in story.  Technological change is certainly evident in telecommu-
nications.  Indeed, the existence of multiple competing platforms
strongly suggests that technologies in network industries are not
locked in, but rather easily superseded.  Finally,  proponents of the
network externality view must decide whether the cure is worse than
124 See, e.g., Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, AM. ECON. REV., May 1985,
at 332; JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 405 n.40 (1988); Farrell &
Saloner, supra note 123, at 941–42.
125 See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at 92,
92–93.
126 See Jerry A. Hausman et al., Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Resi-
dential Customers, AM. ECON. REV., May 2001, at 302, 306–07; Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence
Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48
UCLA L. REV. 925, 934–38, 940–42 (2001).
127 See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 98–100.
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the disease.  In other words, resolution of the regulatory question de-
pends not just on whether a market failure exists, but also on whether
government intervention is likely to do better than private ordering.
a. Network Economics as a Source of Market Failure
As noted above, theories that rely on the supposed presence of
network externalities to justify more intrusive regulation of network
industries suffer from several conceptual shortcomings.128  On closer
inspection, it becomes clear that the argument that network externali-
ties entrench incumbents and existing technologies is too simplistic.
As Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner point out, a consumer’s adoption
of a new technology is subject to two distinct and countervailing ef-
fects.  First, the decision to adopt a new technology enhances the
value of the new network for current users as well as future users of
the new network.  This effect might cause markets to become locked
into obsolete technologies, a phenomenon that Farrell and Saloner
refer to as “excess inertia.”129
At the same time, however, the adoption of a new technology may
reduce the number of people using the old technology, thereby re-
ducing its value.  In effect, adoption of the new technology tends to
strand the installed base in the old technology.  Individuals who adopt
a new technology thus do not fully internalize all of the costs created
by their actions.  This phenomenon may cause an individual to adopt
a new technology even if the societal costs outweigh the benefits, a
situation known as “excess momentum”130 or “insufficient friction.”131
It is thus theoretically possible that the presence of network economic
effects may prevent network providers from realizing all of the availa-
ble economies of scale and may accelerate the pace at which consum-
ers adopt new technologies.  Whether network externalities would in
fact cause market failure thus depends upon which of these two coun-
tervailing effects dominates.132
128 The discussion that follows is based in part on Yoo, supra note 11, at 278–82.
129 See Farrell & Saloner, supra note 123, at 941.
130 Id. at 942.
131 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J.
INDUS. ECON. 55, 73 (1992).
132 The literature refers to the type of network effects we are discussing as direct network
externalities, which are those generated “through a direct physical effect of the number of
purchasers on the quality of the product.”  Katz & Shapiro, supra note 115, at 424.  The
leading example is the number of subscribers attached to a telephone network. See id.
With indirect network externalities, in contrast, there is no direct connection.  Instead, the
value of a good is determined by the number of other people who purchase the same
good.  Commonly cited examples include the selection of a video cassette recorder (VCR)
format and the use of a particular type of software or operating system. See S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market Failure?, 17 RES. LAW &
ECON. 1, 3 (1995) [hereinafter Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure]; S.J. Liebowitz & Ste-
phen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at
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In addition, the economic literature underscores the importance
of examining in detail the structure of the relevant market before rely-
ing on network economic effects to justify regulatory intervention.
The market failures identified by the formal network economic mod-
els tend to depend on the assumption that the relevant markets are
either dominated by a single firm or highly concentrated.  The clear
implication from these models is that the presence of competition is
likely sufficient to mitigate any such problems.  In fact, the Bell Sys-
tem’s failed initial attempt to use network economic effects to forestall
competition133 suggests that the presence of a single competitor of
roughly the same size as the network owner may eliminate such mar-
ket failures.  As we will discuss in considerable detail,134 the markets
described in this Article are not likely concentrated enough to fall
within the ambit of these models.
The economic literature indicates that regulation of network ex-
ternalities is unnecessary, because private ordering can easily resolve
economic problems that may arise.  Any network externalities that
may exist in the examples upon which we are focusing will necessarily
occur within a physical network that can be owned.  Thus, although
individual users may not be in a position to capture all of the benefits
created by their demand for network services, the network owner will
almost certainly be in a position to do so.135  With a single network
owner, the problems associated with this type of externality can be
solved in the same manner as externality problems in other con-
texts—by placing property in the hands of a single owner and protect-
ing it with well-defined property rights.136  Benefits created by
network participation can thus be internalized and allocated through
the interaction between the network owner and network users.137
Relying on unitary ownership of a network to internalize any net-
work externalities that may exist does not necessarily mean that com-
133, 135 [hereinafter Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy]; see also Joseph Farrell &
Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70–71
(1985) (contrasting direct network externalities with market-mediated effects).  Note that
to the extent that key network elements receive some degree of patent, copyright, or trade-
mark protection, it is conceivable that the use of well-defined property rights may solve
some types of indirect network externalities. See Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra,
at 11.  Because all of the networks that form the focus of this Article are physical networks,
any network externalities that may exist with respect them are necessarily direct network
externalities.
133 See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
134 See infra Part III.A.2, B.2, C.2.
135 See  Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 10–14; Liebowitz &
Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 132, at 141–44.
136 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
137 See Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 10–14; Liebowitz & Mar-
golis, Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 132, at 137, 141–44.
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petition cannot emerge.  In many cases, a network need not occupy
the entire market in order to realize a sufficient proportion of the
available demand-side economies of scale.138  When this occurs, no
unexploited gains from trade regarding network size remain, and the
equilibrium solution is competition among multiple proprietary net-
works.  The point can be illustrated through the now classic problem
presented by overfishing of a lake.  Because individual anglers do not
internalize all of the costs of their actions, they lack sufficient incen-
tives to undertake efficient levels of conservation and investment.139
The solution is to internalize network externalities by vesting property
rights to the entire lake in a single owner.140  Moreover, unitary own-
ership will not necessarily eliminate competition in the fish market.
Because owners with unitary property rights over a particular lake will
not have control over all lakes, the various owners of different lakes
will continue to compete with one another.141  With networks, the
proper policy question becomes one of defining property rights in a
way that insures that networks achieve sufficient size to realize enough
of the available network economies.  This does not necessarily mean
that a single network will emerge, with government involvement re-
quired to ensure the network is the “right” one.142
138 See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT
70–71 (1994).
139 See id. at 74–76.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 See Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 132, at 140–42; see also
Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 14–15 (describing how the assump-
tions embodied in formal models of network externalities in effect assume away this prob-
lem by positing inexhaustible economies of scale).
Indirect network externalities pose a somewhat different problem, because the lack of
a direct physical connection among users means that policy makers cannot simply rely on
network ownership to internalize the relevant externalities.  To date, scholars have focused
on two facts: (1) indirect network externalities typically arise in markets that involve com-
plementary goods, and (2) proprietary control of a network can provide users with some
assurance that a ready supply of complementary goods will remain available. See Katz &
Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 101–04; James B. Speta, Handicapping the
Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON
REG. 39, 83 (2000).
Although true to an extent, these facts do not shed light on the more fundamental
analytical deficiencies underlying theories of market failure based on indirect network ex-
ternalities.  Specifically, indirect network externalities primarily affect inframarginal net-
work users.  Therefore, although charging higher prices to inframarginal users has
distributional consequences, it has no impact on efficiency, because equilibrium price and
quantity are determined solely by the decisions of the marginal network user. See Liebowitz
& Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 4–5; Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy,
supra note 132, at 136–37.  Furthermore, it is often difficult to distinguish an indirect net-
work externality from the results of a properly functioning market, because any drop in
prices may represent nothing more than technological change or the fact that the
purchases are occurring in a declining cost industry.  If so, the drop in price would simply
reflect movement along the cost curve rather than a deviation from the cost curve caused
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Even assuming that network externalities that tend to cause mo-
nopolistic dominance and technology lock-in actually exist, other fea-
tures of the market and the structure of consumers’ preferences
might mitigate, if not eliminate, these adverse effects.  For example,
after networks have captured a sufficient number of subscribers, the
marginal benefit from adding another subscriber is likely to be low,
reducing or eliminating network effects and mitigating any potential
externality.143  The market may also dislodge an existing network
technology as long as the additional value provided by the new tech-
nology exceeds the value of the network externalities supporting the
old technology.144  As Professors Kaplan and Ramseyer succinctly put
it, “an entrenched inefficient technology is potentially a twenty-dollar
bill lying on the sidewalk.”145
In addition, network externalities may be substantially mitigated
if user preferences are nonuniform.  As Professors Katz and Shapiro
have noted:
Consumer heterogeneity and product differentiation tend to limit
tipping and sustain multiple networks.  If the rival systems have dis-
tinct features sought by certain consumers, two or more systems may
be able to survive by catering to consumers who care more about
product attributes than network size.  Here, market equilibrium
with multiple incompatible products reflects the social value of
variety.146
by an externality. See Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 7–9; Liebowitz
& Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 132, at 138–39.  In such situations, there is no
efficiency loss to be abated.  Any remedies imposed in the name of compensating for a
network externality would thus be the cause of, rather than the solution to, market failure.
Even worse, the true source of the decline in cost may lie in one of the input markets
rather than the output market.  Positing that the problem is an indirect network external-
ity operating in the output market may thus prompt an incorrect policy response by focus-
ing attention away from the input markets that may be the true locus of whatever market
failure may exist. See Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 9–10.
143 See ALBON, supra note 116, at 53; BRIDGER M. MITCHELL & INGO VOGELSANG, TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS PRICING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 55 (1991); A. de Fontenay & J.T. Marshall
Lee, BC/Alberta Long Distance Calling, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE-
ORY AND APPLICATIONS 199, 208 (Léon Courville et al. eds. 1983); George Yarrow, Dealing
with Social Obligations in Telecoms, in REGULATING UTILITIES: A TIME FOR CHANGE? 67, 75 (S.
Sayer et al. eds., 1996).
144 See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 106 (observing that new,
incompatible standards may emerge despite the presence of network externalities if “con-
sumers . . . care more about product attributes than network size”); S.J. Liebowitz & Ste-
phen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1990) (noting that the “greater
the gap in performance between two standards . . . the more likely that a move to the
efficient standard will take place”), reprinted in FAMOUS FABLES OF ECONOMICS 90, 92
(Daniel F. Spulber ed., 2002), and in LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 138, at 19, 21–22.
145 Steven N. Kaplan & J. Mark Ramseyer, Those Japanese Firms with Their Disdain for
Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 405 (1996).
146 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 115, at 106 (citing Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner,
Standardization and Variety, 20 ECON. LETTERS 71, 71–74 (1986)); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen
E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
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The existence of large network users may further mitigate any
problems caused by network economic effects.  If a single user con-
trols a significant portion of the network, then that user would be able
to internalize more of the benefits of any technological changes,
which would help minimize any slippage caused by the existence of
the network externality.147  Furthermore, because large users can cap-
ture a disproportionate share of the benefits from the adoption of
new technology, they have a significant incentive to make the invest-
ments needed to begin the shift towards the new technology.148  In-
deed, formal models of such market structures indicate that “the
sponsor of a new technology earns greater profits than its entry con-
tributes to social welfare.  In other words, markets with network exter-
nalities in which new technologies are proprietary exhibit a bias
towards new technologies.”149  Far from being a bane, the existence of
large network players may be a blessing in disguise.
In addition, significant growth in market size can render network
externalities irrelevant.150  If a market is undergoing substantial
growth, market outcomes are determined by the commitments that
future users will make, not by the decisions of the users who have
already committed to a particular technology.151  In such cases, the
fact that a particular firm may currently dominate a market is of little
consequence.  Those who are concerned about lock-in should focus
on the future network, not the existing one.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the adoption of a new
technology carries significant costs.  The standardization associated
with established technology can create real benefits by facilitating
compatibility between complementary products.  These benefits
would be lost if a new technology were adopted.  Changes in technol-
ogy also impose significant transaction costs, because it can be costly
to produce new technological platforms and adapt existing network
infrastructure to incorporate innovations.152  Accordingly, some delay
283, 292 (1996) (“Where there are differences in preferences regarding alternative stan-
dards, coexistence of standards is a likely outcome.”).
147 See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 102–03.
148 See Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 11, 13.  The fear of
delays after committing to a network might make consumers reluctant to join proprietary
networks.  Katz and Shapiro describe a number of ways that a network owner can allay such
fears. See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 104–05, 107.
149 Katz & Shapiro, supra note  131, at 73.
150 See id. at 67, 73 (concluding that exponential market growth effectively prevents
excess inertia); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 146, at 292 (“Entrenched incumbents are
less entrenched when consumers react to new sales . . . .”).
151 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 146, at 312.
152 Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Future Structure of
the Computer Industry, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTI-
TRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 155, 200 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard
eds., 1999).
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in the introduction of new products may reflect efficiency, not market
failure.  Absent a compelling reason to believe that network externali-
ties are causing efficiency losses that the market cannot properly re-
dress, regulations designed to counteract network economic effects
cannot be justified.
b. The Empirical Support for Network Induced Market Failures
The fact that markets seem capable of resolving most of the sup-
posed market failures identified by network economics literature sug-
gests that any attempt to remedy these supposed problems should be
approached with considerable caution.  Indeed, it seems appropriate
to insist on empirical proof that such problems actually exist before
authorizing governmental action to redress them.  Proponents of net-
work externality theories have yet to offer any systematic empirical
support for their theories.  Instead, most of these theorists have opted
to invoke a handful of well-known anecdotes concerning supposed
technology lock-in.153
This lack of systematic evaluation has allowed proponents of net-
work externality theories to be maddeningly imprecise about what
constitutes lock-in.  Even the term—“lock-in”—is ambiguous in that
no technological standard is permanent and that over a long enough
time, all technological standards are subject to change.  Whether a
technology has become locked-in is thus largely a function of the pe-
riod of time deemed relevant for evaluating technological change.
Therefore, the concept of lock-in, as currently employed in the eco-
nomics literature, obscures any empirical attempt to verify its
existence.
Furthermore, close analysis of the historical record reveals that
none of the key examples that form the empirical basis for the net-
work externality theory can properly be considered market failures.
Specifically, the evidence suggests that the QWERTY keyboard does
not represent an obsolete technology locked into place by network
externalities.  On the contrary, it appears that the QWERTY keyboard
first emerged as the winner of a vibrant competition on the merits, in
which various keyboard designs were tested against one another in a
series of typing contests.154  In addition, the evidence demonstrating
the Dvorak keyboard’s superiority is riddled with conflicts of interest,
because Dvorak himself conducted all of the key studies, including
U.S. Navy tests that represent the primary support for these claims.
Modern ergonomic studies suggest that any technical difference be-
tween the QWERTY and the Dvorak keyboards is nominal.155
153 See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
154 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 144, at 17–21.
155 See id. at 8–15.
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The historical record also belies any suggestion that VHS’s emer-
gence as the prevailing standard for videocassettes represents the per-
severance of an obsolete technology.  Rather, the evidence suggests
that the competition between Beta and VHS turned on a design trade-
off, with Beta incorporating a smaller cassette in order to enhance
portability and VHS opting for a larger cassette in order to provide for
longer playing and recording times.156  VHS’s victory over Beta thus
seems to have resulted from consumers’ preference for videotapes ca-
pable of recording a two-hour movie on a single cassette, rather than
from a market failure that frustrated the efficient outcome.  In fact,
any suggestion that VHS’s victory was the result of inefficient lock-in
effects is contradicted by the fact that Beta was deployed first and was
the early leader in VCR technology.157  Thus, the outcome is more
properly regarded as an example of how markets can use differences
in product value and an expanding customer base to displace an ex-
isting technology rather than an example of lock-in.
Other anecdotal examples upon which network externality theo-
rists rely have faced similar criticism.158  Moreover, the many circum-
stances in which new technologies have displaced firmly entrenched
technologies further undercut network externality theory.  For exam-
ple, compact discs have displaced vinyl and cassette recordings, and
the digital video disc (DVD) format is in the process of displacing the
VHS format.  In short, the empirical record provides little reason to
believe that networks are so prone to market failure so as to justify
more intrusive regulation than in any other type of industry.  If any-
thing, the history of technological change suggests the contrary.
Therefore, regulators should exercise considerable caution in evaluat-
ing claims of market failures caused by network economic effects
when those claims are not backed by firm empirical support.
c. The Limits of Regulation as a Solution to Market Failure
Finally, even if the necessary empirical preconditions for network-
induced market failure were present, regulatory intervention would
not necessarily improve matters.  As noted earlier, government-im-
posed solutions often fall short of efficient outcomes, even when they
are implemented to correct a market failure.159  Not only can a regula-
tory access regime harm allocative efficiency if access prices are set at
inefficient levels, regulation can also harm dynamic efficiency by caus-
156 See LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 138, at 122–23, reprinted in FAMOUS FABLES OF
ECONOMICS, supra note 144, at 112–13.
157 See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 219–20 (1995).
158 See LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 138, at 127–32, reprinted in FAMOUS FABLES OF
ECONOMICS, supra note 144, at 116–21.
159 See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
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ing investment incentives to fall below efficient levels and by creating
de facto entry barriers.160  Thus, regulators confronting a market fail-
ure must ask themselves the logically subsidiary question whether gov-
ernment intervention is likely to improve matters or make them
worse.
Consider, for example, the particular regulatory decisions associ-
ated with any state-sponsored attempt to solve the problems of techno-
logical lock-in.  Such intervention would necessarily require the
government to replace clear winners in the technology marketplace
with what it believed to be the superior technology.161  Moreover, in
order to be effective, the government must intervene at an early stage
in the technology’s development, when making such determinations
is most difficult.162  Regulators typically would have to assess techno-
logical superiority on the basis of extremely thin information that in
most cases would be provided by parties with a direct interest in the
outcome of the regulatory process.163  In addition, decision makers
would have to insulate themselves from the types of systematic biases
traditionally associated with political decision making.164  Thus, even
supporters of network externality theories caution that government
intervention might well make the problem worse instead of better.165
In short, there is ample reason to be skeptical of claims that net-
work economic effects will cause widespread market failure in network
industries.  Not only are such claims problematic as a theoretical mat-
ter, but they also appear to be essentially devoid of any empirical sup-
port.  Thus, there appears to be little justification for the belief that
basing access rates on actual market transactions would lead to ineffi-
cient outcomes.  On the contrary, basic economic principles indicate
that market-based pricing represents the most appropriate way for
rate-making authorities to ensure that access rates are set at levels that
promote both allocative and dynamic efficiency.  Two fundamental
transformations—the emergence of platform competition and the
shift to access regulation—made direct, facilities-based competition
feasible.  As a result, the only plausible explanation for failing to im-
plement market-based access rates—that the absence of technological
160 See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.  Under rate regulation—the tradi-
tional governmental response to market failure—regulators explicitly prohibit competitors
from entering the market.  Although access regulation does not involve any de jure prohibi-
tion of market entry, it can forestall the emergence of facility-based competition to existing
networks by rescuing users from having to invest alternative capacity. See supra notes 28–29
and accompanying text.
161 See Bresnahan, supra note 152, at 200.
162 See id.
163 See id. at 200–01.
164 See id. at 201–03.
165 See id. at 200–03; Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 112–13.
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substitutes made market-based pricing impossible—has been drained
of its vitality.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE PRICING OF ACCESS
TO NETWORKS
Just as regulatory authorities have largely failed to recognize the
economic significance of both the emergence of platform competi-
tion and the shift from rate regulation to access regulation, they have
failed also to appreciate that these transformations compel a different
constitutional analysis.  Because rate regulation simply adjusts the
terms under which parties can contract, it represents the type of non-
possessory regulation traditionally subjected to a rather permissive
standard of review under the Takings Clause.166  This standard re-
quires only that the rate fall within a zone of reasonableness.167  Com-
pelling access to a physical network, in contrast, invariably requires
the network owner to permit third parties to locate equipment on its
property.  As such, access regulations are subject to the more restric-
tive standards associated with the Court’s physical takings jurispru-
dence.168  Unlike nonpossessory regulations, in which reductions in
the value of property are not necessarily compensable, physical tak-
ings necessarily command market-value compensation.169  Principles
of constitutional law thus reinforce the basic economic conclusion
that network access should be priced at market levels.
A. The Distinction Between Physical and Nonpossessory Takings
1. The Emergence of Nonpossessory Takings Doctrine
Initially, the Takings Clause was believed to protect only against
direct government appropriations of private property or invasions that
effectively divested the owner of possession as though the government
formally condemned the property.170  Government actions that
merely reduced property value did not qualify as a taking.171  The
166 See infra notes 242–44, 249 and accompanying text.
167 See infra notes 239–46 and accompanying text.
168 See infra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
169 See infra Part II.B.2.a.
170 See, e.g., Meyer v. City of Richmond, 172 U.S. 82, 99 (1898) (holding that the depri-
vation of street access to plaintiff’s property did not constitute a taking); Transp. Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642–43 (1878) (holding that city-built dam did not effect a taking,
even though it damaged plaintiff’s property and temporarily rendered the property worth-
less). See generally Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 325 n.21 (2002) (describing early Takings Clause jurisprudence); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (same).
171 See Transp. Co., 99 U.S. at 642 (noting that “acts done in the proper exercise of
governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their
consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking”); Legal Tender
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Court subsequently recognized two types of takings that can arise with-
out a physical occupation.  First, the Court acknowledged that a rate
regulation may effect a taking if the rate is set so low as to be confisca-
tory.172  Second, the Court recognized that the government may effect
a taking without physical occupation or appropriation if it “goes too
far” in limiting the owner’s use of his or her property.173
a. Confiscatory Rate-Making
Confiscatory rate-making doctrine is rooted in the notion that al-
though regulators may limit the prices that certain industries charge
for their services, “it is not to be inferred that this power of limitation
or regulation is itself without limit.  This power to regulate is not a
power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confisca-
tion.”174  As a result, the Court acknowledged that the Constitution
forbids rates that are set so low as to be confiscatory.175  Although ear-
lier Court opinions were unclear as to whether confiscatory rate-mak-
ing doctrine was based on takings or due process principles,176
subsequent decisions clarified that the doctrine stems from the Tak-
ings Clause.177
The methodology on which a particular rate is based does not
determine whether it is confiscatory.178  Instead, determining whether
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871) (holding that the Takings Clause “has never been
supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to
individuals” even if the government action “render[s] valuable property almost valueless”).
172 See, e.g., Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896)
(holding that, in determining the existence of a taking, a court must consider “whether the
rates prescribed . . . are . . . so unjust as to destroy the value of [the] property [and thus]
practically deprived the owner of property”).
173 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
174 R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886).
175 See, e.g., Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co., 164 U.S. at 597; see also Stone v. Wiscon-
sin, 94 U.S. 181, 184 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting) (stating that excessively low rates can
result in “practical confiscation”); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142 (1876) (Field, J., dis-
senting) (“If the legislature of a State . . . can determine, against the consent of the owner,
the . . . prices which the owner shall receive for [his private property’s] uses, it can deprive
him of the property as completely as by a special act for its confiscation or destruction).
176 See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. at 331 (concluding that confiscatory rate mak-
ing violated either the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause, without clarifying which
one applied).  Interestingly, the Court at times suggested that the prohibition of confisca-
tory rate making arose under the Equal Protection Clause. See Covington & Lexington Tpk.
Rd. Co., 164 U.S. at 592; St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 649, 658, 663 (1895); Reagan v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v.
Minnesota ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm’n, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890).
177 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888–1910, at
104 (1995).
178 As the Court recently indicated, “an otherwise reasonable rate is not subject to
constitutional attack by questioning the theoretical consistency of the method that pro-
duced it.  ‘It is not theory, but the impact of the rate order which counts.’”  Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314 (1989) (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944)).
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a particular rate falls within the zone of reasonableness involves a “bal-
ancing of the investor and the consumer interests.”179  Rates are con-
stitutional so long as they provide a return on equity that is sufficient
to cover operating expenses, allow for returns that are “commensu-
rate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corre-
sponding risks,” and are “sufficient to assure confidence in the
financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to
attract capital.”180  In so holding, the Court made clear that the mere
fact that a particular rate reduced the value of the utility’s property is
not by itself sufficient to render a rate confiscatory.  As the Court ac-
knowledged, “Rate-making is indeed but one species of price-fixing.
The fixing of prices, like other applications of the police power, may
reduce the value of the property which is being regulated.  But the
fact that the value is reduced does not mean that the regulation is
invalid.”181
Some Justices have emphasized that the Court’s confiscatory rate-
making jurisprudence occupied a sphere that was distinct and sepa-
rate from its physical takings jurisprudence.  For example, Justice
Brandeis recognized that the Court’s decisions regarding the determi-
nation of value in condemnation cases played no part in determining
value for rate-making purposes.182  Justice Black offered a similar ob-
servation in Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., stating
that “[i]n condemnation cases, the ‘value of property, generally speak-
ing, is determined by its productiveness—the profits which its use
brings to the owner.’”183  In addition, “when property is taken under
the power of eminent domain the owner is ‘entitled to the full money
equivalent of the property taken, and thereby to be put in as good
position pecuniarily as it would have occupied if its property had not
been taken.’”184  Those principles, Black pointed out, “have no place
in rate regulation.”185  All rate regulation necessarily reduces the value
179 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603; see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
180 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 (holding that rates are constitutional so long as
they “enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to
attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed”); accord Duquesne
Light, 488 U.S. at 312 (holding that rates are valid if they do not “jeopardize the financial
integrity of the compan[y], either by leaving [it] insufficient operating capital or by imped-
ing [its] ability to raise future capital” and if they are adequate “to compensate current
equity holders for the risk associated with their investments”).
181 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 601 (citation omitted); accord Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1942) (Black, J., concurring).
182 See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276,
310–11 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
183 315 U.S. at 603 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 328 (1893)).
184 Id. (Black, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262
U.S. 341, 343 (1923)).
185 Id. (Black, J., concurring).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 52  6-MAY-03 11:13
936 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:885
of the regulated property, but this fact does not “stay the hand of the
legislature or its administrative agency in making rate reductions.”186
b. Regulatory Takings
Regulatory takings are the second type of nonpossessory taking
recognized by the Supreme Court.  As Justice Holmes acknowledged
in his seminal opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,187 regulatory
takings necessarily involve a difficult balance of interests.  On the one
hand, the government must have wide latitude in regulating the use of
property, even if such regulation reduced the property’s value.188  In-
deed, “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values inci-
dent to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law.”189  On the other hand, the govern-
ment’s ability to impose limits on the use of property “must have its
limits” if the constitutional protection of property is to be meaning-
ful.190  Without some restriction on the government’s ability to qualify
the manner in which owners can use their property, “the natural ten-
dency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification more
and more until at last private property disappears.”191  Thus, “[t]he
general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a cer-
tain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing.”192  Although the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings
jurisprudence originally emerged in the context of land-use restric-
tions, the Court has since applied the analysis to any government-im-
posed nonpossessory restriction on property.193
In the landmark decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil,194 the Court squarely held what it had frequently noted in dicta in
186 Id. (Black, J., concurring).
187 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).  Although Pennsylvania Coal is generally regarded as the
seminal opinion on regulatory takings, see, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1014 (1992), it was not without its historical antecedents. See, e.g., Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410–11 (1915); Commonwealth v. Perry, 28 N.E. 1126, 1127 (Mass.
1891) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
188 260 U.S. at 413.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 415.
192 Id.  For more recent restatements of this rationale, see Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 325 n.21 (2002), and Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1014.
193 See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522–37 (1998) (plurality opinion) (retiree
benefits); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (interest on attorney
trust accounts); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 641–45 (1993) (pension plans); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 603–09 (1987)
(welfare payments); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004–19 (1984) (pesticide
formulas); United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982) (liens on real prop-
erty); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64–68 (1979) (eagle feathers).
194 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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other cases:195 a nonpossessory regulation may constitute a per se tak-
ing if it deprives the owner of “all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of land.”196  When a restriction reaches this level, it can no
longer be considered a regulation that “simply adjust[s] the benefits
and burdens of economic life,” but instead is more properly regarded
as “the equivalent of a physical appropriation.”197
A more difficult issue arises when a restriction that falls short of
eliminating all economically beneficial use nonetheless constitutes a
regulatory taking.  Holmes did not elaborate on the proper way to
balance the interests of property owners and the government, al-
though he did note that “this is a question of degree.”198  The Court
did not offer much additional guidance until 1978, when it issued its
opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.199  In
Penn Central, the Court recognized that, although determining
whether a particular governmental action constitutes a taking is an
“essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y],” it is possible to identify three
factors with particular significance.200  Specifically, the Court focused
on (1) “the economic impact of the regulation” on the property
owner, (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) “the character of the
governmental action.”201  The Court immediately thereafter empha-
sized that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interfer-
ence with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government than when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.”202
What is perhaps most striking about Penn Central is the suggestion
that physical and regulatory takings might be governed by the same
analysis.  The Court’s observation that a taking may “more readily” be
found when the regulation effects a physical invasion arguably implies
that a physical invasion of property is not by itself a taking.  Instead, it
is simply one consideration that can be overcome by countervailing
considerations.  The Court seemed to confirm this conclusion in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,203 in which the Court upheld a
California decision requiring that the owner of a shopping center per-
195 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295–96 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
196 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
197 Id. at 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted).
198 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
199 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
200 Id. at 124.
201 Id.
202 Id. (citation omitted).
203 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 54  6-MAY-03 11:13
938 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:885
mit a group of high school students to engage in political speech on
his premises.  In holding that this requirement did not violate the
Takings Clause, the Court stated that the students’ physical invasion
of the shopping center “cannot be viewed as determinative.”204  Many
noted scholars have downplayed the importance of this language and
argued that PruneYard can be explained largely on First Amendment
grounds.205  Nevertheless, a number of lower courts following
PruneYard held that the Penn Central factors govern takings that effect
physical invasions as well as nonpossessory restrictions on the use of
property.206
The Supreme Court soon removed any remaining doubts about
the issue.  In the first of two leading cases on the proper takings analy-
sis applied to compelled access to communications networks, the
Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.207 firmly distin-
guished between its physical and regulatory takings jurisprudence.
2. Loretto and the Distinction Between Physical and Regulatory
Takings
The issue in Loretto concerned cable operators’ ability to string
coaxial cables on New York apartment buildings for the provision of
cable television services.208  Such cables served two distinct purposes.
First, they allowed cable operators to provide service to each build-
ing’s tenants.  Second, even if no tenant in a particular building sub-
scribed to cable, the cable operator often needed to string a
“crossover” line in order to service customers in adjacent buildings.209
In 1970, the previous owner of the plaintiff’s building allowed the lo-
cal cable operator to install a thirty-five-foot crossover line that was less
than one-half inch in diameter and which ran eighteen inches above
the building’s roof.  The operator also attached directional taps, mea-
suring four inches per side, on the front and rear of the roof and two
silver boxes, measuring 18 by 12 by 6 inches, along the roof cables.
When the building’s tenants subscribed to the service, the cable oper-
ator installed another cable running down the front of the building to
the first floor.210
204 Id. at 84.
205 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.5, at 600 (2d ed.
1988); cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 450–51 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Loretto rejected the takings rationale of
PruneYard).
206 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 331–34
(N.Y. 1981), rev’d, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
207 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
208 Id. at 422.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 422, 438 n.16.
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The cable operator originally compensated building owners for
such access by paying them a standard rate of five percent of the gross
revenues realized from the particular property owned.211  In 1973,
however, the State of New York enacted a statute requiring that land-
lords permit cable operators to install equipment on their property
and providing that a state agency would set the rate of compensa-
tion.212  The agency eventually set the compensation at a one-time
rate of one dollar.213  The plaintiff, owner of a Manhattan apartment
building, challenged the statute on the ground that it violated the
Takings Clause.214  The New York Court of Appeals, consistent with
the suggestion of the language in Penn Central and PruneYard quoted
above, held that a government-authorized physical occupation is not
necessarily a taking.215
The Supreme Court responded with a ringing reaffirmation of
the distinction between physical and regulatory takings.  In particular,
the Court rejected the conclusion that the takings determination
should in all cases be governed by the ad hoc standards announced in
Penn Central.216  Instead, the Court held that any regulation that au-
thorizes a permanent physical occupation of property constitutes a
per se taking.  This proposition held regardless of whether the govern-
ment itself occupied the property or simply empowered a third party
to do so.217
The Court based its decision on three considerations.  First, the
Court looked to precedent, finding that that “when the ‘character of
the governmental action’ is a permanent physical occupation of prop-
erty, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the oc-
cupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important
public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the
owner.”218  Indeed, the Court indicated that it was the “historical” and
“traditional” rule to treat a permanent physical occupation as a per se
211 Id. at 423.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 423–24.
214 See id. at 423–24.
215 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 330–32 (N.Y.
1981), rev’d,  458 U.S. 419 (1982).
216 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432.
217 See id. at 432 n.9 (“A permanent physical occupation authorized by state law is a
taking without regard to whether the State, or instead a party authorized by the State, is the
occupant.”).
218 Id. at 434–35 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978) (citation omitted); see also id. at 427 (“When faced with a constitutional chal-
lenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found
a taking.”); id. at 427–34 (reviewing precedent).
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taking.219  In so holding, the Court explicitly limited or rejected lan-
guage in Penn Central and PruneYard that suggested otherwise.220
Second, the Court drew support for its conclusion from the gen-
eral policies underlying the existence of property rights.  Permanent
appropriation of property is “perhaps the most serious form of inva-
sion of an owner’s property interests.”221  In so reasoning, the Court
invoked the familiar metaphor of property as a bundle of rights en-
compassing three separate strands—the rights to possess, use, and dis-
pose of the property.222  Unlike regulatory takings, which affect only
the property-use strand, physical invasions “chop[ ] through the bun-
dle, taking a slice of every strand.”223  Specifically, physical occupa-
tions necessarily foreclose owners from either possessing or using the
occupied portion of property.224  Although the owner retains the the-
oretical right to dispose of the occupied space, the presence of equip-
ment attached to that space essentially “empt[ies] the right of any
value.”225  In addition, the Court concluded that these deprivations
are particularly severe when the government authorizes a stranger to
invade and occupy the owner’s property.226  As a result, the Court con-
cluded that a permanent physical occupation “is qualitatively more se-
vere than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that
imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no
control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion.”227
219 Id. at 435–36, 441.
220 See id. at 432, 441.  The Court reasoned that nothing in Penn Central “repudiate[s]
the rule that a permanent physical occupation is a government action of such a unique
character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily
examine.” Id. at 432.  The Court emphasized that the “permanence and absolute exclusiv-
ity” of the physical occupation at issue in Loretto “distinguish[ed] it from [the] temporary
limitations on the right to exclude” at issue in PruneYard. Id. at 435 n.12.  The Court also
distinguished PruneYard on the grounds that the invasion in that case was “temporary and
limited in nature” and that “the owner had not exhibited an interest in excluding all per-
sons from his property.” Id. at 434.  Moreover, in PruneYard, “the owner had already
opened his property to the general public, and . . . permanent access was not required.”
Nolan v. Ca. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 n.1 (1987).  For a recent analysis of
PruneYard, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v.
Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 33–50 (1997).
221 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435; see id. at 441 (concluding that a permanent physical occupa-
tion is “qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property
regulation”).
222 See id. at 435.
223 Id.
224 See id. at 436.  The Court emphasized that physical invasions also deny an owner the
power to exclude others from his property, a power which “has traditionally been consid-
ered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.” Id. at 435.
225 Id. at 436.
226 Id. The Court classified such a regulation as “literally add[ing] insult to injury”
because it violates “an owner’s expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in
the possession of his property.” Id.
227 Id.
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Finally, the Court invoked practical considerations.  Treating per-
manent physical occupations as per se takings “avoids otherwise diffi-
cult line-drawing problems.”228  Unlike the ad hoc quality of the Penn
Central balancing test, determining the presence of a permanent phys-
ical occupation under Loretto poses fewer problems of proof.  For ex-
ample, “[t]he placement of a fixed structure on land or real property
is an obvious fact that will rarely be subject to dispute.”229  As a result,
when the government action is in the form of a permanent physical
occupation, that factor by itself becomes “determinative.”230  Al-
though the size and economic impact of the occupation are relevant
in ascertaining the amount of compensation,231 those considerations
play no role in determining whether a taking has occurred.232
The Court was careful to emphasize that its holding was not at
odds with the “substantial authority” upholding the state power to re-
strict an owner’s use of his property.233  Citing Penn Central, the Court
observed that “[s]o long as these regulations do not require the
[property owner] to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his
building by a third party, they will be analyzed under the multifactor
inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental
activity.”234
Loretto thus established two principles that play a central role in
our analysis.  First, the opinion articulated a strong rationale for sub-
jecting physical takings to the highest degree of protection under the
Takings Clause.  If a regulation requires a property owner to allow
third parties to install permanent equipment on his property, it consti-
tutes a per se taking, regardless of the size of the physical invasion or
the public purposes that the regulation advances.235  Second, Loretto
228 Id.
229 Id. at 437; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (noting that
in those cases in which a physical taking is involved, “the fact and extent of the taking are
known.”).
230 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
231 See id. at 437.
232 See id. at 434–35, 436–38.  Addressing the cable company’s argument regarding the
small size of the equipment it installed, Justice Marshall quipped, “whether the installation
is a taking does not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a
breadbox.” Id. at 438 n.16.
233 See id. at 440, 441 (“[O]ur holding today in no way alters the analysis governing the
State’s power to require landlords to comply with building codes and to provide utility
connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the like in the common
area of a building.”).
234 Id. at 440 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
The reference to Penn Central indicates that the Court was referring to traditional regula-
tory takings doctrine.
235 It bears emphasizing that this Article advances a far narrower argument than the
one advanced in SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 229–32, which claimed that Loretto
required compensation for any deviation from investment-backed expectations resulting
from a change in regulatory systems and that a third party’s introduction of a data stream
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reasserted the sharp distinction between the Court’s physical and reg-
ulatory takings jurisprudence.  When a physical taking is involved, reg-
ulatory takings precedent does not apply.
3. Florida Power and the Distinction Between Physical Takings and
Confiscatory Rate-Making
The Supreme Court advanced similar themes in FCC v. Florida
Power Corp.,236 the other leading case involving a takings challenge to
regulation compelling access to a communications network.  As noted
in Loretto, the distribution of cable television depended on the opera-
tor’s ability to establish a web of coaxial cables connecting individual
households.237  Although in urban areas this could be accomplished
by compelling building owners to allow cable operators to string cable
across their properties,238 in suburban and rural areas, the network of
utility poles owned by telephone and electric companies was the only
feasible means of establishing the necessary infrastructure.239  Con-
gress was concerned, however, that utility companies were exploiting
their monopoly position by overcharging cable operators for the right
to attach coaxial cables to existing utility poles.  As a result, in 1978
Congress enacted the Pole Attachments Act240 authorizing the FCC to
regulate the terms and conditions of pole attachment agreements in
any state that did not already impose such regulation.241
Nothing in the original version of the Pole Attachments Act gave
“cable companies any right to occupy space on utility poles, or pro-
hibit[ed] utility companies from refusing to enter into attachment
agreements with cable operators.”242  Instead, the Act simply regu-
lated the rents charged by those parties who voluntarily chose to enter
into such agreements.  As a result the Court held that the Act did not
constitute the type of permanent physical occupation that Loretto held
to be a per se taking because it lacked the necessary “element of re-
quired acquiescence.”243  The Court found Loretto dispositive, con-
cluding that, “ ‘[s]o long as these regulations do not require the
constituted a physical occupation.  Instead, this Article limits itself to what is indisputably
Loretto’s core holding—that regulations authorizing the permanent placement of equip-
ment on another person’s property constitute a physical taking. See supra note 217 and
accompanying text.  Thus, even those who question the former interpretation of Loretto are
unlikely to find this Article’s interpretation controversial.
236 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
237 See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
238 Supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
239 See Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 247.
240 Pub. L. No. 95-234, 92 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2000)).
241 See Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 247–48.  Cable companies did not utilize the under-
ground rights of way owned by natural gas companies because “in most instances under-
ground installation of the necessary cables is impossible or impracticable.” Id. at 247.
242 Id. at 251.
243 Id. at 252.
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landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his building
by a third party, they will be analyzed under the multifactor inquiry
generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity.’”244
Having held that the Pole Attachments Act fell outside Loretto’s
per se rule governing physical takings, the Court evaluated whether
the Act nonetheless represented a nonpossessory taking.  Rather than
applying the Penn Central factors, as its quotation of Loretto suggested,
Florida Power held that the Takings Clause simply required that the set
rates not be confiscatory.245  The Court concluded that the pole at-
tachment rates established by the statute allowed for sufficient return
on investment to satisfy the requirements of its confiscatory rate-mak-
ing jurisprudence.246
Florida Power thus reinforced the same key principles underlying
the Court’s decision in Loretto.  First, although it did not address the
issue explicitly, the Court implied that had the Pole Attachments Act
compelled utilities to give cable television systems access to their
poles, the Act would have constituted a per se taking under Loretto.247
Second, Florida Power underscored the sharp distinction between the
Court’s physical takings and confiscatory ratemaking precedent.
Echoing the admonitions of Justices Brandeis and Black that physical
takings and confiscatory ratemaking occupy distinct jurisprudential
spheres,248 the Court established that its confiscatory rate-making pre-
cedent did not apply to cases involving physical takings.249
4. Implications
a. Towards a Possible Synthesis of Regulatory Takings and
Confiscatory Rate-Making Doctrine
Although courts and scholars typically treat regulatory takings
and confiscatory rate-making as conceptually distinct,250 the Court’s
opinions in Loretto and Florida Power suggest that both lines of prece-
dent may represent a single concept.  It is easy to conceptualize a re-
244 Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440
(1982)).  The Court further noted:
Appellees contend, in essence, that it is a taking under Loretto for a tenant
invited to lease at a rent of $7.15 to remain at the regulated rent of $1.79.
But it is the invitation, not the rent, that makes the difference.  The line
which separates these cases from Loretto is the unambiguous distinction be-
tween a commercial lessee and an interloper with a government license.
Id. at 252–53.
245 See id. at 253 (citing Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968); St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53 (1936)).
246 See id. at 253–54.
247 See id. at 251–52 n.6.
248 See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text.
249 See Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 251–52.
250 See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 213.
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striction on the amount that one can charge for access to a piece of
property as either a restriction on the property’s use or as a “public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to pro-
mote the common good.”251  Moreover, similar concerns appear to
animate both lines of precedent.  Each recognizes that almost every
government action necessarily affects the value of private property
and that imposing too stringent a leash on regulatory action conflicts
with the exigencies of modern governance.252  At the same time, both
recognize that excess power to regulate can constitute the power to
destroy.253  In addition, both employ almost identical methodologies
that emphasize the fact-specific nature of the claims254 and that focus
primarily on the restriction’s economic impact on the regulated en-
tity255 and investor expectations.256
Finally, some case law suggests that these two approaches may be
fungible.  For example, in Florida Power the Court invoked its regula-
tory takings jurisprudence when it suggested that unless a regulation
required that utilities permit cable companies to occupy existing poles
permanently, it would be “‘analyzed under the multifactor inquiry
generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity.’”257  Im-
mediately following that observation, however, the Court held that in
the absence of such compulsion, the Pole Attachments Act was prop-
251 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
252 Compare, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law.”), with Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944) (“The fixing of prices . . . may reduce the
value of the property which is being regulated.  But the fact that the value is reduced does
not mean that the regulation is invalid.”).
253 Compare Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (noting that, without some limit on the govern-
ment’s ability to restrict owners’ use of their property, “the natural tendency of human
nature [would be] to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappears”), with R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886) (“[I]t is not to be inferred
that this power of limitation or regulation [of rates] is itself without limit.  This power to
regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation.”).
254 Compare Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (calling the regulatory takings standard an “es-
sentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]”), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 602 (observing that
determining whether a rate is confiscatory depends upon a series of fact-intensive inquiries
focusing on the rate’s net effect).
255 Compare Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (identifying “[t]he economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant” as a factor in the regulatory takings analysis), with Hope Natural
Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 (recognizing the importance of ensuring that the regulated entity
receives “enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of
the business”).
256 Compare Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (identifying “the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations” as a factor in the regulatory
takings analysis), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 (noting that investors have “a legiti-
mate concern with the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being
regulated”).
257 FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987) (quoting Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982)).
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erly analyzed under the Court’s confiscatory rate-making prece-
dent.258  The juxtaposition of these two observations indicates that the
Court may have viewed these two lines of precedent as simply varia-
tions on the same theme.
The Court’s reasoning in rent control cases gives rise to a similar
inference.  For example, the Court analyzed the rent control ordi-
nance at issue in Pennell v. City of San Jose259 in terms of the Court’s
confiscatory rate-making precedent.  In contrast, the Court analyzed
the rent control ordinance in Yee v. City of Escondido260 in terms of its
regulatory takings jurisprudence, stating that the rent control ordi-
nance at issue “merely regulate[s] petitioners’ use of their land by reg-
ulating the relationship between landlord and tenant.”261  Indeed, the
Court specifically equated rent ceilings imposed on landlords with
other use restrictions and declared that both types of restrictions were
properly analyzed under classic regulatory takings precedent such as
Pennsylvania Coal and Penn Central’s progeny.262  The parallel between
the two doctrines is further underscored by the Court’s opinion in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which described the strand of
regulatory takings doctrine used to invalidate regulations prohibiting
all economically beneficial land use as being directed against “confis-
catory” regulations.263
It is thus arguable that the Court’s regulatory takings and confis-
catory rate-making jurisprudence amount to slightly different aspects
of a single doctrine.  Unfortunately, the Court has never clearly ad-
dressed the relationship between these two lines of precedent, and
scholarly analysis has shed little light on the issue.264  In addition, it
would be anachronistic to suggest that the Court had a unified takings
jurisprudence in mind from the outset.  The Court’s confiscatory tak-
ings jurisprudence long antedates its recognition of regulatory takings
in Pennsylvania Coal, let alone its announcement of ad hoc factors in
Penn Central.  In fact, because states primarily  regulated rates and the
Takings Clause was not applied to the states until 1897,265 the earliest
258 See id. at 253–54.
259 485 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1988).
260 503 U.S. 519, 522–23 (1992).
261 Id. at 528; see also Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155–56 (1921) (Holmes, J.) (analo-
gizing rent control to restrictions on the use of property, such as limits on billboards and
building heights).
262 See Yee, 503 U.S. at 529.
263 505 U.S. 1003, 1029, 1032 n.18 (1992).
264 See John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits on Utility
Rate Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REV. 65, 98 (1985) (asserting, without analysis, that the Court’s
regulatory takings and confiscatory rate-making precedents are equivalent); see also Richard
Goldsmith, Utility Rates and “Takings”, 10 ENERGY L.J. 241, 256–62 (1989) (identifying simi-
larities in the Court’s regulatory takings and confiscatory rate-making precedents, but con-
cluding that confiscatory rate-making is based on due process considerations).
265 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
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confiscatory rate-making cases arose under the Due Process Clause,
rather than the Takings Clause.  The historical dichotomy is further
reinforced by the views of Justice Brewer, perhaps the primary archi-
tect of the Court’s early takings jurisprudence.  His famous speech at
Yale Law School on the subject clearly evinced his belief that rate reg-
ulation and use restrictions represent distinct lines of authority.266
b. The Paradigmatic Importance of the Shift to Access Regulation
Fortunately, we need not resolve the precise relationship between
regulatory takings and confiscatory rate-making in order to press our
argument.  Although the cases do not shed much light on whether
regulatory takings and confiscatory rate-making represent distinct
concepts or slightly different aspects of the same doctrine, for our
purposes it is sufficient that the Court has emphasized the importance
of distinguishing both categories from its physical takings jurispru-
dence.267  If a regulation authorizes a third party to establish a perma-
nent physical invasion, Loretto and Florida Power hold that it constitutes
a per se taking—regardless of any other factors typically invoked in
regulatory takings and confiscatory rate-making cases.
Equally important, the Court has frequently reiterated that its
physical and nonpossessory takings cases occupy separate doctrinal
spheres, and that its decisions involving nonpossessory takings have
no application to physical takings.  For example, the Court held in Yee
that a regulatory takings challenge was not fairly included in a physical
takings challenge, because “[c]onsideration of whether a regulatory
taking occurred would not assist in resolving whether a physical taking
occurred as well.”268  In so holding, the Court emphasized that both
questions “exist side by side, neither encompassing the other.”269  The
Court struck a similar note in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island270 when it recog-
nized that physical takings “present[ ] different considerations than
cases alleging a taking based on a burdensome regulation.”271
The Court reaffirmed these principles in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.272  The Court held that
whenever a physical taking occurs, the government has a categorical
duty to compensate the owner, regardless of the size of the occupa-
266 See D.J. Brewer, Protection to Private Property from Public Attack, 55 NEW ENGLANDER &
YALE REV. 97, 101–04 (1891), reprinted in 2 PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 41,
45–48 (James W. Ely, Jr. ed., 1997).
267 See supra notes 235–36, 248–49 and accompanying text.
268 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 537 (1992).
269 Id.
270 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
271 Id. at 628.
272 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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tion or whether the government only takes part of a larger parcel.273
Echoing its more extended discussion in Loretto, the Court found it
appropriate to treat physical takings categorically because “physical
appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and usually re-
present a greater affront to individual property rights.”274  As a result,
when determining whether a physical taking has occurred, the Court
does not evaluate the magnitude of the economic impact on the prop-
erty owner or inquire into the substantiality of the governmental inter-
est underlying the regulation; any physical invasion, no matter how
small, is sufficient to trigger the duty to compensate.275  Most impor-
tantly for our purposes, the Tahoe-Sierra Court emphasized that these
differences “make[ ] it inappropriate to treat cases involving physical
takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that
there has been a regulatory taking, and vice versa.”276 Tahoe-Sierra
thus reaffirmed the core substantive holding of Loretto by reiterating
that permanent physical occupations constitute per se takings without
regard to the economic impact or the public purpose served by the
invasion. Tahoe-Sierra also offered the Court’s plainest statement to
date that its regulatory takings decisions do not constitute precedent
in cases involving physical takings.
B. Physical Takings Jurisprudence Applied to Network Access
Determining whether a takings violation has occurred thus re-
quires resolution of two separate questions.  First, has the government
action in question effected a taking?  As the foregoing discussion un-
derscores, the resolution of this question varies depending on
whether the regulation at issue is alleged to be a physical taking.  Sec-
ond, has the government provided just compensation for its actions?
1. Determining Whether a Taking Has Occurred
In contrast to the analysis applied to both regulatory takings and
confiscatory rate-making, which attempt to balance the interests of the
public with those of the utility and which carefully examine the regu-
lation’s economic impact, physical takings are governed by a simple
bright-line rule.  As the Court held in Loretto and reaffirmed several
times since, government action is a per se taking if it authorizes a per-
manent physical occupation, such as giving third parties the right to
place telecommunications equipment on another person’s prop-
erty.277  This fact underscores the constitutional significance of the
273 Id. at 320–22.
274 Id. at 324.
275 Id. at 322.
276 Id. at 323 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
277 See supra Part II.A.2.
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shift from rate regulation to access regulation.  If a permanent physi-
cal occupation occurs, it does not matter whether the action furthers
an important public interest or achieves an important public bene-
fit.278  Nor does the size or economic impact of the invasion matter.279
Indeed, a permanent physical invasion constitutes a per se taking even
if it increases the value of the property.280  The Court reasoned:
[This] conclusion . . . [is] premised on our longstanding recogni-
tion that property is more than economic value; it also consists of
“the group of rights which the so-called owner exercises in his do-
minion of the physical thing,” such “as the right to possess, use and
dispose of it.”  While the [property] at issue here may have no eco-
nomically realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and dis-
position are nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the
property.281
As will be discussed below in greater detail,282 regulations that
compel access to wireline telecommunications networks also generally
require the placement of third-party equipment on the network
owner’s property.283  As a result, the shift from rate regulation to ac-
cess regulation generates an equally fundamental shift in the constitu-
278 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015,
1028 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 530 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
279 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831–32;
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436–37, 438 n.16.
280 See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 169–70 (1998); Loretto, 458 U.S. at
437–38 n.15.
281 Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
282 See infra notes 460–74, 579–91, 715–29 and accompanying text.
283 A more difficult question arises with regard to regulations that do not require a
network owner to allow others to place equipment on its property, but instead require the
network owner to extend its network onto another’s property so that this party may inter-
connect with the network.  As will be discussed later, courts generally regard such require-
ments as physical takings, even though they involve no physical invasion of the network
owner’s property. See infra notes 622–28 and accompanying text.
An even more difficult problem emerges with regard to regulations compelling access
to a wireless network.  In contrast to wireline communications, which depend on a physical
connection to the network, wireless networks do not necessarily require the network owner
to install third-party equipment on its property.  As a result, the D.C. Circuit recently re-
jected a takings challenge to an FCC order intended to ensure access to different forms of
television service. See Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n Int’l v. FCC, 254 F.3d 89, 99 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).  The order required property owners to allow residents to install antennas
needed to receive DBS service, broadcast signals, and other forms of television program-
ming. See id. at 91.  The court concluded that, because the regulation did not compel a
physical invasion of property by a third party, it did not constitute a per se taking under
Loretto. See id. at 99.
It appears, then, that the constitutional arguments for basing access rates on market
prices is weaker with respect to wireless networks than with respect to wireline networks.
The economic arguments, however, are the same in each case, as the harm effected by the
third party’s occupation of productive capacity is the same.  As a result, we would still urge
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tional analysis.  Finding that a taking has occurred, however, is only
the first step in the constitutional inquiry.
2. Determining Just Compensation
Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the constitu-
tionality of the regulation in question depends on whether the gov-
ernment provides just compensation for the property taken.  The
Loretto Court did not address the question of compensation, remand-
ing it for consideration by the state courts.284  In addition, most courts
confronted with this issue held that it was not ripe for judicial
consideration.285
a. Market Value as the Preferred Measure of Just Compensation
The Court often has averred that the guiding principle for deter-
mining just compensation is that the owner should be put “‘in as good
a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.’”286  As a
result, the Court established that the predominant measure of just
compensation should be “market value.”287  As Justice Frankfurter rea-
soned in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States:288
Most things . . . have a general demand which gives them a value
transferable from one owner to another.  As opposed to such per-
the FCC and state public utility commissions to base access rates on market prices as a
matter of policy.
284 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
285 See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 524–25 (2002); Gulf
Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 524 U.S. 327, 342 (2002); Gulf Power
Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999); Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d
753, 818 (8th Cir. 1997), rev’d & remanded in part on other grounds sub nom. AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 396 (1999); Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 911 F.2d 776, 780 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
286 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979) (“Lutheran Synod”)
(quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).  As Richard Epstein has noted,
“In principle, the ideal solution is to leave the individual owner in a position of indiffer-
ence between the taking by the government and the retention of the property.” RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 182, (1985).
For the earliest statements of this principle, see Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893), and Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299,
304 (1923).
287 See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (“Duncanville
Landfill”); Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Lutheran Synod, 441
U.S. at 511; Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474
(1973); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950); United
States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949); United States v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374
(1943); Olson, 292 U.S. at 255; United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 344
(1923).  Although the cases at times refer to this standard as “fair market value,” as the
Court noted in Miller, the two formulations essentially amount to the same thing.  317 U.S.
at 374.
288 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
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sonal and variant standards as value to the particular owner whose
property has been taken, this transferable value has an external va-
lidity which makes it a fair measure of [just compensation].289
The external validity identified by Justice Frankfurter has both a
theoretical and a practical basis.  As a theoretical matter, market value
reflects the seminal economic insights that effectively transformed
value from the intrinsic concept of a good to the result of market
transactions between buyers and sellers.  A good’s market value pro-
vides observable evidence—a market price—of the benefits to buyers
and the costs to sellers.  Market value thus sheds light on property
rights by considering the returns in transferring those rights.  In evalu-
ating the value of assets used in production, market value provides
tangible evidence of the property’s earning potential.  This shift was
evident in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,290 the first case
in which the Court addressed just compensation principles.  The
Court determined that the Takings Clause required not only compen-
sation for the tangible property taken—a lock and a dam—but also
for the tolls the facility would have earned by using that property.  The
Takings Clause required payment of “a full and perfect equivalent for
the property taken,”291  which, “generally speaking, is determined by
its productiveness,—the profits which its use brings to the owner.”292
“The value, therefore, is not determined by the mere cost of construc-
tion, but more by what the completed structure brings in the way of
earnings to its owner.”293  As a result, the income that the lock and the
dam would have earned was considered part of the property’s
value.294  The Court subsequently reaffirmed this principle on numer-
ous occasions.295
Practical considerations provide additional reasons for preferring
exchange-oriented approaches over cost-oriented approaches when
determining just compensation.  As the Court observed, the shift to
the market-value standard was driven in part by the “need for a clear,
easily administrable rule governing the measure of ‘just compensa-
tion.’”296  The use of external measures of value eliminated many of
the “serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth an individual
289 Id. at 5.
290 148 U.S. 312.
291 Id. at 326.
292 Id. at 328.
293 Id.
294 See id. at 329.
295 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (“‘For what is the
land but the profits thereof?’” (quoting 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES, ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. ed. 1812)
(alterations omitted))); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 9 (1949) (“The
market value of land as a business site tends to be as high as the reasonably probable
earnings of a business there situated would justify . . . .”).
296 Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.15 (1984).
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places on particular property at a given time.”297  Permitting such sub-
jective considerations to determine what constitutes just compensa-
tion “would enhance the risk of error and prejudice.”298
The Court has held that the market-value standard is not consti-
tutionally mandated and thus might not require strict adherence.299
Indeed, the Court has long recognized that market value fails to give
“full and literal force” to the principle of putting property owners in
as good a position as if their property had not been taken.300  In par-
ticular, the Court has frequently observed that just compensation does
not necessarily require compensation for the special value that a piece
of property may have for a particular user.301  Furthermore, the Court
does not allow recovery of any transaction costs imposed by the tak-
ing.302  As a result, the market-value standard has been criticized for
failing to make whole those whose property is taken.303
The Court has nonetheless concluded that the market-value stan-
dard offers an appropriate accommodation for the exigencies of mod-
ern governance.  In most cases market value “achieves a fair ‘balance
between the public’s need and the claimant’s loss,’”304 thereby medi-
ating “the conflict between the people’s interest in public projects and
the principle of indemnity to the landowner.”305  Although a failure to
consider subjective valuation can impose real costs on those whose
property is taken, this loss is “properly treated as part of the burden of
297 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (“Lutheran Synod”);
accord United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v.  Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943).
298 United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 36 (1984).
299 See id. at 30–31; Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 10 n.14; Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 512;
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); United States v. Toronto, Hamilton &
Buffalo Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949); United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949)
(cautioning against making a “fetish” of market value).
300 Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 511.  The Court also held that “[a]lthough the market
value standard is a useful and generally sufficient tool for ascertaining the compensation
required to make the owner whole . . . [it] does not necessarily compensate for all values
an owner may derive from his property.” Id.
301 See id. (citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374–75 (1943); Cors, 337 U.S. at
332).
302 See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377–78 (1946).
303 See, e.g., James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent
Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1300 (1985); cf. supra  Part I.C.2 (arguing that transaction
costs are real costs that should be taken into account when compensating network owners
for access to their inputs). See generally DeBow, supra note 36, at 579–80 & n.7 (noting the
systematic undercompensation of property, and collecting commentary); D. Michael Risin-
ger, Direct Damages: The Lost Key to Constitutional Just Compensation when Business Premises Are
Condemned, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 483, 526–40 (1985) (collecting commentary).
304 United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1984) (“Duncanville Landfill”)
(quoting Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 402).
305 United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943).
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common citizenship.”306  As a result, any exceptions to the market-
value rule remain very narrow.307
b. Determining Market Value Under the Takings Clause
Market value is the amount that would be paid for the property in
a transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller.308  Conse-
quently, market value takes into account any aspect of the property
that affects the price that a reasonable buyer is willing to pay.309  For
example, in Boom Co. v. Patterson, the Court held that in determining
the value of condemned land,
the same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property
between private parties.  The inquiry in such cases must be what is
the property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference
to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to
the uses to which it is plainly adapted . . . .310
The Court reiterated these principles in Olson v. United States.311  In
Olson, the Court noted that when determining the price upon which a
willing buyer and a willing seller would settle, “there should be taken
into account all considerations that fairly might be brought forward
and reasonably be given substantial weight in such bargaining.”312
The Court acknowledged the importance of opportunity cost by stat-
ing that
[t]he highest and most profitable use for which the property is
adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near
future is to be considered, not necessarily as the measure of value,
but to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use af-
fects the market value while the property is privately held.313
In addition, “to the extent that probable demand by prospective pur-
chasers or condemnors affects market value, it is to be taken into
account.”314
306 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
307 See DeBow, supra note 36, at 581; Lunney, supra note 36, at 729–31, 759–61; Ann E.
Gergen, Note, Why Fair Market Value Fails as Just Compensation, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 181, 195 (1993).
308 See Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); United States v.
564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (“Lutheran Synod”); United States v. Miller,
317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
309 See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474
(1973); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257–58 (1934); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98
U.S. 403, 407–08 (1878).
310 98 U.S. at 407–08.
311 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
312 Id. at 257; see id. at 255 (“Just compensation includes all elements of value that
inhere in the property . . . .”).
313 Id. at 255.
314 Id. at 256; accord Almota, 409 U.S. at 477–78 (valuing property based on every con-
sideration that would have applied had the property been sold in an open market); id. at
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Consistent with the economic principles identified above,315 the
Court has held that an evaluation of comparable sales represents the
most reliable way to determine the amount a willing buyer would have
agreed to pay a willing seller had the property been transferred on the
open market.  As the Court observed in Kimball Laundry, “If exchanges
of similar property have been frequent, the inference is strong that
the equivalent arrived at by the haggling of the market would proba-
bly have been offered and accepted, and it is thus that the ‘market
price’ becomes so important a standard of reference.”316
Other evaluation methodology may be required when the prop-
erty being valued is traded so infrequently that, in effect, no market
for it exists.317  In the absence of comparable sales, when valuing com-
mercial property the Court has sanctioned the income capitalization
approach, in which market value is equal to the net present value of
the property’s projected income.318  Although this approach has the
advantage of being based on data derived from actual market transac-
tions, the Court has recognized that it does carry some risks.  Esti-
mates of value based on income capitalization are only as reliable as
the data upon which they are based.  For example, projections of fu-
ture income are typically based upon a particular property’s past earn-
ings.  Although such data are often reliable indicators of future
earnings, at times they may fail to reflect the full range of technologi-
cal and economic developments.319
In addition, the Court has suggested that in the absence of better
measures of value, courts can appropriately consider replacement cost
when determining whether the government has provided just com-
pensation.320  As noted earlier, replacement cost is better than historic
cost at reflecting changes in value over time.321  Replacement cost also
479 (Powell, J., concurring) (giving weight to every value that would have applied in a
transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller).
315 See supra Part I.C.1.
316 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6 (1949).
317 See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (“Duncanville
Landfill”) ; Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.14 (1984); United States v.
564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 512 (1979) (“Lutheran Synod”); United States v. Com-
modities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950); Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 5; United
States v.  Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1948); United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
318 See Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 515 (noting that “the uses to which commercial
property is put can often be valued in terms of the capitalized earnings produced”); Kim-
ball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 16 (“One index of going-concern value offered by petitioner is the
record of its past earnings.”).  For an application of these principles in the telecommunica-
tions context, see Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 988 F.2d 1254, 1262–63 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
319 See, e.g., Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 398–403 (finding that develop-
ment of new ferry routes rendered earnings records of prior years’ routes unreliable in-
dicators of future income).
320 See Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 5–7.
321 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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provides a useful price ceiling, because all those who purchase access
can create the input themselves.322  At the same time, the Court’s tak-
ings decisions recognize that replacement-cost approaches to valua-
tion suffer from several conceptual limitations.  First and foremost,
such approaches do not necessarily reflect exchange value.323  In addi-
tion, by failing to incorporate any element that reflects demand, the
replacement-cost approach may fail to account for technological obso-
lescence and thus may require compensation even “when no one
would think of reproducing the property.”324  Moreover, in order to
compensate for functional obsolescence, courts must analyze the re-
placement cost of an equally efficient plant by allowing for physical
depreciation.  Failing to do so would bestow a windfall on the prop-
erty owner due to the difference in quality between the replacement
facility and the older facility.325  Factoring in depreciation does, how-
ever, add considerable uncertainty to the valuation process.326
The Court reserved its heaviest criticism for historical cost, the
valuation approach upon which authorities have relied most often
when regulating network industries.327  As the Court explained in
United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co.,328 historical
cost all too often represents a “false standard of the past” that bears no
necessary relationship with present value.329  As a result, historical cost
is often a backward-looking measure that is unreliable in determining
a current fair market value.330  Moreover, the Court in Olson pointed
out that market value
may be more or less than the owner’s investment.  He may have
acquired the property for less than its worth or he may have paid a
speculative and exorbitant price.  Its value may have changed sub-
stantially while held by him. . . . The public may not by any means
confiscate the benefits, or be required to bear the burden, of the
322 See supra Part I.C.2.
323 See 4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS’ THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01[1], at 12-
35 to -37 (3d ed. 1995).
324 Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 403.  For example, in Toronto, Hamilton &
Buffalo, the Court determined that replacement cost was misleading because the develop-
ment of rail lines and larger ferries had rendered ships of the type in question obsolete.
See id. at 399–400.
325 United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1984) (“Duncanville
Landfill”).
326 See id.
327 The Court’s criticism of historical-cost methodologies dates back to its earliest tak-
ings decisions.  See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 328
(1893) (“The value, therefore, is not determined by the mere cost of construction. . . .”).
328 338 U.S. 396 (1949).
329 Id. at 403 (citation omitted).
330 See id.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 71  6-MAY-03 11:13
2003] ACCESS TO NETWORKS 955
owner’s bargain. . . .  He must be made whole but is not entitled to
more.331
Because of the problems associated with these other methodolo-
gies, the Court has consistently indicated that the comparable-sales
approach represents the best evidence of market value.332  Indeed,
the Court has gone so far as to characterize other valuation methods,
including replacement cost, as exceptions to the comparable-sales ap-
proach, and to hold them inapplicable whenever there are market-
based transactions in similar properties.333  The Court offered its most
dramatic statement to this effect in United States v. New River Collieries
Co.,334 in which it held that “[w]here private property is taken for pub-
lic use, and there is a market price prevailing at the time and place of
the taking, that price is just compensation.”335  As a result, because
comparable sales data were available, the Court properly held inad-
missible income and replacement cost evidence.336  Only if such data
are unavailable should courts resort to other methods.  Furthermore,
if it is necessary to resort to other methods of determining market
value, courts should turn first to the income capitalization approach
and then to the replacement-cost approach before resorting to histori-
cal cost valuation.
Justice Brandeis used historical cost in evaluating takings chal-
lenges to conventional rate regulation.337  At no point, however, did
either Justice Brandeis or the Court suggest that cost-based methodol-
ogies are superior to the comparable-sales approach under the princi-
331 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (citation omitted); accord 4A NICHOLS’ THE LAW OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN, supra note 323, § 15.09[1], at 15-62 (noting that historical cost “is not a
conclusive test, because the money may have been improvidently expended, or by reason
of a change in conditions, parts of the works may have ceased to be of value, or the cost of
labor and materials may have increased or decreased”).
332 See 4 NICHOLS’ THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 323, § 12B.04[3], at 12B-23
(calling the comparable-sales approach “the preferred way to compute market value); De-
Bow, supra note 36, at 582 (stating that “it is widely understood that in practice the Su-
preme Court shows a strong preference for the comparable sales approach”); Lunney,
supra note 36, at 728 (noting that the Court “has preferred that a party establish market
value through the comparable sales approach”).
333 See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (“Duncanville Land-
fill”); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 512–13 (1979) (“Lutheran
Synod”); Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 402.  The Court has also suggested in dicta
that the market value standard may be set aside when its application “‘would result in
manifest injustice to owner or public.’” Duncanville Landfill, 469 U.S. at 29 (quoting
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)).  The Court has
never provided much guidance as to when this exception might arise, and has rejected
every attempt to invoke it. See id. at 30–36; Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 514–17.  The lan-
guage of these opinions and the Court’s failure to apply this exception strongly suggest
that it is extremely narrow, at best, and possibly even empty.
334 262 U.S. 341 (1923).
335 Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
336 See id.
337 See supra notes 58–70 and accompanying text.
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ples of economics and fairness embodied in the Takings Clause.
Instead, the Court made clear that it was sanctioning the cost-based
methodologies only because market-based methodologies were un-
available.338  Implicit in this argument is the recognition that the
emergence of market-based benchmarks would require a return to
market-based compensation principles.
The foregoing analysis underscores the constitutional signifi-
cance of both transformations that we have identified.  The funda-
mental shift from rate regulation to access regulation makes it far
easier for regulatory authorities to incorporate external reference
points that reflect the demand side of the valuation equation.  Be-
cause conventional rate regulations set prices that utilities can charge
for final outputs, any attempt to base regulated rates on final prices is
hopelessly circular.  Access regulation, in contrast, alleviates this prob-
lem by allowing market-based competition to determine the prices
utilities charge for final goods.  It is true that the access regulation
approach is somewhat circular as well.  For example, regulatory au-
thorities still must establish rates to govern the terms under which in-
cumbent firms must provide access to competitors, and the rates they
set will have some influence on the prices charged for final goods.
Network access nonetheless remains only one of several inputs re-
quired to produce the final good.  Therefore, if network access com-
prises only a small percentage of total cost, access rates will not be a
significant determinant of final goods prices.
The emergence of direct, facilities-based network competition
also is of considerable constitutional importance.  Indeed, the emer-
gence of direct competition undercuts the justifications for imposing
access regulation as a matter of principle.  But even setting aside the
question whether access represents good policy, the emergence of
substitute network technologies has profound implications for the im-
plementation of any access regime.  By facilitating the emergence of
alternative networks capable of providing market-based indicia of
competitive pricing, converging telecommunications technology is vi-
tiating the justification for setting rates according to cost-based meth-
odologies.  Once competition leads to market benchmarks, continued
reliance on cost-based methodologies will be improper, under
precedent.339
c. Partial Takings of Utility Property
The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence recognizes that gov-
ernment compensation should generally reflect the earning potential
338 See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276,
292–94 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
339 See supra notes 309–38 and accompanying text.
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of the property taken.  The government need not compensate for a
property’s going concern value when it takes the entire fee and divests
the current owner of title.340  As the Court explained in Kimball Laun-
dry, “the denial of compensation in such circumstances rests on a very
concrete justification: the going-concern value has not been taken.”341
In such circumstances, “only the physical property has been con-
demned, leaving the owner free to move his business to a new loca-
tion.”342  The Court further reasoned that “there is no more reason
for a taker to pay for the business’ going-concern value than there
would be for a purchaser to pay for it who had not secured from his
vendor a covenant to refrain from entering into competition with
him.”343
Nonetheless, the Court identified two circumstances in which
compensation for the going-concern value is appropriate.  The first
occurs when the government takes a public utility that possesses natu-
ral monopoly characteristics.344  “Since a utility cannot ordinarily be
operated profitably except as a monopoly, investment by the former
owner of the utility in duplicating the condemned faculties could have
no prospect of a profitable return.”345  In such cases, “[t]he owner
retains nothing of the going-concern value that it formerly pos-
sessed.”346  Therefore, because taking over a public utility “has the in-
evitable effect of depriving the owner of the going-concern value of
his business,” it is properly regarded as a taking for which compensa-
tion must be paid.347
The second situation arises when the government physically takes
less than the fee interest in the owner’s property.348  For example, the
Court in United States v. General Motors Corp.,349 noted that although
the government need not compensate for a property’s going-concern
value when it takes the full fee interest,350 “[i]t is altogether another
matter when the Government does not take [the owner’s] entire inter-
est, but by the form of its proceeding chops it into bits, of which it
takes only what it wants, however few or minute, and leaves [the
340 See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 11 (1949); United States
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945).  Going-concern value represents the prod-
uct of the “contribution to the earning capacity of the business of greater skill in manage-
ment and more effective solicitation of patronage than are commonly given to [a
particular] combination of land, plant, and equipment.” Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 9.
341 338 U.S. at 11.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 See id. at 12 (citing City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180 (1910)).
345 Id. at 12–13.
346 Id. at 13.
347 Id.
348 See id. at 14–16.
349 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
350 See id. at 379.
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owner] holding the remainder.”351  Because only part of the property
was taken, it was effectively impossible for the property owner simply
to reestablish its business elsewhere.  In such a case, the proper mea-
sure of compensation is not just the cost of the property taken, but
also the going-concern value of the property as reflected by rental fees
that could be obtained on the open market.352
These situations underscore the constitutional problems that
would result if network access rates were based solely on direct cost
and support rates that reflect the probable demand for network ser-
vices.  To the extent that compelled access to any particular portion of
a network is justified, it must be because that portion bears natural
monopoly characteristics.  Because it is infeasible for the network
owner to establish similar facilities elsewhere, the physical occupation
of its facilities requires that the owner be compensated for the going-
concern value of the property taken.  In this case, the value of the
property is reflected by the value of the network services provided.  In
addition, the partial nature of the physical taking effected by access
requirements provides yet another reason for requiring the govern-
ment to compensate network owners for lost profits.  Access necessa-
rily involves a physical taking that is considerably less than the full fee,
thus interrupting the owner’s use of the property and leaving it inex-
tricably intertwined with others’ use.  Because these encumbrances ef-
fectively prevent the owner from using the property for other
purposes, compensation for such a taking must reflect the property’s
going-concern value.
3. Implications
It is no doubt tempting for regulatory authorities and courts to
resolve takings challenges to network regulations according to the
same principles applied in conventional rate regulation cases.  Those
principles are based on balancing tests that regard constitutionally un-
problematic those regulations backed by strong public policy justifica-
tions and having minimal economic impact.  In addition, adherence
to preexisting approaches allows regulators to continue employing the
cost-based methodologies with which they are familiar.  Rate-making
authorities can thus maximize the leverage they have gained from reg-
ulatory tools developed in previous rate-making efforts.
Blind application of existing principles, however, ignores the con-
stitutional import of the shift from rate regulation to access regula-
tion.  As noted earlier, access regulation typically requires network
owners to permit permanent physical occupations of their prop-
351 Id. at 382.
352 See Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 7; Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 382.
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erty.353  Unlike rate regulation, access regulation effects a physical tak-
ing for which the government must pay compensation—without
regard to the magnitude of the invasion, its impact on investment-
backed expectations, or the importance of the policy interests fur-
thered by the regulation.  The Court has made clear that the regula-
tory takings and confiscatory rate-making precedents upon which
regulatory authorities have previously relied in rejecting takings chal-
lenges do not apply to cases involving a physical taking.354
The Court’s takings jurisprudence also makes clear that the best
measure of just compensation is market value, which is best deter-
mined through actual market transactions.355  Although at one point
the absence of external, market-determined benchmarks may have
justified reliance on cost-based valuation methodologies, the emer-
gence of platform competition and the shift from regulating outputs
to regulating inputs have made it increasingly possible for regulatory
authorities to determine value on the basis of actual market transac-
tions.  This shift implies that the theoretical and technological trans-
formation of regulated-industries law commands, in turn, a similar
transformation of the principles used to evaluate takings challenges to
access regulation of network industries.  Front-line policy makers—
those in charge of implementing access regulations—have largely ig-
nored these implications.356  Therefore, the obligation to enforce
these principles will fall to the courts as they begin to address the mer-
its of takings challenges to this type of regulation.
III
CURRENT POLICY APPLICATIONS
This Part applies the framework developed above to the three
most salient access-related policy issues of the day: (1) access to local
telephone networks, (2) access to networks of utility poles, and (3)
access to high-speed broadband networks.  This analysis shows how
the emergence of platform competition and the shift to access regula-
tion have made basing rates on market prices more feasible than ever
before.  Although we expect the level of competition in the relevant
markets—which include local telephony, multichannel video pro-
gramming distribution, and broadband services—to vary, the competi-
tion likely to emerge in each industry should be sufficiently robust to
justify basing rates on market prices.  We also demonstrate how access
to each of these networks necessarily requires a permanent physical
353 See supra Part II.A.2.
354 See supra notes 235, 249, 267–75 and accompanying text.
355 See supra notes 286–89 and accompanying text.
356 See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.1, III.C.1.
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invasion, which adds a constitutional dimension that reinforces the
economic analysis.
A. Access to Local Telephone Networks
Access to local telephone systems represented the keystone to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,357 which has been lauded as the
most sweeping reconceptualization of telecommunications policy
since the initial enactment of the Communications Act of 1934.358
This subpart provides an overview of the access requirements imposed
on local telephone networks.  It then analyzes the regulatory regime
in light of the economic and constitutional principles developed
above.  Both sets of principles compel the conclusion that the current
approach to setting access rates for local telephone networks is flawed
and should be replaced by an approach that better reflects market
pricing.
1. Regulatory Framework
In a typical narrowband network, customers connect to the tele-
phone network through a pair of copper wires known as the local
loop.  Local loops terminate at a circuit switch located in the LEC’s
central office, which receives calls in analog format.  The circuit
switch then routes the calls either to another local customer whose
loop is also connected to the same switch or to a designated intercon-
nection point, called a “point of presence” (POP), where it can trans-
fer the call to a long-distance carrier.  The typical local telephone
network thus performs two distinct functions.  First, it allows custom-
ers to place local calls to other customers in the same geographic area,
a function known as “local exchange services” (represented in Figure
1 by the connection between Customer Premises A and Customer
Premises B).359  Second, the network connects customers to long dis-
tance carriers by providing “exchange access services” (represented in
Figure 1 by the connection between Customer Premises A and the
POP maintained by the long distance carrier).
Policy makers initially regarded the entire telephone network as a
natural monopoly for two reasons.  First, the significant fixed costs as-
sociated with constructing the initial network of wires, switches, and
other equipment caused costs to decline across all relevant volumes.
357 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
358 Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615(b)
(2000).
359 If a local exchange area is particularly large, the LEC may employ more than one
central office switch connected together by high-speed trunk lines to serve a single calling
area.
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FIGURE 1: TYPICAL CONFIGURATION OF A BASIC LOCAL
TELEPHONE NETWORK
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Second, because any local telephone network’s value to a particular
user is determined in large part by the number of other users con-
nected to the same network, local telephone systems exhibit network
economic effects.360
Over time, policy makers realized that portions of the telephone
network could be competitive.  Usually at the prodding of the courts,
the FCC began to allow and then to encourage competition in various
portions of the overall telephone system, such as the markets for tele-
phone-related equipment361 and long-distance services.362  This initial
movement culminated in the breakup of AT&T,363 which was aimed at
preventing the Bell System from using its local telephone service mo-
nopoly to impede competition in the long-distance and equipment
markets.364  This decision, known as the Modified Final Judgment
(MFJ), did not refute the notion that local telephone service is a natu-
ral monopoly.365  Therefore, neither the FCC nor the courts at-
tempted to promote competition at the local level.
Over time, dramatic decreases in the cost of switching and trans-
mission technology led policy makers to question whether local tele-
phone service remained a natural monopoly.  The initial step in
360 See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
361 See, e.g., Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
(allowing continued use of privacy equipment attached to telephones); Use of the
Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424 (1968) (striking down a
tariff that effectively rendered a two-way radio phone extension uneconomical).
362 See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (re-
jecting the FCC’s refusal to allow MCI to establish a long-distance service to compete with
AT&T); MTS and WATS Market Structure, Report and Third Supplemental Notice of In-
quiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 81 F.C.C.2d 177, 202–04 (1980).
363 See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 222–25 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem.
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
364 See id.  For a complete discussion of the theories underlying the breakup of AT&T,
see Noll & Owen, supra note 121, at 295–326.
365 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 14171, 14173–74 ¶ 4
(1996).
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fostering competition in local telephony was the FCC’s Expanded Inter-
connection proceeding,366 which attempted to promote competition in
local telephone service by nurturing the development of a new cate-
gory of carriers known as Competitive Access Providers (CAPs).367
The increasing feasibility of competition in local telephony eventually
culminated with the enactment of the local competition provisions of
the 1996 Act.368
a. The Expanded Interconnection Proceeding
When they first emerged, CAPs focused on offering corporate
customers dedicated connections that allowed high-volume long dis-
tance customers to bypass the incumbent LEC’s facilities by transport-
ing calls directly from the customer’s premises to those of the long-
distance carrier’s POP.369  CAPs also began to offer partial bypass ser-
vices that covered either the segment running from the customer’s
location to the incumbent LEC’s central office (a service known as
“special access”) or the segment running from the central office to the
long-distance carrier’s POP (a service known as “switched transport”).
CAP services had many advantages over the services provided by
the incumbent LECs.  First, CAP networks tended to employ more
modern technology, such as fiber-optic rings, that allowed the net-
works to offer a greater range of features and a more attractive price
structure.370  Moreover, unlike with incumbent LECs, the FCC did not
require that CAPs provide uniform services according to published
tariffs.  As a result, CAPs were able to respond more quickly to market
demands and to tailor pricing and terms of service to each customer’s
particular needs.371  Lastly, the untariffed nature of CAP services al-
lowed them to avoid the cross subsidies embedded in the FCC’s sys-
tem of access charges.372
366 See Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Second Report
and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R. 7374 (1993) (“Switched
Transport Order”); Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Report
and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369 (1992) (“Special Access
Order”).
367 See infra Part III.A.1.a.
368 See infra Part III.A.1.b.
369 For a detailed description of regulations designed to encourage the development
of CAPs, see Alexander C. Larson & Douglas R. Mudd, Collocation and Telecommunications
Policy: A Fostering of Competition on the Merits?, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 274–84 (1992).
370 Specifically, fiber optics provided dramatic improvements in the amount of availa-
ble bandwidth.  They also decreased service costs in general and made them much less
distance-sensitive.  Finally, fiber optics allowed CAPs to take advantage of the efficiencies
made possible by computer processing, such as improved switching and digital compres-
sion. Id. at 275; David J. Teece, Telecommunications in Transition: Unbundling Reintegration,
and Competition, 1 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 47, 68 (1994-1995).
371 Larson & Mudd, supra note 369, at 274–75.
372 Teece, supra note 370, at 57.
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CAPs were also important for a far more fundamental reason.
The eventual expansion of CAP networks to cover the entire core bus-
iness districts of major metropolitan areas made it possible for CAPs
to offer local telephone service in direct competition with the incum-
bent LECs.373  The FCC recognized that in order for CAPs to compete
with the major LECs,374 they needed to interconnect with the LECs’
networks on the same terms and conditions that the LECs provided
for their own circuits.  As a result, the FCC gave CAPs the right to
install in LECs’ central offices any equipment necessary to terminate
calls.375  The FCC believed that this right, dubbed “physical colloca-
tion,” was necessary to ensure that the interconnection provided to
the CAPs was comparable to that used by LECs.  If the LECs’ central
offices lacked the physical space to accommodate physical collocation,
the LECs could instead provide “virtual collocation” which is the in-
stallation and maintenance of equipment on their property that al-
lowed the requesting carrier to interconnect with the LECs’ networks
through a location outside of the LECs’ central offices.376  Price caps
373 See id. at 66, 78 (describing CAP entry into local telephone service in New York,
Chicago, and Grand Rapids).
374 The FCC limited these expanded interconnection requirements to Tier I LECs,
which it defined as LECs with revenues of at least $100 million. See Expanded Interconnec-
tion with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Second Report and Order and Third Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R. 7374, 7376 ¶ 1 & n.1 (1993) (“Switched Transport Order”);
Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Report and Order and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369, 7372 n.1, 7398 ¶ 57  (1992) (“Special
Access Order”).
375 See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7391–92 ¶ 29; Special Access Order, 7
F.C.C.R. at 7389–90 ¶ 39, 7391 ¶ 42; see also Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1444
(“[T]he CAP strings its cable to the LEC central office.  The LEC must then turn over
space within the central office in which the CAP may install and operate its circuit termi-
nating equipment.”).  This requirement applied only to central office equipment needed
to terminate basic transmission facilities.  It did not cover equipment, such as enhanced
services or customer premises equipment, unrelated to the competitive provision of trans-
mission services. See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7412–13 ¶ 63; Special Access Or-
der, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7413–14 ¶ 93.  This was by no means the only obstacle hindering CAPs
from emerging as direct competitors of LECs.  The existing tariffs required customers
purchasing partial bypass services from the CAPs to pay for both the special access and the
switched transport segments, even though they used the CAP to bypass one of the legs.
This forced CAP customers to pay twice for the same service, rendering CAP pricing un-
economical.  In order to cure this problem, the FCC ordered Tier I LECs to unbundle
their special access and switched transport tariffs. See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at
7418 ¶ 75; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7424–25 ¶ 120.
376 See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7393–94 ¶ 31; Special Access Order, 7
F.C.C.R. at 7390–91 ¶ 41.  The FCC also approved virtual collocation if both parties agreed
that it was preferable to physical collocation or if state regulatory authorities determined
either that virtual collocation was preferable or that the LEC should decide which form to
allow. See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7393–95 ¶¶ 31–32; Special Access Order, 7
F.C.C.R. at 7390–91 ¶¶ 40–41.  The FCC set specific conditions on LECs’ provision of
virtual collocation in order to minimize technical differences between physical and virtual
collocation.  First, the FCC required LECs to permit interconnectors using virtual colloca-
tion to designate the type of equipment dedicated to their use, although the intercon-
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governed interconnection rates for both physical and virtual colloca-
tion.  As in other price-cap regimes, the initial rates were based on
historical cost.377  The FCC also rejected arguments that the physical
collocation requirement violated the Takings Clause on the ground
that physical takings doctrine was not applicable to public utility prop-
erty, which was governed exclusively by the framework applied to reg-
ulatory takings.378  Even assuming that physical collocation did
constitute a taking, the FCC argued in the alternative that the com-
pensation it provided was sufficient to render the requirement consti-
tutional.379  State regulatory authorities issued similar orders in order
to facilitate CAP entry into local telephone service.380
The D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s collocation rules in Bell
Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC on the ground that they exceeded the
FCC’s statutory authority.381  The court reasoned that granting CAPs
the right to place equipment in the LECs’ central offices represented
precisely the type of permanent physical occupation that constituted a
per se taking under Loretto.382  As a result, the physical collocation re-
quirement ran afoul of the principle that statutes should not be con-
strued to create “‘an identifiable class of cases in which application of
a statute will necessarily constitute a taking.’”383
The FCC responded to the Bell Atlantic decision by ceasing to
mandate physical collocation and by giving the LECs the option of
providing virtual collocation.384  The FCC continued to maintain that
mandatory physical collocation did not constitute a per se taking, but
argued that the virtual collocation option eliminated any potential
constitutional infirmity.385  Before the courts could address the valid-
nectors bore any additional costs associated with their choice of equipment.  In addition,
the FCC required LECs to install, maintain, and repair virtual collocation equipment as
regularly and with the same failure rates that applied to the LEC’s own equipment.  Finally,
LECs had to allow interconnectors to monitor and control the equipment remotely. See
Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7392 ¶ 30; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7392–94
¶¶ 44–46.
377 See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7419 ¶ 79; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at
7428–29 ¶ 127; Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259, 3267 ¶¶ 52–53 (1991).
378 See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7445 ¶ 144; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R.
at 7476–83 ¶¶ 230–40.
379 See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7475 ¶ 144; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R.
at 7482–83 ¶ 240.
380 See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7374–75 ¶ 7 & nn.10–12.
381 24 F.3d 1441, 1446–47 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
382 See id. at 1445–47.
383 Id. at 1445 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
128 n.5 (1985)).
384 See Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5154, 5163 ¶¶ 22–23 (1994).
385 Id.
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ity of these revised regulations, the entire scheme was rendered moot
by the collocation provisions of the 1996 Act.386
b. The Local Competition Provisions of the 1996 Act
The local competition provisions of the 1996 Act were designed
to “open[ ] all communications services to competition,” including
local telephone service, by eliminating local providers’ bottleneck
control over the elements needed to originate or terminate telephone
calls.387  Rather than regulating the retail prices charged for local tele-
phone service, the 1996 Act focuses on regulating the price at which
new entrants can obtain access to key elements of an incumbent
LEC’s network.  As such, it represents a prime example of the shift
from output regulation to input regulation taking place throughout
regulated industries.
Congress envisioned that competition in local telephone markets
might emerge through one of three paths.388  First, a new entrant
might obtain all of the necessary elements from the incumbent LEC
and resell them.389  Second, a new entrant might construct an entirely
new network.390  Because the inability to complete calls to the incum-
bent LEC’s customers would render a new network relatively unattrac-
tive, the Act requires that incumbent LECs allow any requesting
telecommunications carrier to interconnect with their networks “at
any technically feasible point.”391  The Act also requires that the inter-
connection be equal in quality to that which the incumbent LEC pro-
vides to itself or a subsidiary392 and that it be provided according to
“rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory.”393
Congress recognized, however, that not every facilities-based en-
trant could have its entire network in place when it began to offer
local service.394  Therefore, to allow competition to emerge before en-
trants had fully established their networks, Congress established a
third path for entering local telephone markets by requiring that in-
cumbent LECs provide other carriers with access to all of their net-
work elements on an unbundled basis.  The LECs must provide access
386 See Pac. Bell v. FCC, 81 F.3d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (table decision).
387 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. I, at 48–49, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 11–13.
388 See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15509 ¶ 12 (1996) (“Local Competi-
tion Order”); Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 491–92 (2002).
389 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(1), (c)(4) (2000).
390 Verizon, 535 U.S. at 491.
391 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B).
392 Id. § 251(c)(2)(C).
393 Id. § 251(c)(2)(D).
394 S. CONF. REP. NO. 104-230, at 148 (1996).
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“at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that
are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.”395
Typically, to interconnect and have access to unbundled network
elements, the requesting carrier must install some of its equipment on
the incumbent LEC’s property.  Thus, mandatory interconnection
presupposes that competitors will establish physical connections to
the incumbent LEC’s network.396  In addition, compelled access to el-
ements of the incumbent LEC’s network presupposes some ability to
combine those elements with the new entrant’s facilities.397  The local
loop, which more than any other network element has natural mo-
nopoly characteristics, is the element that a requesting carrier is most
likely to access in this manner.  A carrier who requests unbundled ac-
cess to the local loop must terminate that loop by connecting the loop
to its switching equipment.
As a result, the 1996 Act includes collocation requirements simi-
lar to those the FCC adopted in its Expanded Interconnection proceed-
ings.398  Specifically, the Act requires incumbent LECs to permit
“physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or
access to unbundled network elements.”399  When technical consider-
ations or space limitations render physical collocation impractical, in-
cumbent LECs need only provide virtual collocation.400
The 1996 Act requires that prices for interconnection and access
to unbundled network elements be determined through voluntary ne-
gotiations between the incumbent LEC and the requesting carrier, at
times aided by a state public utility commission’s mediation.401  If the
parties are unable to reach a voluntary agreement, the Act gives state
public utility commissions the authority to set rates through binding
arbitration, which would be governed by one of two statutory man-
dates.402  First, the arbitrators shall set rates for interconnection and
access to unbundled network elements that are “based on the cost . . .
395 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).  In determining which network elements are subject to the
unbundled access requirement, the statute requires that the FCC consider whether “access
to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary” and whether “the failure
to provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunica-
tions carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer. Id.
§ 251(d)(2)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).
396 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15514 ¶ 26 (1996) (“Local
Competition Order”) (defining interconnection as “the physical linking of two networks for
the mutual exchange of traffic”).
397 Id. at 15514–15.
398 See supra notes 375–79 and accompanying text.
399 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
400 See id.; see also supra notes 376, 384 and accompanying text (describing similar vir-
tual collocation provision with respect to CAPs).
401 47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1)–(2).
402 See id. § 252(b), (c)(2).
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of providing the interconnection or network element,” provided that
cost is “determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-
based proceeding.”403  Second, the Act requires that compensation
for traffic originating on the network of one LEC and terminating on
the network of another be governed by the principle of “reciprocal
compensation.”404  This requirement “provide[s] for the mutual and
reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated with the trans-
port and termination on each carrier’s network facilities of calls that
originate on the network facilities of the other carrier.”405  Such costs,
moreover, must be determined “on the basis of a reasonable approxi-
mation of the additional costs of terminating such calls.”406
c. Implementation of the 1996 Act
The FCC implemented the local competition provisions of the
1996 Act in a massive order issued just three months after the statute’s
enactment.407  The order dealt encyclically with a wide range of imple-
mentation-related issues, including the scope of the unbundling re-
quirements, which gave rise to the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.408  For our purposes, however, it is suffi-
403 Id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i).  The statute further requires that rates be “nondiscrimina-
tory,” id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(ii), and that they “may include a reasonable profit,” id.
§ 252(d)(1)(B).
404 See id. § 251(b)(5).
405 Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(i).
406 Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii).  The statute, however, specifically allows carriers to waive
mutual recovery in favor of other arrangements, such as bill-and-keep systems. Id.
§ 252(d)(2)(B)(i).
407 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”).
408 525 U.S. 366 (1999).  Initially, the FCC broadly defined the elements subject to
unbundled access without considering the availability of equally cost-effective inputs. See
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. . at 15642 ¶ 283, 15643 ¶ 285.  The FCC gave a similarly
broad interpretation to the equipment subject to physical collocation. See id. at 15628
¶ 250, 15794 ¶ 579.  The Supreme Court struck down the FCC’s interpretation of the
scope of the unbundled access requirements as an improper construction of the statutory
requirements that a network element be “necessary” before it is subject to unbundled ac-
cess and that withholding access to that element would “impair” the requesting carrier’s
ability to provide such service. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 387–92.  The D.C. Circuit
applied similar reasoning in striking down the FCC’s initial collocation orders. See GTE
Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 422–24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at
389–90).  On remand, the FCC reinterpreted the “necessary” and “impair” standards in a
way designed to give those terms substance, only to see those provisions struck down once
again. See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecommunications Act of
1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R.
3696, 3712 ¶ 22 (1999) (“UNE Remand Order”), remanded sub nom. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v.
FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 422–28 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 71 U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Mar. 24,
2003) (No. 02-858).  The FCC also revised its rules to limit collocation to equipment de-
signed primarily to provide the requesting carrier either with interconnection that is
“equal in quality” to that provided by the incumbent LEC for its own services, or with
“nondiscriminatory access” to an unbundled network element.  Deployment of Wireline
Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Fourth Report and Order, 16
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cient to focus on the FCC’s methodology for setting interconnection,
unbundled access, and physical collocation rates.
The FCC has implemented the provisions governing rates for in-
terconnection and access to unbundled network elements using a
methodology known as Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost
(TELRIC).  TELRIC bases rates on the element’s “economic costs,”
which the FCC defines as the sum of the incremental costs directly
attributable to the specified element and a reasonable allocation of
common costs.409  TELRIC’s most distinctive feature is that it assesses
both incremental and common costs on a forward-looking basis by
focusing on a network element’s replacement cost, rather than its his-
torical cost.410  The FCC believed that basing rates on forward-looking
incremental cost represents the best way to replicate the conditions of
a competitive market.411  TELRIC further accommodates technologi-
cal change by requiring that costs be determined “based on the use of
the most efficient . . . technology currently available and the lowest
cost network configuration, given the existing location of the incum-
bent LEC’s wire centers.”412  Finally, the FCC declined to incorporate
an element reflecting the opportunity cost to a network owner of pro-
viding competitors unbundled access to its network elements.413
Although the statutory mandate underlying TELRIC ostensibly
applies only to compensation for interconnection and access to un-
bundled network elements, the FCC determined that the same pric-
ing rules should govern compensation for physical collocation.414  In
F.C.C.R. 15435, 15452–60 ¶¶ 32–44 (2001) (“Collocation Remand Order”), aff’d sub nom. Ver-
izon Tel. Cos.  v. FCC, 292 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  The FCC subsequently adopted a
new construction of “impair” designed to address the concerns raised by the D.C. Circuit.
With respect to business customers, the FCC entered a presumption that local switching
would no longer be subject to UNE access.  State regulators would have ninety days to
rebut this presumption in particular cases.  With respect to mass market customers, the
FCC gave state regulators nine months to determine whether eliminating access to switch-
ing would impair competitors in particular markets.  News Release, FCC Adopts New Rules
for Network Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Phone Carriers, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-231344A1.pdf (Feb. 20, 2003).
The text of the order has not yet been released.
409 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(a) (2001).  TELRIC properly refers only to the first of these
two components.  For simplicity, however, this Article refers to both parts of the methodol-
ogy collectively as TELRIC.
410 Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15857–59 ¶¶ 704–707 (citing 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000)).  TELRIC avoids the problems caused by the distinction be-
tween fixed and variable costs by measuring incremental costs from a “long run” perspec-
tive, defined as a period long enough that all of a firm’s costs become variable or
avoidable. See id. at 15845 ¶ 677, 15851 ¶ 692.
411 See id. at 15846–47 ¶ 679.
412 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1).
413 See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15859 ¶ 709.
414 Id. at 15816 ¶ 629.  The FCC reasoned that physical collocation is simply a method
of obtaining interconnection and access to unbundled network elements and, as such,
should be priced in the same fashion. See id.
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addition, the FCC determines that TELRIC-based rates provide an ap-
propriate basis for reciprocal compensation.415  TELRIC thus governs
all of the important pricing aspects of the access regime created by the
1996 Act.
In so ruling, the FCC rejected arguments that TELRIC violates
the Takings Clause.  Whereas in its Expanded Interconnection proceed-
ings, the FCC argued that takings of public utility property are gov-
erned by the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence,416 it later ruled
that the guiding principle for determining whether such regulation
violates the Constitution is whether the rates are confiscatory.417  Al-
ternatively, even if physical collocation constitutes a physical taking,
the FCC found that its rate-making methodology satisfies the just-com-
pensation standard.  Although the government must pay the fair mar-
ket value of the property taken, it need not allow recovery of
monopoly rents.418  The FCC reaffirmed this reasoning in its Colloca-
tion Order and its Collocation Reconsideration Order.419
The Supreme Court upheld TELRIC as a matter of statutory con-
struction in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC.420  As several lower
415 47 C.F.R. § 51.705(a)(1) (requiring that reciprocal compensation be determined
on the basis of forward-looking economic costs pursuant to the methodology governing
pricing for interconnection and access to unbundled network elements); Local Competition
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 16025–26 ¶ 1058 (ruling that a reasonable allocation of common costs
represents an appropriate “additional cost” under the standard for reciprocal compensa-
tion).  The FCC allowed for two alternatives.  First, state public utility commissions could
adopt a proxy range set by the FCC (at 0.2 and 0.4 cents per minute for termination). See
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 16024 ¶ 1055, 16026–28 ¶¶ 1060–62.  The Eighth
Circuit struck down the use of proxy prices in Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 756–57
(8th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535
U.S. 467 (2002).  This portion of the Eighth Circuit’s decision does not appear to have
been challenged before the Supreme Court.  Second, state PUCs could instead impose
“bill and keep” arrangements so long as the traffic flowing in each direction is roughly
equal. Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 16024 ¶ 1055, 16054–58 ¶¶ 1111–18.  The
FCC recently sought comment on whether it should abandon TELRIC for reciprocal com-
pensation in favor of “bill and keep.”  Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation
Regime, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 9610, 9634–37 ¶¶ 69–77 (2001).
416 See supra notes 378, 384 and accompanying text.
417 See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15869–70 ¶ 733 (citing Duquesne Light
Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989)).
418 Id. at 15872 ¶ 740 (citing Lord Mfg. Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 748, 755–56
(Ct. Cl. 1949)); see also id. at 15811 ¶ 617, 15811 ¶ 818.
419 See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Ca-
pability and Implementation of the Local Competitions Provisions of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Order on Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 98–147 and Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
in CC Docket No. 96-98, 15 F.C.C.R. 17806, 17838–39 ¶ 68 (2000) (“Collocation Reconsidera-
tion Order”); Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Ca-
pability, First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761,
4778–79 ¶ 31 (1999) (“Collocation Order”).
420 535 U.S. 467 (2002).
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courts had done previously,421 the Court declined to reach the merits
of the underlying takings claim.  Instead, it explicitly adopted what its
previous decisions clearly implied—that takings challenges to rate-
making methodologies were generally inappropriate until the meth-
odology in question had been embodied in an actual rate order.  Al-
though the Court suggested that a rate-making methodology might
have sweeping implications that would justify addressing its constitu-
tionality on its face, the methodology before the Court did not call for
such an evaluation.422
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
As Part I demonstrated, the best way to promote economic effi-
ciency when compelling access to an input is to price the input at its
market value.  This pricing scheme promotes allocative efficiency by
providing the signals that firms need in order to calibrate the amount
of each input purchased and to ensure that they are employing the
optimal mix of possible inputs.423  Market-based pricing also promotes
dynamic efficiency by signaling to incumbents and new entrants the
need to invest in additional capacity.424  As Justice Breyer noted in his
separate opinion in Iowa Utilities Board:
[A] sharing requirement may diminish the original owner’s incen-
tive to keep up or to improve the property by depriving the owner
of the fruits of value-creating investment, research, or labor. . . .
[One cannot] guarantee that firms will undertake the investment
necessary to produce complex technological innovations knowing
that any competitive advantage deriving from those innovations will
be dissipated by the sharing requirement.  The more complex the
facilities, the more central their relation to the firm’s managerial
responsibilities, the more extensive the sharing demanded, the
more likely these costs will become serious.  And the more serious
they become, the more likely they will offset any economic or com-
petitive gain that a sharing requirement might otherwise provide.425
421 See Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 428–29 (5th Cir. 1999),
cert. granted sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 530 U.S. 1213, cert. dismissed, 531 U.S. 975
(2000); Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 818 (8th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other
grounds sub nom. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); US W. Communications,
Inc. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 968, 990 (D. Minn. 1999); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. AT&T Communications of Southwest, Inc., No. A–97-CA-132, 1998 WL
657717, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 1998).
422 Verizon, 535 U.S. at 522–25.
423 See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
424 See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
425 525 U.S. at 428–29 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted); accord Verizon, 535 U.S. at 551–52 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (noting that compelling incumbents to share the cost-reducing benefits of a success-
ful innovation destroys the incumbents’ incentives to innovate in the first place).
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In addition, “compulsory sharing can have significant administra-
tive and social costs inconsistent with the Act’s purposes.”426  If taken
to an extreme, “[r]ules that force firms to share every resource or ele-
ment of a business would create not competition, but pervasive regula-
tion, for the regulators, not the marketplace, would set the relevant
terms.”427
Thus, the best way to promote economic efficiency is to base ac-
cess rates on the price the input in question would command on the
open market.  Such prices are easy to determine when comparable
inputs are purchased in external markets.428  Although local tele-
phone service has long been regarded as a natural monopoly in which
direct competition is impossible, the emergence of platform competi-
tion provides a wide range of possible external markets that can serve
as bases for determining market value.  New entrants have followed
the lead of the CAPs and have constructed fiber optic networks that
offer increasing competition with the incumbent LECs’ networks.429
Because they are unlikely to be regarded as “incumbent local ex-
change carriers” under the 1996 Act, new fiber optic carriers are likely
to be exempt from Section 251(c)’s unbundled access, reasonable in-
terconnection, and collocation requirements.430  As a result, their
emergence promises to provide market-based benchmarks for pricing
each of those access requirements.  Actual prices charged will reflect
regulation rather than the interaction of supply and demand.431
In addition, providers of wireless telephone services have success-
fully emerged as direct competitors to the incumbent LECs.  The FCC
chose to deploy the first generation of wireless devices, comprised of
analog cellular telephony, by issuing only two licenses per city, with
one of those licenses automatically going to the incumbent LEC.432
As a result, wireless initially offered only modest improvements to the
competitive environment.  The arrival of second generation wireless
426 Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
427 Id. at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
428 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 275, 319, 321.
429 See Evan Ramstead & Kortney Stringer, Road Kill: In Race to Lay Fiber, Telecom Firms,
Wreak Havoc on City Streets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2001, at A1 (describing recent efforts to lay
fiber in Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Cincinnati, Dallas, Kansas City, San Antonio, Portland,
Richmond, and Washington, D.C.).
430 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)–(3), (6) (2000).
431 The one area in which these firms are unlikely to be able to provide a market-based
benchmark is the transport and termination of calls.  To the extent that fiber optic provid-
ers offer telecommunications services to the general public, they are likely to be consid-
ered “local exchange carriers” subject to § 251(b).  If so, compensation for the transport
and termination of calls by those providers will be governed by TELRIC by virtue of the
1996 Act’s reciprocal compensation provisions. See id. § 251(b)(5).
432 See Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825–845 MHz & 870–890 MHz for Cellular
Communications Systems, Report and Order, 86 F.C.C. 2d 469, 476–93 ¶¶ 15–47 (1981).
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devices, known as “Personal Communication Services” (PCS), diversi-
fied the market still further by significantly increasing the number of
licenses available for wireless telephony.433  As a result, eighty percent
of the U.S. population can choose from among five different wireless
providers.434  Once third generation wireless devices (“3G”) are fully
deployed, the wireless industry is likely to provide sufficient competi-
tion to drive market-prices towards efficient levels.
The wireless industry’s emergence is important because, unlike
fiber optic carriers, wireless telephone providers are not considered
“local exchange carriers” under the 1996 Act.435  As a result, unlike
fiber optic carriers,436 Section 251(c) does not govern the terms
under which they provide interconnection, unbundled access, or col-
location access to their networks, nor does Section 251(b) govern the
terms under which they transport and terminate calls.  Although Con-
gress has given the FCC the authority to regulate the terms under
which wireless carriers interconnect with each other, the FCC has de-
clined to do so.437  As a result, wireless carriers determine their terms
433 See Amendment of Commission’s Rules to Establish New Personal Communications
Services, Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700, 7732–33 ¶¶ 73–77 (1993); Thomas
W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas,
and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 335, 516–17 (2001).
434
Total Number of Pct. of U.S. Population
Providers in a County Contained in those Counties
3 or more 94.1%
4 or more 88.7%
5 or more 80.4%
6 or more 53.1%
7 or more 21.2%
Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993:
Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commer-
cial Mobile Services, Seventh Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 12985, 13095 app. C, tbl.5 (2002).
435 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15994–95 ¶ 1001, 15995–96
¶¶ 1004, 1006 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”).  Although wireless providers are under no
obligation to provide interconnection or access to their network elements, the FCC has
ruled that they are “telecommunications carriers” who are eligible to request interconnec-
tion and access to unbundled network elements from incumbent LECs. See id. at
15998–16000 ¶¶ 1012–13.
436 See supra note 431.
437 Interconnection & Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Ser-
vices, Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 13523, 13534 ¶ 28 (2000) (“CMRS Interconnec-
tion Order”).  This order culminated protracted regulatory proceedings dating back to
1993, when the FCC issued a notice requesting comment whether it should require wire-
less providers to provide interconnection to other wireless providers. See Implementation
of Sections 3(n) & 332 of Communications Act, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8
F.C.C.R. 7988, 8001–02 ¶ 71 (1993).  When the FCC issued the order resulting from this
notice, however, it declined to resolve the issue. See Implementation of Sections 3(n) &
332 of Communications Act, Second Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 1411, 1499–1500
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of interconnection through arms-length negotiations.  These terms
can thus provide the type of external benchmark needed to deter-
mine the market value of transport and call-termination services.  Ad-
mittedly, interconnection with wireless carriers is distinguishable from
interconnection with incumbent LECs.  For example, significant dif-
ferences in utilization rates complicate direct comparisons, as does
the emergence of wireless pricing schemes that fail to differentiate
between local and long distance service.  Furthermore, wireless carri-
ers often interconnect indirectly through the LECs.438  Nevertheless,
as wireless and other facilities-based competitors grow, the rates they
charge others for interconnection will emerge as a market-based refer-
ence point for use in resolving most pricing problems.  The number
of external benchmarks will only grow as local cable operators and
other broadband providers begin to offer local telephone service.
On a more fundamental level, the existence of platform competi-
tion raises serious questions about whether compelling access to local
telephone networks represents sound economic policy.  To the extent
that substitute networks are available, it is not clear that the incum-
bent LEC’s facilities act as a monopoly bottleneck.439  Even if com-
pelled access were necessary, however, the emergence of alternative
facilities capable of providing the same functions dramatically affects
the manner in which such access should be priced.  Simply put, com-
¶¶ 237–238 (1994).  Instead, the FCC opted to seek further comment on the issue in a
subsequent proceeding. See Equal Access & Interconnection Obligations Pertaining to
Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of In-
quiry, 9 F.C.C.R. 5408, 5458–69 ¶¶ 121-143 (1994).  In the interim, the FCC indicated that
it would “entertain any requests [for] interconnection on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 5458
n.213.  When these proceedings also matured into a formal decision, the FCC again post-
poned ruling on the issue on the grounds that, although requiring wireless-to-wireless in-
terconnection would appear to promote efficiency, such regulation was premature. See
Interconnection & Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services,
Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 10666, 10681–82 ¶¶ 28–29 (1995).
An association of equipment manufacturers brought suit to compel the FCC to act. See
Telecomms. Resellers Ass’n v. FCC, 141 F.3d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  Although the D.C.
Circuit expressed dismay over the fact that five years had lapsed while the FCC continued
to investigate the issue, the court nonetheless upheld the FCC’s decision to defer resolu-
tion of the issue. See id. at 1197.  The FCC did not issue a final resolution until the CMRS
Interconnection Order two years later.  15 F.C.C.R. at 13534 ¶ 28.  For a brief overview of the
early history of these somewhat protracted proceedings, see PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FED-
ERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 953–55 (2d ed. 1999).
438 CMRS Interconnection Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 13533–34 ¶¶ 26–27.  Historically, the
FCC further complicated such comparisons by awarding one of the two available first-gen-
eration cellular licenses to the incumbent LEC, which in turn raised questions whether
interconnection agreements between wireless carriers actually represented arms-length
transactions.  The deployment of competitive wireless network on a national scale, the sub-
sequent emergence of PCS, and the impending arrival of third-generation wireless devices
should eliminate this problem in the near future.
439 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 389 (1999) (holding that the FCC
must consider whether a network element is available from other sources before compel-
ling access to that element under the 1996 Act).
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parable transactions provide external benchmarks that should enable
regulatory authorities to establish access rates that are more likely to
promote efficiency.
In the absence of external benchmarks based on actual market
transactions, a cost-based, second-best measure of market value is nec-
essary.  As noted earlier, economic theory suggests that cost-based
measures should follow ECPR, which sets rates as the sum of the direct
incremental costs of providing an input and the opportunity costs that
the incumbent incurs when the new entrant provides the services in-
stead of the incumbent.440  TELRIC includes elements designed to re-
flect the first of these two components.441  The key problem with the
FCC’s analysis is its refusal to include any factor reflecting opportunity
cost.442  In setting prices without considering the value of foregone
alternatives, TELRIC essentially ignores the insights of neoclassical ec-
onomics by basing value solely on cost without taking any demand-
side effects into consideration.
The FCC’s reasons for declining to base access rates on ECPR do
not withstand analysis.  First, the FCC argued that the statutory re-
quirement that prices be cost-based precluded consideration of op-
portunity cost.443  The Supreme Court, however, specifically rejected
this reasoning, finding the term cost “too protean” to support any such
plain-language argument.444  If anything, the economic truism that
opportunity costs represent the true economic cost directly undercuts
the FCC’s argument.445  Indeed, the Court recognized as much when
it cited “opportunity cost” as an example of a forward-looking “cost”
that fell within the purview of the statute.446
The FCC’s second basis for rejecting ECPR is equally unsound.
The FCC asserted that because ECPR calculates opportunity cost on
the basis of current retail prices, it locks in monopoly rents without
providing a mechanism for moving prices towards competitive
440 See supra Part I.C.3.  Professor Spulber has argued elsewhere that the rates charged
for access to unbundled network elements should include an end-user charge that cannot
be bypassed in order to compensate incumbent LECs for costs incurred due to the deregu-
latory innovations that caused investment-backed expectations to fail. See SIDAK & SPULBER,
supra note 39, at 334–35. Extended discussion of these issues falls outside the scope of this
Article.  For the time being, it suffices that the argument advanced in this Article, while
consistent with the imposition of such user charges, does not require it.
441 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 316–18.
442 See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
443 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15859 ¶ 709 (1996) (“Local
Competition Order”).
444 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 500–01 (2002) (describing
“cost” as “a chameleon” and as a “virtually meaningless term . . . [that] say[s] little about
the method employed to determine a particular rate” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
445 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 322–23, 404–10.
446 Verizon, 535 U.S. at 499 n.17.
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levels.447  This argument suffers from two fundamental flaws.  First, it
ignores the fact that the competition will cause retail prices to drop
and that, as this occurs, ECPR will dynamically readjust the opportu-
nity-cost factor to reflect those price changes.448  Second, the exis-
tence of any monopoly rents in retail prices is more the result of failed
rate regulation at the state level than of any theoretical flaw in
ECPR.449  Although such a failure would justify improving state regula-
tion of retail prices, it does not justify incurring the myriad problems
that would result from distorting access prices.450
The Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s rate-making methodology
in Verizon,451 but it did not specifically endorse TELRIC and reject
ECPR as a matter of economic policy.  On the contrary, the Court
carefully eschewed expressing any opinion about the merits of any
particular economic approach.452  Instead, it applied the deferential
standard of review that gives agencies a wide range of discretion in
resolving statutory ambiguities, as long as their interpretation falls
within a wide zone of reasonableness.453  Thus, the Court’s decision
does not necessarily foreclose the FCC from applying a rate-making
approach based on market prices or ECPR.454
Indeed, because there are alternative technological platforms, it
may no longer be sound economic policy to compel access to the ele-
ments of local telephone networks.  As noted above,455 any market
failures that exist are caused by the paucity of horizontal competition
at the network level.  The only viable long-term solution to this prob-
lem is to promote the deployment of alternative network capacity.
UNE access requirements have the effect of destroying incentives to
447 Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15859 ¶ 709; see also Expanded Interconnec-
tion with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369, 7426 ¶ 123, 7430 ¶ 129 (1992) (“Special Access Order”) (re-
jecting the use of the “net revenue” test proposed by Alfred Kahn in setting interconnec-
tion rates in the FCC’s Expanded Interconnection proceeding).
448 See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 352–53.
449 See id. at 353–54.
450 See id. at 351–58, 362–63.
451 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 497–522.
452 See id. at 507 (“As a reviewing Court we are, of course, in no position to assess the
precise economic significance of [various economic aspects of the incumbent LECs’ argu-
ments].  Instead it is enough to recognize that the incumbents’ assumption may well be
incorrect.”); id. at 523 (“We cannot say whether the passage of time will show competition
prompted by TELRIC to be an illusion, but TELRIC appears to be a reasonable policy for
now, and that is all that counts.”).
453 See id. at 501 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843–45 (1984)).
454 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 426 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (noting that, in rejecting ECPR, the FCC “did not claim, nor
did its reasoning support the claim, that the use of such a system would be arbitrary or
unreasonable”).
455 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 92  6-MAY-03 11:13
976 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:885
invest in this alternative capacity and rescuing would-be purchasers of
those services from having to make such investments.  As a result,
UNE access requirements tend to harm dynamic efficiency and to en-
trench incumbent carriers by depriving wireless carriers, cable teleph-
ony companies, and other alternative local phone-service providers of
their natural strategic partners.  Indeed, there is some evidence that
policy makers may be coming around to this point of view.  Media
reports indicate that the FCC is becoming concerned that the UNE
access is forestalling the emergence of facilities-based competition in
local telephone service.  As a result, it is considering whether to begin
phasing out the UNE access requirements.456
3. Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
The FCC’s implementation of the 1996 Act was not only economi-
cally problematic; its adoption of a methodology focused solely on re-
placement cost raises serious constitutional problems as well.  The
takings implications of the interconnection and unbundled access
provisions of the local competition provisions have largely escaped at-
tention.  Like most forms of rate regulation, TELRIC limits the prices
that incumbent LECs can charge for the use of their network ele-
ments.  Therefore, the courts and the FCC have suggested that the
principles of confiscatory rate-making457 or regulatory takings458 are
likely to govern.459
The problem with this analysis is that it focuses on TELRIC as a
general matter without focusing on the constitutional implications of
the 1996 Act’s physical collocation provisions.  As the FCC has itself
recognized, both interconnection and access to unbundled network
elements typically require the network owner to permit other carriers
456 See Yochi J. Dreazen & Shawn Young, FCC Plans to Erase a Key Rule Aiding Local Phone
Competition, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A1.  The FCC took the first steps in this direction
shortly before this Article went to press. See supra note 408.
457 See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 523–24; Implementation of the Local Competition Provi-
sions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order (“Local Competition
Order”), 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15871–72 ¶¶ 737–738 (1996).  In another case, a court rejected
a takings challenge because no taking would occur until a new entrant had actually pur-
chased services under the interconnection agreement under dispute. See US W. Communi-
cations, Inc. v. WorldCom Tech., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 819,  (D. Or. 1998).  Although the
court did not offer any hint of the type of takings analysis that would apply, an earlier
decision in the same case appeared to embrace a confiscatory rate-making analysis. See US
W. Communications, Inc. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1236 (D. Or. 1998)
(indicating that the takings challenge would turn on whether the total effect of the rates
established by the interconnection agreement is confiscatory).
458 See Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 429 n.59 (5th Cir. 1999);
Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7
F.C.C.R. 7369, 7477–81 ¶¶ 235–237 (1992).
459 The notable exception is Qwest Corp. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 672 (2001), dis-
cussed infra notes 465–72 and accompanying text.
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to place equipment in its central office on an indefinite basis.460  The
physical collocation required by interconnection and unbundled ac-
cess provisions represents the type of permanent physical invasion
that Loretto deemed a per se taking.461  The D.C. Circuit reinforced
this conclusion in Bell Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC,462 holding that the
physical collocation regime upon which the FCC modeled its imple-
mentation of the 1996 Act constituted a physical taking.  Similarly,
GTE Service Corp. v. FCC,463 which overruled the FCC’s Collocation Or-
der, emphasized that the Commission’s interpretation of the physical
collocation provisions may result in “unnecessary takings” of LEC
property.464
Most instructive is the decision in Qwest Corp. v. United States,465
one of the few cases to address the merits of a takings challenge to the
1996 Act.  In that case, a requesting carrier obtained access to four-
teen loops that served one customer, and connected them to its own
switching equipment, located in a collocation cage in the incumbent
LEC’s central office.466  The incumbent LEC brought a takings chal-
lenge, arguing that it received constitutionally insufficient compensa-
tion.467  The incumbent circumscribed its argument by conceding
that it was already receiving adequate compensation for the space oc-
cupied by the collocation cage.  As a result, it restricted its takings
claim to the loops leased by the new entrant.468
The court resolved the case by relying on the distinction between
physical and nonpossessory takings.  In particular, the court accepted
the theory that “government-mandated co-location of one party’s
equipment on another party’s premises constitutes a physical taking
of the occupied space.”469  As a result, the court acknowledged that
the collocation cage “is analogous to the rooftop equipment in Loretto”
and that it might have held that the restriction constituted a per se
taking had the incumbent LEC focused on the collocation cage it-
460 See supra note 396–99 and accompanying text.
461 See supra Part II.A.2.  Even scholars who are skeptical of broader readings of Loretto
accept that regulations that require physical collocation effect per se takings. See Leonard
M. Baynes, Swerving to Avoid the “Takings” and “Ultra Vires” Potholes on the Information Super-
highway: Is the New York Collocations and Telecommunications Policy a Taking Under the New York
Public Service Law?, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 51, 73–74 (1995); Chen, supra note 62,
at 1551; Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV.
1435, 1466–67 & n.115 (2000).
462 24 F.3d 1441, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see supra notes 381–82 and accompanying text.
463 205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
464 Id. at 416, 421, 426
465 48 Fed. Cl. 672 (2001).
466 See id. at 679–80.
467 See id. at 680.
468 See id. at 689–93.
469 Id. at 694.
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self.470  When the new entrant leased loops, on the other hand, it did
not require the incumbent LEC to submit to a permanent physical
occupation, even if the LEC’s use of its property was restricted.
Therefore, the court concluded that the claim based on the loops did
not constitute a physical taking.471  The court once again emphasized
that its holding that compelled access to the loops was not a physical
taking is consistent with its prior conclusion that “the implementation
of mandatory access provisions requiring a telecommunications pro-
vider or utility to make space available on its premises for a competi-
tor to affix its own equipment . . . constitut[ed] a physical taking
under Loretto.”472
The FCC has attempted to reconcile these holdings by asserting
that takings claims involving public utility property are governed by
the more permissive principles embodied in the Supreme Court’s
confiscatory rate-making473 and regulatory takings474 precedents.  The
fundamental problem with this analysis is that it ignores the distinc-
tion between physical and nonpossessory takings made in Loretto and
Florida Power and reaffirmed in Tahoe-Sierra.475  Because the 1996 Act’s
physical-collocation mandate unambiguously requires incumbent
LECs to permit competing carriers to place equipment on their prop-
erty, the Act constitutes a classic physical taking under Loretto.  There-
fore, unlike with confiscatory rate-making or regulatory takings
jurisprudence, the regulation’s economic impact and its public pur-
pose are of no consequence.
It follows that the owners of local telephone networks are entitled
to just compensation for the physical invasion that the 1996 Act man-
dates.  As discussed above, to the extent that there are external mar-
kets for a particular input, the principles of just compensation require
that the incumbent LECs receive the market value of the inputs that
are physically taken.476  Although the past absence of direct competi-
tion in local telephony deprived regulators of any market-based
benchmarks,477 cellular telephony and other forms of wireless com-
munications have created an external basis for determining the value
470 Id. at 691.
471 Id. at 691, 693.
472 Id. at 693.
473 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15871–72 ¶¶ 737–738 (1996)
(“Local Competition Order”).
474 See Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369,  7479–81¶¶ 235–237 (1992).
475 See supra notes 233–35, 244, 276 and accompanying text.
476 See Part II.B.2.a.
477 See Leonard M. Baynes, How Much Is the Toll to Access the Information Superhighway?
An Analysis of the Appropriate Measure of Compensation for the Partial Taking of Public Utility
Property, 62 TENN. L. REV. 141, 149–50, 163–64 (1994).
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of the local loop’s services.478  Therefore, basing access prices on re-
placement cost conflicts with the Court’s established takings jurispru-
dence.  Perhaps sensing the weakness of its position, the FCC offered
the alternative argument that, assuming that a taking had occurred,
fair market value should not include monopoly rents.479  The legal
support for this claim, however, is suspect.480  Even if the FCC’s legal
conclusion were sound, there is reason to doubt the factual premises
underlying the argument.  The emergence of direct facilities-based
competition and the regulation of local telephone service rates sug-
gest that the open market prices did not include monopoly rents.
Although we find it unavoidable to conclude that the 1996 Act’s
physical collocation requirements effect a physical taking, we recog-
nize that virtual collocation poses a much closer question.  The Su-
preme Court recognized this distinction in Loretto, observing that
regulations requiring property owners to install certain types of net-
work-related equipment might present a different question.481  In
such a case, the property owner would own the equipment and have
full authority over its “placement, manner, use, and possibly [its] dis-
position.”482  In addition, the property owner would be able to decide
how to comply with the applicable regulations and therefore “could
minimize the physical, esthetic, and other effects of the installa-
478 See supra notes 437–38 and accompanying text.
479 Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15872 ¶ 740; see also Baynes, supra note 477, at
173–76 (arguing that excluding monopoly rates would foster competition, meet the expec-
tation of public utility investors, and provide constitutionally just compensation).
480 The FCC cites a single lower court decision as authority for the proposition that
just compensation does not permit recovery of monopoly rents. See Local Competition Order,
11 F.C.C.R. at 15872 ¶ 740 (citing Lord Mfg. Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 748 (Ct. Cl.
1949)).  Furthermore, Lord Mfg. does not stand for the proposition for which the FCC cites
it.  In that case, a manufacturer of patented rubber and metal mountings critical for air-
craft flight in adverse weather conditions had developed a dominant market position that
allowed it to earn profits ranging from fifty-nine to one hundred forty-seven percent. See
84 F. Supp. at 748–49, 751.  During World War II, the federal government ordered the
manufacturer to sell its products to the government at prices the government deemed “fair
and reasonable,” allowing the manufacturer a profit of only ten and one-half percent. See
id. at 749–50.  The manufacturer challenged the action under the Takings Clause. See id.
at 751–54.  The court conceded that “[i]f these were ordinary times,” the manufacturer
would have been able to earn supercompetitive profits. Id. at 755.  “[T]hese were not
ordinary times,” however, because the war had interfered with the free and untrammeled
market necessary for a fair-market value determination. See id. at 755.  Thus, the true hold-
ing of Lord Mfg. is that circumstances may exist in which current market price is no longer
an appropriate indicator of fair market value. See also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511
U.S. 531, 537–38 (1994) (discussing how forced sales can drive prices above or below fair-
market value). Lord Mfg. does not stand for the proposition that monopoly profits are not
properly considered part of fair-market value.  On the contrary, the Court of Claims explic-
itly recognized that the opposite would hold true in the absence of wartime price controls.
See also City of Tucson v. El Rio Water Co., 415 P.2d 872, 875 (Ariz. 1966) (recognizing that
monopoly profits are properly regarded as part of fair-market value).
481 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 n.19 (1982).
482 Id.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 96  6-MAY-03 11:13
980 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:885
tion.”483  The FCC followed this reasoning in its Expanded Interconnec-
tion proceeding, where it held that offering the LECs the option of
virtual collocation eliminated any remaining constitutional
infirmities.484
Unfortunately, the courts have never had the opportunity to ad-
dress whether virtual collocation effects a physical taking.  During the
Expanded Interconnection proceeding, the 1996 Act’s physical colloca-
tion provisions rendered the virtual collocation provisions moot.485
The Act further obviated the need to resolve whether a bare virtual
collocation requirement constitutes a physical taking, because in most
circumstances section 251(c)(6) clearly gives requesting carriers the
right to physically collocate their equipment.486  As a result, the Act is
directly analogous to the type of regime that Loretto, Qwest, and Bell
Atlantic found to constitute a physical taking.
That said, language in Bell Atlantic suggests that virtual colloca-
tion poses the same takings concerns as physical collocation in that
both allow CAPs to physically connect their networks to the LECs’ net-
works.487  This interconnection requirement is enough to constitute a
physical taking, regardless of who owns the property on which the in-
terconnection occurs.488  Indeed, a subsequent court drew largely the
same conclusion in holding that it constituted a physical taking to re-
quire that an incumbent LEC accommodate a competitor by recon-
figuring the wires with which it provided telephone service to a multi-
building complex.489  The court did not consider it important that the
apartment complex owner—and not the LEC—owned the land on
which the regulation obligated the LEC to extend its wires.490
B. Access to Networks of Utility Poles
The analysis we have developed helps illuminate the economic
and constitutional considerations underlying a second emerging pol-
icy problem: compelled access to networks of utility poles.  This sub-
part describes the FCC regulations requiring such access and applies
483 Id.; see also GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Virtual
collocation therefore minimizes the takings problem, because competitors do not have
physical access to a LEC’s property.”).
484 See supra note 384 and accompanying text; see also Baynes, supra note 461, at 74–75
(“[P]hysical ‘invasions’ of utility equipment through pipes, wires, or cables deal with the
manner in which the landowner can use property; this invasion is considerably less burden-
some than a traditional physical invasion.”).
485 See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
486 See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
487 See Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
488 Id.
489 See GTE Southwest Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 10 S.W.3d 7, 10–11 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000).
490 See id.
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the analytical framework that we have developed to evaluate the regu-
lations from an economic and constitutional standpoint.  As was the
case in the first policy problem we addressed,491 we conclude that the
manner in which the government has compelled access to networks of
utility poles conflicts with basic economic theory as well as with the
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence.  Thus,  we argue that the cur-
rent pricing regime should be replaced by an approach that bases ac-
cess rates on market prices.
1. Regulatory Framework
In much of the country, cable television systems depend upon
networks of utility poles to establish the wireline connections to indi-
vidual homes and businesses.  Congress, aware of this fact, became
concerned that the electric and telephone companies who owned the
poles were charging monopoly prices that tended to retard cable’s de-
ployment.492  As a result, it enacted the Pole Attachments Act of
1978,493 which gave the FCC the power to regulate the rates that utili-
ties could charge cable television systems for pole attachments in any
state that did not already regulate such agreements.494  As originally
enacted, the Pole Attachments Act required that the rates, terms, and
conditions for pole attachment be just and reasonable495 and estab-
lished methodologies for determining the minimum and maximum
rates that could be charged.496  As implemented by the FCC, the
“Cable Formula” allowed the pole owner to recover approximately 7.4
percent of the total costs of the pole from each attaching entity.497  As
491 See supra Part III.A.
492 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 330–31
(2002); supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.
493 Pub. L. No. 95-234, 92 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2000)).
494 See 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1).  Eighteen states and the District of Columbia impose
such regulation.  Application by Verizon New England, Inc., for Authorization to Provide
In-Region, InterLATA Services in Vermont, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17
F.C.C.R. 7625, 7957 ¶ 47 (2002) (citing States that Have Certified that They Regulate Pole
Attachments, Public Notice, 7 F.C.C.R. 1498 (1992)).
495 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1).
496 The statute required that at a minimum the rates established by the FCC allow the
utilities to recover “the additional costs of providing pole attachments.” Id. § 224(d)(1).
The maximum rate was set “by multiplying the percentage of the total usable space [occu-
pied by the attachment] by the sum of the operating expenses and actual capital costs
[attributable to the pole].” Id.  The resulting formula is:
Carrying
Charge Rate
x
Net Cost of a
Bare Pole
x
Total Usable Space
Space Occupied
=
Maximum
Rate
Amendments of Commission’s Rules & Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Consolidated
Partial Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 12103, 12131 ¶ 53 (2001) (“Consol. Reconsid-
eration Order”).
497 The FCC established standard presumptions that the total amount of usable space
is limited to thirteen and one-half feet and that each attaching entity occupies one foot of
usable space. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1404(g)(l)(xi), 1.1402(c) (2001).  As a result, the pole
owner could recover 1/13.5 of the total cost of the pole from each attaching entity, an
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discussed above, the Supreme Court held in Florida Power that the stat-
ute as originally enacted did not constitute a per se taking under
Loretto.498  Because the Act did not require that any utility enter into a
pole attachment agreement, it represented nothing more than a form
of rate regulation, which violated the Takings Clause only if
confiscatory.499
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, however, modified the
Pole Attachments Act.  As the Court noted in National Cable & Telecom-
munications Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co.,500 one of the key changes was to
broaden the scope of the regulatory scheme, which now covered tele-
communications carriers as well as cable television systems.501  In addi-
tion, two other features of the 1996 amendments merit extended
discussion.  First, the amendments made access to poles compulsory
rather than voluntary.502  Second, the amendments established a new
pricing mechanism to govern attachments by telecommunications car-
riers that differed from that governing attachments by cable television
systems.503
a. The Shift to Compulsory Access
For the purposes of this Article, the most important feature of the
1996 amendments is the transformation of Pole Attachments Act into
a compulsory access provision.  Prior to the 1996 amendments, when
deciding whether to treat the Pole Attachments Act as a per se taking
under Loretto, the Supreme Court gave substantial weight to the fact
that the Act did not compel any utility to allow any other entity access
to its network of utility poles.504  Although the Court explicitly de-
clined to address what would follow if the statute compelled access to
utility poles, its reasoning strongly suggested that such a change would
bring the Pole Attachments Act within the ambit of its physical takings
jurisprudence.505
The Eleventh Circuit followed Florida Power to its logical conclu-
sion when it held in Gulf Power Co. v. United States (Gulf Power I)506 that
amount approximately equal to 7.4 percent. See Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at
12129 ¶ 48.
498 See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text.
499 See supra notes 245–46 and accompanying text.
500 534 U.S. 327 (2002).
501 47 U.S.C. § 224(e) (2000); see also id. § 224(a)(4) (defining “pole attachment” to
include attachments by telecommunications providers).
502 Id. § 224(f)(1).  The statute created exceptions for situations in which there is in-
sufficient capacity or when refusal to provide access is justified by safety, reliability, or other
engineering concerns. Id. § 224(f)(2).
503 Compare id. § 224(e), with id. § 224(d)(3).
504 See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text.
505 See supra notes 247–49 and accompanying text.
506 187 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 1999).
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the 1996 amendments turned the Pole Attachments Act into a per se
taking under Loretto.  Reaffirming the distinction between physical
and nonpossessory takings, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Court’s
confiscatory rate-making jurisprudence did not apply to cases involv-
ing the permanent physical occupation of property.507  Although the
Gulf Power I court found that a taking had occurred, it held that the
logically subsequent question—whether the statute provided for just
compensation—was not yet ripe for judicial resolution.508  The follow-
ing year, in Gulf Power Co. v. FCC (Gulf Power II)509 and Alabama Power
Co. v. FCC,510 the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed these conclusions.  Al-
though the Supreme Court later vacated Gulf Power II,511 its action did
not weaken the precedential effect of Alabama Power or Gulf Power I.
In addition, the Court did not question the propriety of the Eleventh
Circuit’s resolution of the takings issues.
b. The Compensation Regime
The 1996 amendments also supplied a different basis for com-
pensating telecommunications carriers than the one for cable televi-
sion systems.512  This new basis is commonly known as the “Telecom
Formula.”513  Although the details of the various formulas are compli-
cated,514 for our purposes it suffices to point out a few key differences.
In contrast to the Cable Formula, which established uniform rates of
507 Id.
508 Id. at 1338.  In so holding, however, the court did express some skepticism about
whether it would ultimately be persuaded by the utility’s takings argument. See id.  This
dictum should carry little weight, because it attempted to employ the Court’s confiscatory
rate-making precedent to dispose of a case involving a physical taking.
509 Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002).
510 311 F.3d 1357, 1367–68 (11th Cir. 2002).
511 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 534 U.S. at 327.
512 See 47 U.S.C. § 224(e) (2000).  The separate scheme governing telecommunica-
tions carriers became effective after February 8, 2001, after which point the Telecom
Formula began to be phased in over a period of five years.
513 See Amendment of Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Report and
Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 6453, 6457–58 ¶ 5 (2000) (“Fee Order”).  Prior to the adoption of the
new formula, the Cable Formula governed pole attachments by telecommunications
carriers.
514 Although rates associated with usable portions of the pole follow the approach of
the Cable Formula and allocate costs in accordance with the percentage of usable space
occupied, see 47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(3), recovery rates associated with the unusable portion of
the pole are allocated in accordance with the number of attaching entities, see id.
§ 224(e)(2).  Specifically, one-third of the cost of the unusable space is borne by the pole
owner, with the remaining two-thirds divided among all attaching entities (including the
pole owner). See id. § 224(e)(3); Implementation of Section 703(e) of Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, 6799–6800 ¶ 43 (1998) (“Telecom
Order”).  The FCC originally established two different formulas to calculate each part sepa-
rately.  For simplicity, they eventually combined the calculation into a single formula.  The
combined formula is written as follows:
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compensation for all portions of the pole, the Telecom Formula al-
lowed for different rates of recovery for the “usable” and “unusable”
portions of the pole.  As a result, the Cable Formula and the Telecom
Formula can lead to significant differences in compensation.515
FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF RECOVERY RATES UNDER
THE POLE ATTACHMENTS ACT
Percentage of Pole Costs Recoverable Number of 
Attaching Entities Cable Formula Telecom Formula 
1 7.4% 24.0%
2 33.8%
3 40.0%
4 44.8%
5 48.9%
6 52.6%
7 56.0%
8
14.8%
22.2%
29.6%
37.0%
44.4%
51.9%
59.3% 59.3%
It is also noteworthy that both the Cable and the Telecom Formu-
las are based on historical cost rather than forward-looking cost.516
Rate
Charge
Carrying
Pole Bare a ofCost Net 
HeightPole
EntitiesAttachingofNo.
SpaceUnusable
3
2
Occupied
Space
Rate
Maximum xx
x
=
Amendments of Commission’s Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Consoli-
dated Partial Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 12103, 12131–32 ¶ 55 (2001) (“Con-
sol. Reconsideration Order”).  If the standard presumptions are applied, the formula is further
simplified as follows:
Rate
Charge
Carrying
Pole Bare a ofCost Net 
HeightPole
EntitiesAttachingofNo.
SpaceUnusable
3
2
Occupied
Space
Rate
Maximum xx
x
=
Id. at 12132 ¶ 56.  The FCC subsequently established a rebuttable presumption that the
average number of attaching entities in non-urbanized areas was three, and that the aver-
age number of attachers in an urbanized area was five. Id. at 12139–40 ¶¶ 71–72.
515 Because the Telecom Formula allows for more generous rates for unusable space, it
in effect allows for greater recovery than the Cable Formula for any reasonable number of
attaching entities.  For example, Alabama Power has asserted in litigation that, although
application of the Cable Formula leads to an annual compensation rate of $6.30 per pole,
application of the Telecom Formula would result in an annual compensation rate of
$20.41 per pole.  Brief of Alabama Power Company and Gulf Power Company at 23, Ala.
Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002).
516 Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 1249 ¶ 17, 12116–17 ¶¶ 21–22; Fee Order,
15 F.C.C.R. at 6460–61 ¶¶  9–10.
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The FCC orders implementing the 1996 amendments reasoned that
that the Supreme Court upheld the use of such an approach in Florida
Power.517  The FCC further argued that the policies underlying the
Pole Attachments Act, the static nature of the technology underlying
utility poles, and the impossibility of duplicating utility pole networks
justified adopting a methodology that was less focused on stimulating
competitive entry.518  In addition, the FCC emphasized the adminis-
trative convenience of maintaining the previous regime.519
The FCC’s cost-based orientation is further reflected by the posi-
tion it adopted with respect to “overlashing,” which refers to the prac-
tice by which an additional telecommunications or cable provider
attaches a wire to one already attached to the pole.  The FCC reversed
its initial decision520 and instead ruled that an overlasher should not
be counted as a separate attaching entity when determining the com-
pensation paid to pole owners.521  It based these decisions largely on
cost-oriented considerations, reasoning that because “overlashing
shares [space] with the host attachment,” “no additional usable space
[would be] occupied.”522  Consequently, the regulations require
overlashers to pay compensation to pole owners only if their overlash-
ing requires the owners to incur direct costs to increase the height or
strength of their poles.523  The D.C. Circuit subsequently sustained
the overlashing rules.524
The FCC declined to decide whether basing its methodology on
historical costs violated the Takings Clause, stating that such as-ap-
plied takings challenges were not ripe until the methodology was em-
bodied in a specific rate order.  Until then, the only challenge that
could be raised was a facial challenge.  The FCC rejected the facial
challenge, however, because it could not conclude that the historical
rate methodology would deny just compensation in all cases.525
517 Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12117 ¶ 22; Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6460
¶ 9.
518 Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12116–17 ¶¶ 20–21, 12118 ¶ 24.
519 Id. at 12116–17 ¶¶ 20–22, 12119 ¶ 25; Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6460–61 ¶ 9.
520 Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report
and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, 6809–10 ¶ 69 (1998) (“Telecom Order”).
521 Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12145 ¶ 83.
522 Id. at 12142 ¶ 76; see also id. at 12143 ¶ 78 (justifying the failure to require addi-
tional compensation on the ground that “[o]verlashing does not increase the amount of
space actually occupied by the attachment.”).
523 Id. at 12142–43 ¶¶  77–78.
524 Southern Co. Servs. v. FCC, 313 F.3d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
525 See Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12115–16 ¶ 18; Implementation of
the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 16087–88 ¶ 1192 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”).
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The FCC reiterated these principles when deciding Alabama Cable
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Alabama Power Co..526  Because this case
arose out of an actual rate order, the FCC addressed the takings issue
directly.  Citing Florida Power, the FCC ruled that the constitutionality
of its actions turned solely on whether the established rates were con-
fiscatory.  Even assuming that the 1996 amendments constituted a tak-
ing for which just compensation must be paid, the FCC found it
impossible to apply any of the three conventional methodologies for
determining fair market value.527  The FCC invoked the same ratio-
nale in rejecting similar arguments raised in its Georgia Power
proceedings.528
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently upheld Alabama Power Co., but
on substantially different grounds.  As it did in Gulf Power I and II, the
court rejected the FCC’s attempt to invoke the Supreme Court’s con-
fiscatory rate-making jurisprudence, holding that such precedent does
not apply to cases involving compelled access.529  Instead, the court
ruled that the case was governed by the Supreme Court’s physical tak-
ings decisions, which require that pole owners who are forced to sub-
mit to permanent physical invasions receive fair market value, which
in turn includes compensation for their opportunity costs.530  The
court nonetheless sustained the FCC’s decision not to include oppor-
tunity-cost compensation on the ground that one party’s use of the
poles generally did not preclude use by another party.531  So long as
there is excess pole capacity, the grant of a right of access to that pole
does not foreclose the opportunity to sell the space to another bid-
ding firm.  In other words, access rates need not include compensa-
tion for opportunity costs unless the network is at full capacity and the
pole owner can demonstrate that it had a higher-valued use for that
capacity.  Accordingly, the court in Alabama Power concluded that the
526 See Ala. Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Ala. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 12209 (2001)
(“[T]he Commission’s rules implementing the Pole Attachment Act, including the Com-
mission’s formula for calculating just and reasonable pole attachment rates, satisfy the con-
stitutional requirement of just compensation for the taking of property under the Fifth
Amendment.”), aff’d sub nom. Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002).
527 Ala. Cable, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12229–35 ¶¶ 46–57.
528 See Teleport Communications Atlanta, Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R.
20238, 20240–41 ¶ 7 (2001) (following the rule of Alabama Cable) .  The FCC subsequently
ordered that a series of complaints against Georgia Power be held in abeyance pending
attempts to negotiate a mutually acceptable rate using the information provided by the
FCC’s opinion in Teleport Communications. See City of Dublin v. Ga. Power Co., Order Grant-
ing Temporary Stay, 16 F.C.C.R. 20421 (2001); City of Sanderville v. Ga. Power Co., Order
Granting Temporary Stay, 16 F.C.C.R. 20417 (2001); Knology, Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., Order
Granting Temporary Stay, 16 F.C.C.R. 20413 (2001).
529 Ala. Power, 311 F.3d at 1367–68.  For an earlier discussion of the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Alabama Power, see supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text.
530 311 F.3d at 1368–69.
531 Id. at 1369–70.
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opportunity costs of allowing another party to access the plaintiff’s
network were zero.532  A similar appeal filed in Georgia Power is still
pending before the Eleventh Circuit.533
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
Basic economic theory indicates that the most efficient way to im-
plement the Pole Attachments Act would be to base access rates on
market prices.  This promotes allocative efficiency by providing those
who obtain access with the signals they need in order to purchase the
optimal quantity and overall mix of inputs.  Market-based pricing also
helps inputs find their way to those buyers who obtain the greatest
benefit from them.  Finally, market-based pricing promotes dynamic
efficiency by providing the appropriate incentives for investment and
innovation.
Basing access rates on the price that would be paid for access on
the open market thus typically represents the best way to promote eco-
nomic efficiency.  Although arguably such external benchmarks once
did not exist,534 the emergence of platform competition and the shift
from rate regulation to access regulation have made it possible for
regulatory authorities to infer market prices from two different types
of transactions.  First, regulators can consider the revenue earned
from other attaching entities.  Second, they can infer market value
from the price of any substitute technologies available to attaching
entities.
a. Unregulated Pole Attachments
The years since the enactment of the Pole Attachments Act have
witnessed periods in which the rates for certain types of pole attach-
ments were determined through arms-length transactions.  For exam-
ple, the Pole Attachments Act as originally enacted only extended to
cable television systems.  It was not until 1996 that it was extended to
cover telecommunications carriers as well.535  As a result, there was no
federal regulation of pole attachment agreements negotiated by local
telephone companies seeking access to electrical companies’ utility
poles prior to 1996.  Such agreements were necessarily quite common
because electric companies owned the vast majority of utility poles.536
Thus, regulatory authorities can  use the terms of market-based trans-
actions—pole attachment agreements between telephone companies
532 Id. at 1370–71.
533 Ga. Power Co. v. FCC, No. 02-10222-B (11th Cir. filed Jan. 11, 2002).
534 See Baynes, supra note 461, at 177.
535 See supra notes 238–41, 394–95 and accompanying text.
536 See James R. Dukart, The Fight for Power Poles, UTIL. BUS., Feb. 1, 2002, tbl. (reporting
that local telephone companies own only 3% of all utility poles), available at http://
www.utilitybusiness.com/ar/power_fight_power_poles/index.htm.
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and utilities—to establish efficient pricing.  FCC proceedings suggest
that these rates were substantially higher than those authorized under
the Pole Attachments Act.537
In addition, it is possible that some arms-length transactions were
negotiated during the regulatory gaps that followed judicial chal-
lenges to the Pole Attachments Act.  For example, in the aftermath of
Gulf Power I, the FCC’s uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the
Cable and Telecom Formulas led the Commission to issue statements
that seemed to indicate that it would not require that pole attachment
rates comply with the formulas until after the courts had determined
what constituted just compensation.538  Until the FCC explicitly dis-
avowed this position,539 the parties negotiating pole attachment agree-
ments may well have believed that such agreements were temporarily
unregulated and, therefore, may have negotiated arms-length transac-
tions during this time.540
b. Alternative Network Technologies
Regulatory authorities may also infer market prices from the rates
charged for access to alternative technologies that provide the same
functions as utility pole networks.  According to basic economic the-
ory, the prices for substitutes for a particular good represent useful
proxies for determining the market value of that good.
i. Wireless Carriers
Of all the types of attachments likely to be attached to utility
poles, attachments by wireless carriers are likely to face the most com-
537 Compare Ala. Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Ala. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 12209,
12224 ¶ 35 (2001) (reporting that joint-use agreements between local telephone compa-
nies and electric companies reveal rates ranging between $26.29–$30.30 per pole), aff’d sub
nom. Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002), with supra note 515 (indicating
that the Cable Formula and the Telecom Formula allowed for rates of $6.30 and $20.41,
respectively).
538 See Ala. Cable, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12219 ¶ 23.
539 See id. at 12221–23 ¶¶ 29–31.
540 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Gulf Power II, holding that the Pole Attachments
Act did not cover Internet services, could also have created a window during which broad-
band providers and pole owners negotiated arms-length transactions.  Apparently, the
Eleventh Circuit immediately stayed the mandate of Gulf Power II pending Supreme Court
review. See Teleport Communications Atlanta, Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R.
20238, 20241–42 ¶ 9 (2001); Ala. Cable, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12214–15 ¶¶ 11-12.  Interestingly,
the fact that such market benchmarks are no longer available underscores the extent to
which the absence of a well-established market is the direct result of state and federal
regulation.  For a discussion of the problems associated with allowing other features of a
regulatory regime to render a particular restriction constitutional, see Yoo, Rise and Demise,
supra note 37, at 29–52.  The absence of a market, however, does not imply that a product
or service lacks market value.  Rather, it means only that because of regulatory interven-
tion, the value must be determined through some method other than by reference to
market prices.
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petition, because wireless carriers have the option of attaching their
equipment to a wide variety of alternative facilities.  Skyscrapers, com-
munications towers, and any other sufficiently tall location can serve
as a direct substitute for a utility pole.  As a result, the Supreme Court
has questioned whether attachments by wireless carriers truly fall
within the economic rationale of the Pole Attachments Act, which is
directed towards preventing monopoly pricing in bottleneck facili-
ties.541  Furthermore, the rates charged by these alternative attach-
ment sites can provide an external benchmark for rate setting in the
event that policy makers decide to impose such access requirements.
The rental rates property owners charge wireless companies for space
on their communications towers appear to exceed the rates allowed by
the Pole Attachments Act by several hundred percent.542  Therefore,
there is reason to question whether the cost-based rates currently in
place effectively promote allocative and dynamic efficiency.
ii. Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (MVPDs)
Providers of multichannel television service (dubbed “multichan-
nel video programming distributors” (MVPDs) under federal law)
have begun to utilize an ever broadening array of alternatives to con-
ventional utility pole networks when delivering television program-
ming to individual homes.  In many cases, cable operators find it
economically attractive to bypass utility poles altogether and instead
install below-ground fiber networks of their own.543
In addition, the emergence of digital broadcast satellite (DBS)
systems as a viable competitor to cable television provides another ba-
sis for estimating the value of cable television access to utility pole
networks.544  DBS penetration is approaching levels that, under cur-
541 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 341 (2002).
The Court nonetheless held that the plain language of the statute included wireless carri-
ers within its scope.  Even if the text contained some ambiguity, the Court would defer to
the FCC’s construction of the statute. Id.
542 Compare Fryer’s TowerSource, The TowerSource/Tower Summit Survey, at http://
www.towersource.com/survey.html (last visited May 16, 2002) (reporting that communica-
tions towers receive an average annual rent of over $12,000 from each attaching entity);
and Reply Brief of Ala. Power Co. & Gulf Power Co. at 14, Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.2d
1357 (11th Cir. 2002) (reporting that Comcast charges between $18,000 and $21,600, an-
nually, for wireless attachments to cellular communications towers), with supra note 515
(noting that the Telecom Formula allowed Alabama Power to charge wireless companies
$20.41 per year to attach to its poles)
543 See, e.g., Michael Grebb, Cable’s Big Worry: Getting Poleaxed, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
June 4, 2001, at 100 (noting that Time Warner Cable “just decided to go underground”
when confronted with higher pole attachment rates sought by an unregulated rural coop-
erative); see also Kathy Brister, Cable Firms Battling Pole Fees, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 28,
2001, at D9 (indicating that the cable industry would consider digging trenches “if the FCC
does not keep rate control” on utility pole fees).
544 DBS is the most recent of a series of spectrum-based MVPD technologies.  Other
technologies include multipoint distribution services (MDS), which employ microwave
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rent law, represent competition sufficient to justify eliminating rate
regulation of basic cable services.545  Recent empirical studies have
confirmed that consumers are beginning to regard DBS as a substitute
for cable.546
Rates for DBS transmission service can thus provide an external
benchmark for use in determining the market value of access to net-
works of public utility poles.  There are, however, a number of factors
that complicate a direct comparison.  First, the geographic structure
of the two media is, of course, quite different.  By its nature, DBS is
necessarily national in scope, while cable television service is necessa-
rily limited to specific localities.  In addition, the services differ in
terms of quality.  For example, DBS is more susceptible to weather-
related interference than is cable.  Finally, because there are presently
only two national DBS providers547 thus giving most consumers only
three MVPD options—MVPD competition may prove too thin to jus-
tify using market-based indicia to approximate efficient pricing.  For
the most part, though, this substitute technology provides useful gui-
dance as to the value of the services being provided under a com-
pelled access regime.
iii. Broadband Providers
Broadband providers are similarly benefiting from an increas-
ingly wide array of alternative technologies that allow them to reach
transmission facilities to provide multichannel programming; satellite master antenna tele-
vision systems (SMATV), which establish private cable systems that service individual apart-
ment buildings; home satellite dishes (HSD), comprised of C-band satellite dishes; and
various forms of Internet video.  To date, none of these other technologies has proved
particularly successful. See Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for De-
livery of Video Programming, Ninth Annual Report, FCC 02-338, at 36–40 ¶¶ 71–78, 43–52
¶¶ 88–111 (2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-
02-338A1.pdf [hereinafter Ninth Annual Report on Video Programming Delivery].
545 See Yoo, supra note 11, at 228–30.
546 See Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Report on Cable Industry Prices, 16 F.C.C.R. 4346, 4363 ¶ 48,
4364–65 ¶ 53 (2001).
547 There are currently three DBS companies providing service: DirecTV, EchoStar
(marketed as the DISH Network), and Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. (marketed as Sky
Angel).  Of these, only DirecTV and EchoStar have established positions in the national
market for television programming of general interest.  Dominion’s Sky Angel operates
through transponders located on an EchoStar satellite and is a self-described Christian and
family-oriented DBS service.  Its subscribership lags significantly behind that of DirecTV
and EchoStar. See Ninth Annual Report on Video Programming Delivery, supra note 544, at
27–28 ¶ 53, 30 ¶ 59.  Ironically, the relative paucity of DBS providers may itself be the
direct result of the regulatory requirements requiring DBS providers who wish to carry
programming provided by the major broadcast networks to carry all local television sta-
tions.  Because the footprint of every DBS channel is national in scope, this requirement in
effect forces DBS to devote precious channel capacity to redundant programming that can
be transmitted to only a small portion of the country. See Yoo, Rethinking Free, Local Televi-
sion, supra note 37, at 37–39.
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consumers without using pole attachments.548  Although cable
modem and digital subscriber line (DSL) providers have taken the
early lead in the broadband race, there are a number of alternative
broadband technologies in various stages of deployment.549  As noted
earlier, a number of wireline telecommunications carriers have been
aggressively building extensive subterranean fiber-optic networks that
effectively bypass utility pole networks.550  In addition, DBS providers
already offer satellite-based broadband technologies that are begin-
ning to compete directly with wireline broadband services.551  Al-
though the differences between DBS and cable operators make direct
comparisons difficult, these substitute technologies are still useful in
determining the value of the services being provided through utility
pole networks.
Other providers are deploying spectrum-based technologies
whose geographic footprints are similar to those of cable operators.
For example, PCS providers deliver mobile wireless broadband ser-
vices, and other companies are preparing to use multipoint distribu-
tion service (MDS) to provide fixed wireless broadband services.552
Digital television broadcasters are considering proposals to use part of
the increased efficiency provided by digital transmission to expand
into broadband services.553  Finally, the promise of third generation
wireless devices (3G) hangs over the entire competitive arena.554
Each of these technologies provides network transmission services on
a geographic scale that is much more comparable to utility poles than
is DBS.
548 See generally Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wire-
line Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3037–38 ¶¶ 36–37
(2002) (describing broadband technology and its effect on data processing); Yoo, supra
note 11, at 253–58 (same).
549 Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Re-
port, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2864 ¶ 44, 2865 ¶ 48 (2002) (“Third § 706 Report”).
550 See supra note 429 and accompanying text.
551 Third § 706 Report, 17 F.C.C.R. at 2869 ¶ 60, 2879–80 ¶ 85, app. B at 2926–27
¶¶ 45–49.
552 See id. at 2867–69 ¶¶ 55–59, 2901 ¶ 146, app. B at 2921–26 ¶¶ 31–44; Inquiry
Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in
a Reasonable and Timely Fashion and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pur-
suant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 F.C.C.R.
20913, 20932–37 ¶¶ 42–55 (2000) (“Second § 706 Report”); Ninth Annual Report on Video
Programming Delivery, supra note 544, at 37 ¶ 73.
553 See Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for Delivery of Video
Programming, Seventh Annual Report, 16 F.C.C.R. 6005, 6052 ¶ 102 (2001); Advanced
Television System and Their Impact upon Existing Television Broadcast Service, Fifth Re-
port and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12809, 12820–21 ¶ 29 (1997) (authorizing digital television
stations to provide “ancillary and supplementary services,” including data transmission).
554 Third § 706 Report, 17 F.C.C.R. at 2878 ¶ 80, 2900 ¶¶ 141–143, 2901–02 ¶ 147.
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The growth of direct, facilities-based competition to utility poles
raises serious questions about whether compelled access represents
sound economic policy.  Compelled access harms dynamic efficiency
in two ways.  First, it forces the pole owner to share any benefits that
result from investments in its own facilities.  And second, compelled
access rescues those who need access to such facilities from having to
invest in alternative networks capable of providing similar services.
Thus, access both lowers the pole owner’s incentives to invest in its
own facilities as well as deprives the sponsors of substitute network
facilities of their natural strategic partners.  In so doing, access re-
quirements can forestall the emergence of alternative facilities-based
competition to utility poles, which represents the most effective long-
term solution to the bottleneck problem.
If regulators are to compel access, however, the best way to miti-
gate the negative effects is to establish access rates based on market
prices.  Doing so not only encourages existing participants to employ
appropriate levels of network inputs; it also provides appropriate sig-
nals to those deciding whether to enter particular markets and to
those deciding whether to invest in network facilities.  Moreover, the
competitive environment is also likely to be sufficiently robust to allow
market prices to serve as a reliable benchmark for setting relatively
efficient rates.  Compelling access to utility poles at submarket rates,
in contrast, threatens to make alternative transmission technologies
appear artificially unattractive.  Therefore, regulation threatens to
cause investment in those technologies to fall below efficient levels.
Although the use of a network of utility poles does not consume
the poles, this does not justify the conclusion (advanced by the Elev-
enth Circuit in Alabama Power555) that it is harmless to compensate the
network only for the direct incremental costs of providing access.  Ec-
onomic analysis indicates that the price the pole owner charges is de-
termined by demand-side considerations as well as supply-side
considerations.  Thus, the market value of an object depends not only
on the costs that compelled access forces the network owner to incur,
but also on how much the would-be purchaser is willing to pay.  The
opportunity costs associated with foregoing the arms-length transac-
tion with any single buyer are real economic costs for which the net-
work owner should be compensated.
Finally, with respect to broadband, it is possible that the rates al-
lowed under the Telecom Formula can serve as a reference point for
market-based pricing for cable television systems.  Admittedly, the
prices determined by the Telecom formula are not established in
open markets.  Nonetheless, application of the Cable Formula typi-
555 See supra note 530 and accompanying text.
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cally leads to significantly lower rates than does application of the
Telecom Formula,556 thus suggesting that rates established under the
Cable Formula are not properly regarded as fair market value.  In-
deed, the system impairs allocative efficiency by establishing signifi-
cantly different cost structures for cable modem service and DSL and
impedes dynamic efficiency by distorting the investment and entry de-
cisions of these two types of providers.  Allowing such a significant dif-
ferential to persist gives the government too great a role in
determining which of these platforms will eventually emerge as the
technological winner.
c. ECPR as a Second-Best Valuation Method
The growing availability of alternative telecommunications net-
works is making it increasingly possible for regulatory authorities to
base access pricing on actual transactions for comparable services.  We
acknowledge, however, that many of these technologies are not yet
fully deployed and that differences in utilization levels and geographic
scope may further limit the usefulness of these transactions as external
benchmarks.  If this is the case, the appropriate step is for regulators
to base rates on ECPR, which requires that rates be set equal to the
sum of the direct incremental costs and the opportunity costs associ-
ated with providing access.557
The current rate-setting methodologies for pole attachments de-
viate from ECPR in two significant ways.  First, the current approaches
calculate direct incremental costs on the basis of historical cost rather
than forward-looking cost.  The FCC has acknowledged that reliance
on forward-looking costs would better promote allocative efficiency,
observing that, “a firm compares forward-looking costs with existing
market prices, in making decisions about entry, expansion, and
price.”558  As a result, rate-making methodologies based on forward-
looking cost help “to ensure the efficient use of existing telecommuni-
cations network facilities, and to encourage new entrants to make eco-
nomically rational decisions about whether or how to enter a local
telecommunications market.”559  In addition, forward-looking cost
pricing reflects efficient replacement of an asset’s functions using the
most advanced technology available.560  Use of forward-looking costs
would also promote dynamic efficiency, because setting prices on the
556 See supra note 530 and accompanying text.
557 See supra Part I.C.2.
558 Amendments of Commission’s Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments,
Consolidated Partial Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 12103, 12116 ¶ 20 (2001)
(“Consol. Reconsideration Order”).
559 Id.
560 See id. at 12118–19 ¶ 24.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 110  6-MAY-03 11:13
994 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:885
basis of forward-looking economic costs would “giv[e] the appropriate
signal for new entrants to invest in network facilities.”561
Despite acknowledging the benefits of using a methodology
based on forward-looking cost, the FCC nonetheless persisted in rely-
ing on historical cost in setting pole attachment rates, offering several
justifications.  First, the FCC reasoned that the Pole Attachments Act
was designed to stem anticompetitive pricing, not to stimulate com-
petitive entry.562  The FCC also suggested that its continued applica-
tion of a historical cost methodology was justified in part because the
technology underlying utility poles was relatively static.563  Finally, the
FCC pointed out that investment incentives are less important in the
pole attachment context because local zoning and other right-of-way
restrictions prevent the construction of duplicative pole networks.564
The FCC’s reasoning fails to accord sufficient weight to the arri-
val of alternative technologies that compete directly with utility pole
networks.  In terms of static efficiency, the FCC focuses on controlling
monopoly pricing even though the emergence of substitute facilities
generally causes monopoly rents to dissipate.  In focusing too nar-
rowly on the network of utility poles as a universe unto itself, the FCC
ignores the fact that substitute facilities, such as DBS and wireless sys-
tems, can support transmission of multichannel video program distri-
bution.565  In addition, wireless telephony has emerged as a viable
alternative to wireline communications.  Over time, the growing im-
portance of these substitute media will erode any monopoly power
possessed by utility pole owners, if it has not done so already.  The
most dramatic illustration of this point exists with respect to wireless
providers, which the FCC and Supreme Court have concluded fall
within the ambit of the Pole Attachments Act.566  Wireless providers
have an extensive array of alternative locations for their equipment,
including communications towers and rooftop placements, eliminat-
ing any supposed monopoly power possessed by utility pole owners.567
By forcing pole owners to provide wireless carriers with access at rates
561 Id. at 12119 ¶ 25 (citing Amendment of Rules & Policies Governing Pole Attach-
ments, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 6453, 6460–61 ¶ 9 (2000) (“Fee Order”)); see  id. at
12118–19 ¶ 24  (noting that methodologies based on forward-looking costs give new en-
trants “the proper cost signals to decide whether to construct their own networks or to use
the incumbent’s”).
562 Id. at 12116–17 ¶¶ 20–21; see also Baynes, supra note 461, at 177 (arguing that a cost
based pricing scheme is better suited to avoid monopoly rents than a market based pricing
scheme).
563 See Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12118–19 ¶ 24.
564 Id.
565 See supra Part III.B.2.b.ii.
566 See supra note 541 and accompanying text.
567 See supra Part III.B.2.b.i.
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below what they would reach through arms-length negotiations, cur-
rent regulatory policy interferes with allocative efficiency.
More importantly, by disregarding the impact of below-market
rates on investment in alternative technologies, the FCC ignores ac-
cess rates’ impact on dynamic efficiency.  For example, the price of
access to poles directly affects investment in communication towers
and other utility pole substitutes, even though these same access
prices may not spur any additional investment in duplicate networks
of poles.  Furthermore, the dramatic changes in substitute technolo-
gies will influence the economics of distributing telecommunications
services even if the technology underlying utility poles does not
change.  It is only by taking an artificially truncated view of the scope
of the relevant technologies that the FCC is able to view these consid-
erations as unimportant.
This adverse effect on dynamic efficiency will be particularly dra-
matic with respect to broadband technologies.  As noted earlier, com-
panies are in the process of deploying a wide range of broadband
technologies, including PCS, fixed wireless systems, 3G wireless de-
vices, and ancillary and supplementary services provided via spectrum
assigned to digital television broadcasting.568  The manner in which
access to poles is priced will directly and dramatically impact the tim-
ing and level of investment in deploying these new technologies.
The second way in which the current rate setting methodology
for pole attachments deviates from ECPR is the absence of an element
reflecting opportunity cost.  The FCC fails to understand that the
price of access to networks—a capital asset that is not consumed—
should be based on the value of the services sold through the network,
not on the costs of constructing it.  In addition, the historical cost
methodology fails to consider that market value is determined
through the interaction between demand and supply and not just sup-
ply-side considerations.  The FCC’s overlashing rules569 fall into the
same trap.  The fact that overlashers may not require pole owners to
incur any additional direct costs does not justify allowing overlashers
to use networks of utility poles without paying any compensation.  If
markets are to serve their usual role in promoting the efficient alloca-
tion of resources, any such access should reflect not only cost consid-
erations, but also the value of the services made possible by access to
the network.  Finally, an opportunity cost scheme would be relatively
568 See supra notes 548–54 and accompanying text.  One of the parties in Alabama Power
also offered expert testimony asserting that railroad and highway rights of way have
emerged as yet another way in which broadband providers can bypass the network of utility
poles. See Ala. Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Ala. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 12209, 12224
¶ 34 (2001), aff’d sub nom. Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002).
569 See supra notes 520–24 and accompanying text.
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easy to implement in this context because the relevant markets—wire-
less telephony, MVPDs, and broadband—are or are becoming ex-
tremely competitive.570
These arguments underscore the extent to which access regula-
tions represent an anomaly in competition policy.571  Rather than
breaking up monopolies, compelled access simply forces monopolists
to share a bottleneck, thereby saving other firms from having to de-
velop alternative sources of that input.  In effect, compelled access
cuts off emerging alternative network technologies from their natural
strategic partners.  As a consequence, it actually entrenches monopoly
power by preempting the development of viable alternatives to the
bottleneck facility, which represent the only viable long-term solution
to the monopoly problem.572  This is particularly problematic in tech-
nologically dynamic industries such as wireless telephony, video distri-
bution, and the Internet, in which the prospects of developing new
ways either to circumvent or to compete directly with the bottleneck
are the greatest.
Indeed, applying access requirements to industries characterized
by high fixed costs can represent a form of regulatory opportunism.
Firms deciding whether to enter such industries ex ante will do so only
if they can expect to recover their fixed cost investments.  Economists
have long recognized that once fixed costs are sunk, firms remain vul-
nerable to ex post opportunistic behavior that can beat prices down
towards marginal cost because sunk costs should no longer be taken
into account.573  The law of contracts, the desire to maintain business
relationships, and market reputation effects can mitigate such oppor-
tunism in competitive markets.574  Regulators’ access requirements re-
main problematic to the extent that they push prices below the levels
needed to guarantee full investment.
The FCC’s attempts to evade this logic are unpersuasive.  In argu-
ing that the relatively static nature of utility pole technology and the
practical impossibility of replacing the network render investment in-
centives less important, the FCC focuses too narrowly on utility poles
as a distinct technological universe and fails to give appropriate con-
sideration to substitute technologies.  The relevant incentives stimu-
late investment in alternative networks as much as they stimulate
investment in alternative sets of poles.  For example, below-market
pricing of access to pole networks threatens to dampen television net-
570 See Yoo, supra note 11, at 227–30, 253–58; supra notes 548–54 and accompanying
text.
571 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
572 See Yoo, supra note 11, at 246.
573 See id. at 235.
574 But see id. (arguing that “such contracts may be costly to negotiate and, in any
event, will not be able to anticipate every possible contingency”).
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works’ incentives to invest in DBS and other alternatives to cable tele-
vision.  Similarly, allowing broadband providers to obtain transmission
via utility poles may deprive non-wireline broadband technologies of
the support needed to finance their deployment.
In the end, the only justification for the FCC’s position is admin-
istrative convenience.  The FCC argued that for over two decades the
historical-cost approach had “provided a stable and certain regulatory
framework, that may be applied ‘simply and expeditiously’ requiring
‘a minimum of staff, paperwork and procedures consistent with fair
and efficient regulation.’”575  The FCC also emphasized that Congress
never indicated that it wanted the FCC to deviate from this approach.
The FCC “acknowledge[d] that setting prices on the basis of forward-
looking economic costs has significant advantages, including that it
gives the appropriate signal for new entrants to invest in facilities,” but
concluded that switching to a methodology based on forward-looking
cost would cause excessive disruption and force the Commission to
undertake extensive proceedings.576
Administrative simplicity ultimately proves too insubstantial to
justify the economic losses that result from basing access prices on
historical cost.  As Justice Breyer observed, although continued reli-
ance on historical costs may provide some administrative advantages,
“[w]here the economic problems created by the use of historical cost
valuation become serious, special modifications must be made in the
process.”577  The FCC should consider whether the administrative ad-
vantages of retaining the existing regime outweigh the long-term ben-
efits of efficient pricing, both in current transactions and in fostering
the emergence of direct facilities-based competition to utility poles—
the only viable long-term solution to the problems of bottleneck con-
trol.  Thus, the FCC should not let short-term inconvenience prevent
it from amending regulatory policies and procedures in ways that pro-
mote substantial long-term benefits.578  Indeed, adhering to outmo-
ded methodologies in the name of administrative convenience could
preempt many of the benefits expected from the shift from rate regu-
lation to access regulation.  By maintaining the status quo the FCC
575 Amendment of Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Report & Order,
15 F.C.C.R. 6453, 6460–61 ¶ 9 (2000) (“Fee Order”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-580, at 21
(1977)); accord Amendments of Commission’s Rules and Political Governing Pole Attach-
ments, Consolidated Partial Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 12103, 12117 ¶ 22,
12119 ¶ 25 (2001) (“Consol. Reconsideration Order”).
576 Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6460–61 ¶ 9.
577 BREYER, supra note 29, at 40.
578 For other instances in which the FCC has inhibited the emergence of competition
by permitting itself to be unduly swayed by one-time costs associated with regulatory
change, see Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note 37, at 41–44.
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risks quashing the benefits this supposed revolution in regulatory
policy.
3. Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence also cuts against the
FCC’s decision to base pole attachment rates on historical cost.  As the
FCC concedes, the 1996 amendments are “not reasonably susceptible
of a reading that gives the pole owner the choice of whether to grant
telecommunications carriers or cable television systems access.”579
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit recognized in Gulf Power I and con-
firmed in Gulf Power II and Alabama Power that the 1996 amendments
transformed the Pole Attachments Act from a rate regulation scheme
into a compulsory access requirement, thus bringing the entire
scheme within Loretto’s ambit.580  The court did not decide the case
based on whether the pole owners purchased their property knowing
that they would have to put it to a public use.581  Nor did the utilities’
knowledge that their property would be subject to extensive regula-
tion justify forcing the utilities to subject themselves to physical inva-
sions without just compensation.582  On the contrary, the court
concluded that such an argument had things “backwards,” in that “[a]
property owner is entitled to expect that the property it acquired via
eminent domain . . . came with the right all property has—not to be
subject to government-coerced, permanent, physical occupation with-
out just compensation.”583
The FCC contended that Florida Power foreclosed this argument
by holding that the compensation provided by the existing approach
to setting pole attachment rates is constitutional.584  The FCC main-
579 See Implementation of Local Competition Provision in Telecommunications Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 16087 ¶ 1191 (1996) (“Local Competition
Order”).
580 See supra notes 506–10 and accompanying text.
581 See Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 187 F.3d 1324, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 195 U.S. 540, 573 (1904) (noting that even though a rail-
road’s right of way is devoted to public use, “it has always been recognized . . . that a
railroad right of way is so far private property as to be entitled to that provision of the
Constitution which forbids its taking, except under the power of eminent domain and
upon payment of [just] compensation”); United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 249
(1930) (noting that “the property of a public utility, although devoted to the public service
and impressed with a public interest, is still private property; and neither the corpus of that
property nor the use thereof constitutionally can be taken for a compulsory price which
falls below the measure of just compensation”)), overruled on other grounds by Fed. Power
Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944)).
582 See id. at 1329.
583 Id. at 1330.
584 See Ala. Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Ala. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. . 12209,
12229–30 ¶¶ 45-46 (2001); see also Amendments of Commission’s Rules and Policies Gov-
erning Pole Attachments, Consolidated Partial Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R.
12103, 12115 ¶ 18 (2001) (“Consol. Reconsideration Order”) (citing Duquesne Light and Hope
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tained that Florida Power definitively established that the proper stan-
dard for resolving all pole attachment takings challenges was the
confiscatory rate-making standard as elaborated in Duquesne Light and
Hope Natural Gas.585  The FCC’s position ignores the sharp distinction
between physical and nonpossessory takings drawn by the Supreme
Court.586  In the words of the Eleventh Circuit:
Characterizing the mandatory access provision as a regulatory con-
dition, even one allegedly designed to foster competition, cannot
change the fact that it effects a taking by requiring a utility to sub-
mit to a permanent, physical occupation of its property.  However
laudatory its motive, Congress’ power to regulate utilities does not
extend to taking without just compensation the right of a utility to
exclude unwanted occupiers of its property.587
The Supreme Court underscored this point when it explicitly recog-
nized that “ ‘[a] permanent physical occupation authorized by govern-
ment is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve.’”588
More specifically, the FCC’s conclusion was inconsistent with pre-
cedent, which held that confiscatory rate-making principles have no
application in determining whether a physical taking has occurred.
As the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, “Duquesne’s discussion of utilities
was not in the context of a takings case dealing with the permanent
occupation of property.  Nothing in Duquesne suggests a utility’s prop-
erty is less subject to protection against permanent, physical occupa-
tion than anyone else’s property.  It is not.”589  Nor could the 1996
amendments be upheld under a regulatory taking analysis:
“[A]lthough property is subject to broad regulatory power, a regula-
tion becomes a taking when the government authorizes permanent,
physical occupation by a third party.”590 Because the 1996 Act effects
a per se taking, the government must ensure that the pole owners
receive compensation that reflects the earning potential of the prop-
erty taken.  Fair market value is the accepted basis for determining
that earning potential.591
In apparent recognition of the weakness of its position, the FCC
considered the possibility that the Takings Clause required the gov-
Natural Gas in its analysis of just compensation); Amendments of Rules and Policies Gov-
erning Pole Attachments, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 6453, 6459–60 ¶ 8 (2000) (“Fee
Order”) (citing Duquesne Light).
585 See Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12230–31 ¶¶ 47-48 (citing Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
586 See supra notes 235–36, 276 and accompanying text.
587 Gulf Power Co., 187 F.3d at 1331.
588 Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982)).
589 Id. at 1330.
590 Id. at 1328 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439–40).
591 See supra notes 286–94 and accompanying text.
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ernment to give pole owners market-value compensation for access to
their poles.  Even so, the Commission concluded that “the unusual
nature of pole attachments, and the nature of the property interest
conveyed,” made it impossible to apply the standard techniques for
determining market value.592  Specifically, the absence of viable alter-
natives to the networks of utility poles made it impossible to base mar-
ket value on comparable sales because all existing market transactions
either included monopoly rents or involved property rights “too dif-
ferent to draw any meaningful conclusions.”593  In addition, the FCC
found the income capitalization approach too speculative.594  Because
access to utility poles represented only one of many inputs needed to
provide cable television and telecommunications services, it was im-
possible to determine the income attributable to any one input.595
The FCC rejected the replacement-cost approach in part because ac-
cess did not destroy the pole owner’s property interests, but instead
simply imposed an occupation that was “restricted in duration, pri-
macy, exclusivity, and physical manner of use.”596  Finally, the FCC
reasoned that the replacement cost approach should not be used be-
cause it would be infeasible to replace the existing network of utility
poles.597
The FCC’s arguments are unconvincing.  As discussed above, sub-
stitute network technologies have made it possible to establish access
rates that reflect actual market transactions.  Indeed, regulators can
analyze wireless carriers’ attachment rates, which are nearly identical
transactions.  The FCC’s objection to the income capitalization ap-
proach ignores the fact that the Supreme Court has sanctioned its use
when an asset was simply one of many inputs in a productive pro-
cess.598  Furthermore, the FCC’s grounds for rejecting the replace-
ment cost approach are factually incorrect in one important respect:
the access requirement authorizes occupations that are indefinite, not
temporary, and that effectively deprive the pole owner of the right to
possess, use, and dispose of the occupied property.  Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that access requirements destroy all of
the property owner’s interests with respect to that particular portion
of the occupied property.599  The infeasibility of replicating a network
of utility poles might be relevant if no technological alternatives exis-
592 Ala. Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Ala. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 12209, 12233 ¶
53 (2001), aff’d sub nom. Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002).
593 Id. at 12234 ¶ 55.
594 See id. at 12233–34 ¶ 56.
595 See id.
596 Id. at 12234–35 ¶ 57.
597 Id.
598 See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
599 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435–36 (1982).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 117  6-MAY-03 11:13
2003] ACCESS TO NETWORKS 1001
ted.  In this case, however, numerous alternative technologies exist
that can perform the same functions as utility poles.  Thus, the FCC
should not disrupt investment signals by basing access rates on histori-
cal cost.
In short, the FCC could justify its position only by making two
analytical errors.  First, it ignored the fundamental change in the tak-
ings analysis required by the shift to access regulation, as recognized
in Gulf Power I and II.  Second, it ignored the fundamental change in
the just compensation analysis required by the emergence of facilities-
based competition to networks of utility poles.
As discussed earlier,600 the Eleventh Circuit sustained the FCC’s
action against a takings challenge in Alabama Power Co. v. FCC.601  The
court avoided the pitfalls that ensnared the FCC by recognizing that
the Takings Clause mandated that pole owners receive market value
for granting access and that market value necessarily includes some
measure of opportunity costs.602  It nonetheless upheld the FCC’s
rate-setting regime on the assumption that, in the absence of some
showing that the poles’ capacity was exhausted, the opportunity cost
associated with granting access was zero, because granting access did
not foreclose the pole owner from selling pole capacity to other firms
or using it itself.603
We have previously analyzed the problems associated with these
arguments in detail604 and need only sketch them again here.  Simply
put, certain features, including the lumpiness of network capacity, the
need to anticipate user requirements, and the importance of ensuring
network reliability, make excess capacity a quality that is endemic to
telecommunications networks.  The conclusion that opportunity costs
are zero also conflicts with the fundamental economic principle that
market value is determined by demand as well as supply considera-
tions.  It simply does not follow that a person who is not currently
using a particular piece of property will give it away for free.  Instead,
the property owner will attempt to use its bargaining position (largely
determined by the value of the property to the would-be purchaser) to
capture the highest possible price.  Therefore, because the Pole At-
tachments Act effects a physical taking, pole owners are entitled to
market value for granting access to their poles, and such value prop-
erly includes opportunity cost—the value of the services made possi-
ble by that access.
600 See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
601 311 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002).
602 See id. at 1368–69.
603 See id. at 1369–71.
604 See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. .
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C. Access to Broadband Networks
The internet represents perhaps the most significant and far-
reaching communications technology to emerge in the last several
years, competing variously as a substitute for telephones, faxes, televi-
sion, radio, postal services, and private data transmission networks.
Initially, most U.S. households received internet service through “nar-
rowband” technologies employing an analog modem attached to a
conventional telephone line.  Although conventional telephone-based
connections permit connection speeds of 56.6 thousand bits per sec-
ond (kbps), typical connection speeds fall in the neighborhood of
thirty kbps.605
Increasingly, however, U.S. consumers have been turning to
“broadband” technologies that allow subscribers to achieve actual
speeds in excess of one million bits per second (1 Mbps).606  Broad-
band transmission facilities provide many advantages for customers
seeking telecommunications and Internet access services, including
speeds up to 100 times faster than standard dial-up services.  Moreo-
ver, broadband services permit bandwidth-intensive multimedia con-
tent with enriched entertainment features, such as video and
interactive computer games.607  High-bandwidth systems further allow
“always-on” service without the inconvenience of repeatedly logging
on to connect to the internet.  In 2000, the FCC estimated that over
one-third of all U.S. online households would subscribe to some form
of broadband service within a few years.608  Econometric studies also
indicate that broadband is not a substitute for dial-up service, but in-
stead constitutes a separate market.609  The FCC has declared that
“[t]he widespread deployment of broadband infrastructure [was a]
central communications policy objective.”610
One key difference between narrowband and broadband connec-
tions to the internet has emerged as the flash point for policy makers.
Narrowband customers can use their telephone lines to connect to
any one of a large number of internet service providers (ISPs).  Broad-
band providers, however, typically require that their customers em-
605 See Speta, supra note 142, at 43.
606 Most DSL and cable modem users can expect speed somewhere in the neighbor-
hood of 1.5 Mbps, although theoretical speeds are much higher. Id. at 52, 56.
607 See id.
608 Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Re-
port, 15 F.C.C.R. 20913, 20983 ¶ 186 (2000) (“Second § 706 Report”).
609 See Hausman et al., supra note 126, at 303–04.
610 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3020–21 ¶ 1 (2002).
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ploy a proprietary ISP.611  Policy makers and commentators have
begun to explore whether they should compel broadband providers
to allow unaffiliated ISPs to employ their transmission networks.
Thus, of all the issues surrounding broadband deployment, the con-
troversy over this question has made access to broadband networks
“among the most compelling issues in the communications
industry.”612
This subpart explores the manner in which any such access re-
quirement should be implemented.  It begins by reviewing the ex-
isting regulatory regimes governing the two principal broadband
technologies: digital subscriber lines (DSL) and cable modem systems.
It then explores the proper manner in which access to such systems
should be priced.  We conclude that economic and constitutional con-
siderations both indicate that such access should be priced at market
value.
1. Regulatory Framework
a. Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL)
As noted earlier, DSL represents one of the two principal current
technologies for delivering broadband services to residential custom-
ers.  DSL takes advantage of the fact that conventional voice commu-
nications only occupy the lower transmission frequencies (typically
those ranging from 300 to 3400 hertz).  It is thus possible to use the
higher frequencies (those above 20,000 hertz) to convey data commu-
nications through the same telephone line without interfering with
voice communications.  Although there are numerous types of DSL
technology,613 we shall use the term “DSL” as the generic reference to
all forms of the technology.
611 For example, before its collapse, Excite@Home, which was the largest ISP serving
cable modem subscribers, was owned by such major cable modem providers as AT&T,
Comcast, Cox Communications, Cablevision Systems, and Shaw Cablesystems, and was the
exclusive ISP for those systems.  Time Warner, the second largest high-speed broadband
provider, previously required all of its subscribers to use a proprietary ISP called “Road-
Runner.” See Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9863 ¶ 107 (2000) (“AT&T-MediaOne
Merger”).
612 DEBORAH A. LATHEN, BROADBAND TODAY: A STAFF REPORT TO WILLIAM E. KENNARD,
CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 10 (Oct. 1999), available at http://
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf.
613 The most popular form of DSL is Asymmetric DSL (ADSL), in which download
transmission rates are higher than upload rates.  Other forms include High-bit-rate DSL
(HDSL), which has the same data transmission capacity in each direction and provides the
same capacity as a T1 line; Very-high-data-rate DSL (VDSL), which is the fastest DSL tech-
nology, but is expensive to deploy and cannot function over sustained distances; and Rate-
Adaptive DSL (RADSL), which allows software to adjust the rate of data transmission.  The
FCC refers to these various technologies as “xDSL,” with the “x” serving as a generic
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 120  6-MAY-03 11:13
1004 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:885
Several technical changes must be made to a local telephone net-
work before it can be used for DSL.  First, the loops used for DSL
must be “conditioned” because incumbent LECs often add devices to
their loops, such as bridge taps, low-pass filters, and range extenders,
which improve their networks’ performance and functionality for
transmitting voice calls.  Unfortunately, these devices also cause the
quality and the speed of DSL service to suffer.  Thus, before loops can
be used for DSL, all devices that have accumulated on the loop must
be removed.  In addition, if a single telephone line is used for both
voice and data traffic, the carrier must install equipment that can sep-
arate voice traffic from data traffic.  Typically the carrier will install a
device known as a digital subscriber line access multiplexer (DSLAM)
in the incumbent LEC’s central office.  The relevant loops are con-
nected to the DSLAM, which routes voice communications into a con-
ventional circuit-switched network and data communications into a
packet-switched network.
FIGURE 3: TYPICAL CONFIGURATION OF LOCAL TELEPHONE NETWORK
PROVIDING DSL SERVICE
DSLAM
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Data Switch
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Copper Loop
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Voice
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Data
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This scenario changes when incumbent LECs have deployed fiber
optics to increase the efficiency of their networks through a technol-
ogy known as “digital loop carriers” (DLCs), as depicted in Figure
4.614  Instead of using an all-copper loop to transmit analog signals
between the central office and the customer’s premises, DLC systems
placeholder for the designation of the particular type of DSL involved. See id. at 20–21 &
tbl.2.  The newest form is G.SHDSL, a new standard recently announced by the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union, which allows for a symmetric, multi-rate service capable
of reaching speeds up to 2.3 Mbps in both directions as well as deployment nearly twice as
far from the central office as other forms of DSL. See Inquiry Concerning Deployment of
Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in Reasonable and Timely
Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2879 ¶ 83 (2002)
(“Third § 706 Report”).
614 See William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the Principle
of Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment and Innovation,
2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 125, 141–42.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 121  6-MAY-03 11:13
2003] ACCESS TO NETWORKS 1005
use fiber optics to establish a digital connection between the central
office and a satellite facility known as a remote terminal.  From the
remote terminal, the transmission is converted into an analog format
and distributed to the customer’s premises through a copper sub-
loop.615  The fiber optic connection provides improved efficiency and
range that greatly enhance the quality of voice transmissions.  DLCs,
however, can impede the deployment of DSL because DSL depends
on the ability to send and receive signals in an analog format through
an all-copper connection.  The digital fiber-optic connection between
the central office and the remote terminal forces carriers who wish to
provide DSL services on a DLC network either to deploy DSLAMs in
remote terminals or to find an alternative copper loop running be-
tween the customer and the central office.
FIGURE 4: CONFIGURATION OF DSL SERVICE PROVIDED THROUGH
DIGITAL LOUP CARRIERS
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Policy makers have created two sets of regulations providing for
some degree of access to elements of a LEC’s DSL network.  The first
set of regulations originated in a series of FCC proceedings known as
the Computer Inquiries.616  The second set was created by the section
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that required incumbent
LECs to provide unbundled access to certain network elements.617
i. The Computer Inquiries
The first regulatory regime the FCC implemented to govern local
telephone companies’ broadband services was created during the
FCC’s Computer Inquiries.  Telecommunications companies began to
do more than provide customers with a pure transmission path, a
615 For simplicity, Figure 4 omits the fact that remote terminals are actually deployed
in a ring configuration.
616 See Robert Cannon, Where Internet Service Providers and Telephone Companies Compete: A
Guide to the Computer Inquiries, Enhanced Service Providers and Information Service Providers, 9
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 49, 53–56 (2001).
617 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6) (2000).
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function that came to be known as “basic services.”618  Instead, compa-
nies began to offer what became known as “enhanced services,” which
used computer processing to modify the information provided by the
customer before routing it to its final destination.619  Although the
LECs could offer the additional functionality provided by combining
computer processing and the transmission of those services to end
users as a single, integrated product, the lack of transmission capabil-
ity prevented other enhanced service providers (ESPs) from doing the
same.  These “pure ESPs” instead depended on the incumbent LEC to
provide such transmission services.
Policy makers soon became concerned that the LECs that were
formerly part of the Bell network, known as the “Bell Operating Com-
panies” (BOCs), would use their monopoly control over basic services
to favor their own, proprietary enhanced services over those offered
by unaffiliated ESPs in much the same manner that AT&T had fa-
vored its own long distance offerings prior to its breakup.620  The FCC
618 The regulations defined basic telecommunications services as “the offering of a
pure transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually transparent in
terms of its interaction with customer supplied information.”  Amendment of Section
64.702 of Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Deci-
sion, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 419–20 ¶¶ 95-96 (1980) (“Computer II Final Decision”), aff’d sub nom.
Computer & Communications Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 205 n.18 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
619 The regulations define “enhanced services” as “services, offered over common car-
rier transmission facilities used in interstate communications, which employ computer
processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of
the subscriber’s transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or
restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information.”  47
C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2001).  Common contemporary examples include voice mail, elec-
tronic mail, electronic store-and-forward, fax store-and-forward, and gateways to online
databases such as Westlaw, Lexis, and the Internet. See Cannon, supra note 616, at 54.
620 The regulatory regime established by the Third Computer Inquiry (“Computer III”)
applied only to those LECs that were originally part of the Bell system.  The FCC initially
applied the Computer III rules to both AT&T and the BOCs. See Amendment of Sections
64.702 of Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Or-
der, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (“Computer III Phase I Order”).  The FCC eventually relieved
AT&T of most Computer III requirements. See, e.g., Competition in Interstate Interexchange
Marketplace, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 10 F.C.C.R. 4562
(1995); Competition in Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order, 6
F.C.C.R. 5880 (1991); Amendment of Sections 64.702 of Commission’s Rules and Regula-
tions (Third Computer Inquiry), Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 2
F.C.C.R. 3035, 3039–40 ¶ 32, 3042–43, ¶¶ 45–53 (1987) (“Computer III Phase I Reconsidera-
tion Order”). But see Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 2449 (1988) (“AT&T ONA Order”) (ruling that AT&T re-
mains subject to a modified ONA plan the FCC approved in 1988).  The FCC later ex-
tended some ONA requirements to GTE. See Application of Open Network Architecture
and Nondiscrimination Safeguards to GTE Corp., Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 4922
(1994) (“GTE ONA Order”).  The FCC never imposed CEI requirements on GTE. See Com-
puter III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Services,
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, 6049 n.30 (1998) (“Computer III
Further Remand Notice”).
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responded in its First and Second Computer Inquiries (“Computer I
and II”) by requiring that BOCs wishing to provide enhanced services
to do so through a separate corporate subsidiary.621  The order that
memorialized the breakup of AT&T similarly prohibited the BOCs
from providing “information services,”622 a category determined by
the courts and the FCC to be coterminous with “enhanced ser-
vices,”623 and ordered the BOCs to provide nondiscriminatory access
to all information service providers.624
In its Third Computer Inquiry (“Computer III”), the FCC eventu-
ally concluded that the costs of the separate subsidiary requirement
outweighed the benefits and that nonstructural safeguards would pro-
tect against anticompetitive activity just as effectively.625  Conse-
quently, the Commission created a two-phase system of nonstructural
restrictions that would allow the BOCs to avoid the separate subsidiary
requirement and thereby provide enhanced services on an integrated
basis.  The first phase, known as comparably efficient interconnection
(CEI), required LECs that wished to provide enhanced services with-
out establishing a separate corporate entity to provide unaffiliated
ESPs with access to the same basic services the LECs employed to pro-
vide their own enhanced service offerings.626  The second phase,
known as open network architecture (ONA), required the LECs to
621 In its First Computer Inquiry, the FCC drew a distinction between “communica-
tions services” and “data processing services.”  Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented
by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, Tenta-
tive Decision of the Commission, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 295 ¶ 15(a) (1970).  The FCC also
required common carriers other than AT&T who wished to furnish data processing ser-
vices to do so through a separate corporate subsidiary. See Regulatory and Policy Problems
Presented by Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities,
Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270–74 ¶¶ 11–22 (1971), aff’d sub nom. GTE
Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).  AT&T was precluded from offering data
processing services altogether by the 1956 consent decree that terminated antitrust litiga-
tion against it. See id. at 282 ¶ 39 & n.13.
622 United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 189–90 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).  The AT&T decision defined infor-
mation services as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, trans-
forming, processing, retrieving, utilizing or making available information which may be
conveyed via telecommunications.” Id. at 179, 229.  Although the court prohibited the
BOCs from offering information services, it did allow AT&T to offer most information
services after the divestiture of local telephone companies.  The only exception was elec-
tronic publishing, from which AT&T was to be barred for seven years. See id. at 178–86.
623 Id. at 178 n.198; Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections
271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, First Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905, 21955–56 ¶ 102 (1996).  As a
result, the FCC has used the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Computer III Further Remand
Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Services, Report and Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 4289, 4290–91 n.3 (1999) (“Computer III Further Remand Report & Order”); Computer
III Further Remand Notice, 13 F.C.C.R. at 6042 n.4, 6066 ¶ 40.
624 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 141 n.40, 195–97.
625 104 F.C.C.2d at 1002–12 ¶¶ 79–98.
626 See Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1035–43 ¶¶ 147–166.
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allow unbundled access to all of their network elements.  ONA is sub-
stantially broader than CEI because it is not limited to LECs that offer
advanced services.627  Moreover, ONA requires that LECs provide ac-
cess to all of their network elements, not simply those that the LECs
were using to provide their own enhanced services.628
In requiring LECs to provide unbundled access to elements of
their networks, the FCC refused to require physical collocation under
either CEI or ONA.629  Instead, the FCC simply mandated that the
LECs minimize transmission costs.  Although the FCC recognized that
collocation would often represent the most efficient form of equal ac-
cess available, it also acknowledged that other means might prove
more cost effective when space is extremely limited.630
During 1992 and 1993, the FCC lifted the structural separation
requirement as soon as individual BOCs had shown that their plans
met the ONA requirements.631  A series of judicial challenges has
failed to resolve the legality of the FCC’s Computer III regime.632  In
627 See Ameritech’s Comparably Efficient Interconnection Plan for Electronic Vaulting
Service, Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 80, 84 n.18 (1997); Bell Operating Cos. Joint Petition for
Waiver of Computer II Rules, Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 13758, 13762–63 ¶ 26 (1995).
628 Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1064–66 ¶¶ 214–217.  As originally con-
ceived, ONA appeared to offer LECs’ networks to unaffiliated ESPs on an element-by-ele-
ment basis.  The FCC eventually stopped short of such “fundamental unbundling,” instead
approving a “common ONA model” that did not require the LECs to disaggregate their
networks into individual facilities but instead allowed them to provide access of somewhat
larger aggregations of network elements. See Filing and Review of Open Network Architec-
ture Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1, 13–14 ¶¶ 5–8, 41–42  ¶ 69
(1988) (“BOC ONA Order”) .
629 See Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1037–38 ¶¶ 151–153, 1042 ¶ 164
(ruling that CEI did not require mandatory collocation); id. at 1066 ¶ 218 (extending the
same principles to ONA); accord BOC ONA Order, 4 F.C.C.R. at 41–42 ¶ 69 (recognizing that
the Computer III Phase I Order did not order “mandated interconnection on carriers’ prem-
ises of facilities owned by others”).
630 See Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1037–38 ¶¶ 151–153, 1042 ¶ 164; id.
at 1066 ¶ 218.  The FCC has reaffirmed this decision on numerous occasions. See, e.g.,
Application of Open Network Architecture and Nondiscrimination Safeguards to GTE
Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 1388, 1414 ¶ 57 (1995); Computer III
Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Safeguards and Tier 1 Local Exchange Co. Safe-
guards, Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 7600–01 ¶ 64 (1991) (“Computer III Remand
Proceedings”), vacated and remanded in part sub nom. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995); BOC ONA Order, 4 F.C.C.R. at 94 ¶¶ 181–183
(1988).
631 See Computer III: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Services, Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 8360, 8366–67 n.22 (1995).
632 The Ninth Circuit initially overturned the Computer III regime as arbitrary and ca-
pricious on the ground that the FCC had not adequately justified its decision to rely on
nonstructural safeguards. See California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1230–39 (9th Cir. 1990).
In response, the FCC strengthened ONA by imposing mandatory price cap regulation on
the BOCs and by establishing new cost accounting rules to make anticompetitive activity
easier to detect.  The FCC also reaffirmed its conclusion that nonstructural safeguards
should govern BOC participation in the information services industry. See Computer III Re-
mand Proceedings, 6 F.C.C.R. at 7578–88 ¶¶ 14–41, 7617–25 ¶¶ 98–109. As noted earlier,
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 125  6-MAY-03 11:13
2003] ACCESS TO NETWORKS 1009
the meantime, the FCC has continued to require that BOCs and GTE
that comply with the ONA plans already filed with and approved by
the FCC.633  Furthermore, courts rejected the FCC’s attempt to pre-
clude states from imposing more stringent access requirements on the
LECs.634  States were free to impose more stringent requirements over
intrastate enhanced services.  As will be discussed in greater detail
later, certain states, such as Oregon, enacted their own ONA regimes
mandating physical collocation.635
ii. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
As noted earlier, the 1996 Act requires incumbent LECs to inter-
connect with other telecommunications carriers on just and reasona-
ble terms and to provide other telecommunications carriers with
access to all of their network elements on an unbundled basis.636  In a
series of orders, the FCC determined that these statutory obligations
apply to many of the elements needed to provide DSL service.  Specifi-
cally, the FCC ruled that the 1996  Act’s interconnection obligations
applied to facilities and equipment used to provide data services as
well as voice services637 and declined to exempt advanced services
from those requirements.638  In addition, the FCC concluded that the
high frequency portion of the loop used to carry DSL was subject to
the FCC simultaneously weakened ONA by shifting from a “fundamental unbundling” ap-
proach, in which ISPs could obtain access to the BOCs’ networks on an element-by-ele-
ment basis, to a less granular approach, in which unbundling was defined in terms of
network services rather than facilities. See supra note 628.  In California v. FCC, the Ninth
Circuit again partially vacated the FCC’s ONA regime on the ground that the FCC failed to
explain the shift away from fundamental unbundling.  39 F.3d at 925–30.  The FCC has
issued a series of notices attempting to address the concerns raised by the Ninth Circuit.
See Computer III: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servvices, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, 6050–55 (1998); Computer III Further Remand Proceedings:
Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10
F.C.C.R. 8360, 8370–87 (1995) (“Computer III Further Remand Proceedings”).  These proceed-
ings, however, are yet to be completed. See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell
Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Services, Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 4289, 4292
n.6 (1999).
633 Bell Operating Cos.’ Joint Petition for Waiver of Computer II Rules, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 1724, 1730 (Common Carrier Bur. 1995) (“Interim Waiver
Order”); accord Computer III Further Remand Proceedings, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8369 ¶ 11.
634 California v. FCC, 905 F.2d at 1239–45.
635 See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 860-035-0110 (2002); infra text accompanying note 718.
636 See supra notes 13, 47, 395–99 and accompanying text.  Initially, the 1996 Act also
prohibited BOCs from offering in-region alarm monitoring services, 47 U.S.C. § 275(a)(1)
(2000), and temporarily required that BOCs offer information services and electronic pub-
lishing through a separate subsidiary, id. §§ 272(a)(2)(C), 274(a).  These restrictions have
since expired. See id. §§ 272(f)(2), 274(g)(2), 275(a)(1).
637 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capabil-
ity, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R.
24012, 24034–35 ¶¶ 46–47 (1998) (“Advanced Servs. Order”), remanded sub nom. US W. Com-
munications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1410, 1999 WL 72855 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 1999).
638 See id. at 24018 ¶ 12, 24044–48 ¶¶  69–79.
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unbundled access,639 as were most attached electronics.640  The FCC
also ruled that the forward-looking incremental-cost approach embod-
ied in TELRIC would determine the rates charged for access to DSL
components.641
The FCC stopped short of mandating unbundled access to in-
cumbent LECs’ packet-switching technology, including DSLAMs.  Al-
though unbundled access to routing and switching capability was
appropriate in the circuit-switched market, in which higher utilization
rates allowed incumbent LECs to achieve significant economies of
scale, incumbent LECs did not maintain a monopoly in the packet-
switched market.  The FCC recognized that investments in facilities
used to provide service to nascent markets, such as broadband, carried
significantly greater risks than those in established markets.  There-
fore, although the failure to mandate unbundled access required en-
trants to incur the costs associated with collocating their own
equipment, the potential adverse effect on investment incentives led
the FCC to refuse to mandate unbundled access to DSLAMs and other
packet-switching technology.642
The FCC did allow for one exception to this refusal by ruling that
incumbent LECs employing DLCs must provide unbundled access to
packet-switching equipment when the incumbent LEC has placed a
DSLAM in a remote terminal, but has not allowed other carriers to do
the same through physical collocation.643  In addition, although in-
cumbent LECs need not provide unbundled access to their own
DSLAMs, they must allow requesting carriers to collocate DSLAMs
639 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capabil-
ity, Third Report and Order in CC Docket No. 98-147 and Fourth Report and Order in CC
Docket No. 96-98, 14 F.C.C.R. 20912, 20921–22 ¶¶  13–14, 20922–23 ¶¶  16–19, 20926 ¶ 25
(1999) (“Line Sharing Order”); 47 C.F.R. § 51.319(h) (2001); Advanced Servs. Order, 13
F.C.C.R. at 24036–38 ¶¶ 52–54.  The FCC later clarified that incumbent LECs also must
condition (i.e., remove equipment from) loops upon request. See Implementation of Local
Competition Provisions of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and
Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3775 ¶ 172, 3783–84
¶¶ 190–194 (1999) (“UNE Remand Order”); 47 C.F.R. § 51.319(a)(3), (h)(5).  The D.C.
Circuit affirmed that incumbent LECs’ DSL-based advanced services are subject to 47
U.S.C. § 251(c).  WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246 F.3d 690, 693–95 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  The
court did, however, vacate and remand the order for the FCC to determine whether DSL-
based advanced services constituted “exchange access” or “telephone exchange service.”
Id. at 695–96.
640 UNE Remand Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3776–77 ¶ 175.
641 Line Sharing Order, 14 F.C.C.R. at 20973 ¶ 132, 20974–81 ¶¶ 135–157.
642 See UNE Remand Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3835–37 ¶¶ 306–309, 3839–40 ¶¶ 314–317; see
also Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of Telecommunications Act of 1996,
First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15713 ¶ 427 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”)
(declining to “adopt a national rule for the unbundling of packet switches”).
643 UNE Remand Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3838–39 ¶ 313; 47 C.F.R. § 51.319(c)(5).  The
regulations also require that no spare copper loops capable of providing DSL service be
available. See id.
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and other equipment needed to route data communications into the
requesting carrier’s packet-switched network.644
The FCC’s conclusions with respect to collocation largely paral-
leled its conclusions with respect to interconnection and unbundled
access.  Carriers could collocate transmission and termination equip-
ment, including multiplexers on LEC premises.  New entrants were
not permitted, however, to collocate packet switches and other equip-
ment used solely to provide enhanced services, because such equip-
ment was unrelated to the transmission and termination of telephone
exchange service and exchange access.645  The FCC later clarified the
manner in which these rules applied to multifunction equipment by
explaining that incumbent LECs must permit collocation of any
equipment that was “used or useful for interconnection or access to
unbundled network elements, regardless of any other functionalities
that may be offered by that equipment.”646  As a result, competitors
had the right to collocate equipment such as DSLAMs, routers, ATM
multiplexers, and remote switching modules, which are designed both
to terminate and switch broadband traffic.647
The D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s decision permitting the
collocation of multifunction equipment.648  The court reasoned that
the FCC’s decision to mandate collocation of any equipment used or
useful for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements
conflicted with the statutory requirement that collocation be limited
to equipment that was “necessary to achieve reasonable physical
collocation.”649
A subsequent D.C. Circuit decision also struck down the FCC’s
decision requiring unbundled access to the high frequency portion of
local loops.650  The court based this decision on the FCC’s own find-
ings that DSL providers faced “robust competition” from cable
modem providers and, to a lesser extent, satellite broadband provid-
644 See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Ca-
pability, Fourth Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 15435, 15460–63 ¶¶ 45–51 (2001) (“Colloca-
tion Remand Order”), aff’d sub nom. Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
645 See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15794–96 ¶¶ 580–581.
646 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capabil-
ity, First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 4776–79
¶¶ 28–31 (1999) (“Collocation Order”).
647 See id. at 4776–77 ¶¶ 27–28.
648 GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 418–19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  For an earlier
discussion of this case, see supra notes 408, 463, 483 and accompanying text.
649 GTE Serv. Corp., 205 F.3d at 426 (internal quotations omitted).  In so holding, the
D.C. Circuit invoked the Supreme Court’s admonition that the term “necessary” must be
construed according to its ordinary meaning, which is limited to what is “required to achieve
a desired goal” and is not so broad as to apply to anything that simply increases the request-
ing carrier’s costs. Id. at 423–24 (emphasis added) (citing AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,
525 U.S. 366, 389–90 (1999)).
650 United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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ers.651  In fact, cable modems established the early lead, capturing
fifty-four percent of the market for high-speed lines, while DSL cap-
tured only twenty-eight percent.652  At this point in the race, however,
“no competitor has a large embedded base of paying residential con-
sumers,” and as a result the “record does not indicate that the con-
sumer market is inherently a natural monopoly.”653  Drawing
guidance from Justice Breyer’s observation that mandatory un-
bundling creates innovation and investment disincentives and em-
broils network owners in the “tangled management inherent in
shared use of a common resource,”654 the D.C. Circuit concluded that
compelling access to the high frequency portions of loops exceeded
the “necessary” and “impair” requirements of the 1996 Act.655
In response, the FCC ruled that the high frequency portion of
the loop and fiber and hybrid fiber-copper loops are no longer un-
bundled network elements.656  In addition, the FCC revised its rules to
limit collocation of multifunction equipment to equipment that pro-
vides the requesting carrier either with interconnection that is “equal
in quality” to that provided by the incumbent LEC for its own services
or with “nondiscriminatory access to one or more unbundled network
elements.”657  The FCC asserted that even if the collocation effected a
per se taking, any issues relating to just compensation can be ad-
dressed after the implementation of an actual rate order.658  The par-
ties did not press any constitutional issues in their unsuccessful
judicial challenge to the revised rules.659
651 See id. at 428.
652 Id. at 429 (citing Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunica-
tions Capability to All Americans in Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2864 ¶ 44, 2865 ¶ 48 (2002)).
653 Id. at 428–29 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Inquiry Concerning De-
ployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in Reasonable
and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Sec-
tion 706 of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 2423 ¶ 48 (1999)).
654 See id. at 429 (citing AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428–29 (1999)
(Berger, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
655 See id. (holding that the FCC’s Line Sharing Order was tainted by the same error as
the provisions discussed in the earlier portions of the opinion, which focused on the “nec-
essary” and “impair” standards).  For a more complete description of these standards, see
supra note 408 and accompanying text.
656 Attachment to Triennial Review Press Release 2 (F.C.C. Feb. 20, 2003), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov./edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-231344A2.pdf.
657 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capabil-
ity, Fourth Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 15435, 15454 ¶¶ 32–44 (2001) (“Collocation Re-
mand Order”).
658 See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Ca-
pability, Order on Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
CC Docket No. 8-147 and Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No.
96-98, 15 F.C.C.R. 17806, 17839 ¶ 69 (2000) (“Collocation Reconsideration Order”).
659 See Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 903, 905 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 129  6-MAY-03 11:13
2003] ACCESS TO NETWORKS 1013
iii. Reconciling the Two Regimes
Although some commentators have suggested that the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 superseded the Computer III regime,660 both
regimes continue to govern in slightly different spheres.  For example,
the range of entities that must provide access under the 1996 Act is
broader than the range of entities that must do so under Computer III,
because the relevant provisions of the 1996 Act cover all incumbent
LECs, whereas ONA applies only to BOCs and, in some cases, GTE.661
In addition, a narrower range of entities may request access under the
1996 Act than may request access under Computer III.  Because the in-
terconnection and unbundled access provisions of the 1996 Act ex-
tend only to “telecommunications carriers”662—those who offer
transport services to the public without changing the form or content
of the information663—it does not cover pure ESPs, which use com-
puter processing to modify user-supplied information without provid-
ing transmission services to end users.664  Finally, the two regimes have
different geographic scopes.665
The FCC launched a series of proposals reconsidering various
features of the current regulatory regime.  For example, the FCC
reevaluated whether the high-frequency portion of the loop should
continue to be a network element subject to unbundled access.666  At
660 See, e.g., Cannon, supra note 616, at 68.
661 See supra note 620.  GTE merged with Bell Atlantic to form Verizon. See Peter J.
Howe, Regulators OK Bell Atlantic-GTE Merger, BOSTON GLOBE, June 17, 2000, at C1.
662 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)–(3) (2000).
663 See id. § 153(43), (44), (46).  The FCC determined that telecommunications carri-
ers remain within the scope of the interconnection and unbundled access provisions of the
1996 Act even if they offer information services through the same arrangement.  Imple-
mentation of Local Competition Provisions of Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Re-
port & Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15990 ¶¶ 992–995 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”).
664 Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of En-
hanced Services, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, 6061 ¶ 32,
6090 ¶ 92 (1998) (“Computer III Further Remand Notice”).  Pure ISPs provide only informa-
tion services. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).
665 The separate affiliate requirements for BOC provision of information services
under the 1996 Act are limited to interLATA information services, 47 U.S.C. § 271(a),
except with regard to electronic publishing services, which must be provided through a
separate affiliate regardless of whether it is offered on an interLATA or on an intraLATA
basis, 47 U.S.C. § 274(a).  The separate subsidiary requirements enacted by Computer II and
the nonstructural safeguards enacted by Computer III do not distinguish between in-
terLATA and intraLATA information services.  Implementation of the Non-Accounting
Safeguards of Section 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, First
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905,
21969–70 ¶¶ 132–134 (1996) (“Non-Accounting Safeguards Order”).  As a result, interLATA
information services are subject to both section 271 of the 1996 Act and ONA/CEI.  In-
traLATA services (except electronic publishing) are subject only to CEI and ONA. Id.
666 See Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22781, 22805–06 ¶ 53 (2001) (“Tri-
ennial UNE Review Notice”).
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the same proceeding, the FCC solicited comments on the rules gov-
erning unbundling.667  The FCC also sought comments on the physi-
cal collocation rules of DSLAMs and other equipment at remote
terminals.668  Finally, the FCC opened a sweeping inquiry attempting
to rationalize these two regulatory regimes.  In particular, this pro-
ceeding explored whether technological changes or the enactment of
the 1996 Act justify or require the modification or elimination of part
or all of the CEI and ONA regime created by Computer III.669
For the purposes of this Article, the key fact is that unlike the
federal ONA regime, the 1996 Act and certain state ONA regimes give
requesting carriers the right to collocate DSLAMs and switching and
routing equipment on the incumbent LEC’s property, whether in cen-
tral offices or remote terminals.670  Like all unbundled network ele-
ments governed by the 1996 Act, the rates that incumbent LECs may
charge for conditioned loops and physical collocation are governed
by TELRIC.671
b. Cable Modem Systems
Cable modems represent the other principal technology for pro-
viding broadband services to residential customers.672  Cable modem
systems provide data communications through the network of coaxial
cables originally designed to provide a uniform stream of video pro-
gramming in one direction running from the network to all subscrib-
ers.  Before a cable network can be used to provide cable modem
service, it must be transformed from the typical tree-and-branch infra-
structure associated with transmitting television programming into a
ring or star-type infrastructure.  This is usually accomplished through
a hybrid fiber-coaxial (HFC) architecture similar to the DLC architec-
ture discussed above.673  In an HFC architecture, fiber optic cables are
used to connect the cable headend to a satellite facility known as a
neighborhood node.  The final connection between the neighbor-
667 Id. at 22809 ¶ 61 (requesting comments on the rule requiring unbundled access to
DSLAMs in remote terminals where collocation is impossible and alternative copper loops
are unavailable); Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunica-
tions Capability, Order on Reconsideration & Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 8–147 and Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
CC Docket No. 96–98, 15 F.C.C.R. 17806, 17851–54 ¶¶ 103–112 (2000) (“Collocation Recon-
sideration Order”) (opening general inquiry into unbundled access at remote terminals).
668 See Collocation Reconsideration Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 17851–54 ¶¶ 104–112 (2000).
669 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3040–43 ¶¶ 43-53 (2002).
670 See supra notes 375, 384, 634 and accompanying text.
671 See supra notes 408–15 and accompanying text.
672 The ensuing regulatory history draws on the discussion in Yoo, supra note 11, at
175–76, 250–51.
673 See supra note 614 and accompanying text.  For simplicity, Figure 5 omits the fact
that fiber rods are actually deployed in a ring configuration.
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hood node and the subscribers is made through copper-based coaxial
cables.  Cable modem service also requires special equipment at the
headend known as frequency up-conventer to segregate the video at
data streams onto different channels.  A device known as a cable
modem termination system (CMTS) in turn separates and connects
the flow of data to the various broadband services, such as e-mail, IP
telephony, content cached locally, and content residing on the World
Wide Web.
FIGURE 5: TYPICAL CONFIGURATION OF CABLE MODEM SYSTEM
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Router
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The principal access-related policy question regarding cable
modem systems is the extent to which the government should ensure
that cable modem customers have some degree of choice among ISPs.
Litigants and commentators have described this issue as either “open
access” or “forced access,” depending on the particular biases of the
party using the term.674  In an attempt to sidestep the political over-
tones associated with either designation, the FCC opted to refer to the
issue as “multiple ISP access.”675
Questions about multiple ISP access first arose during the FCC’s
review of AT&T’s proposed acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne.  A
number of parties argued that allowing AT&T to bring both physical
transmission and ISP services under the same corporate umbrella
would allow AT&T to use its control over cable to harm competition
in the market for ISPs.  Consequently, these parties asked the FCC to
force AT&T to allow independent ISPs to interconnect with AT&T’s
cable modem service network on nondiscriminatory terms.676  Consis-
tent with its longstanding policy of nonregulation of computer-based
674 See Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9866 ¶ 114 (2000) (“AT&T-MediaOne
Merger”).
675 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facil-
ities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4839 ¶ 72
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
676 See AT&T-MediaOne Merger, 15 F.C.C.R. at 9866 ¶¶ 114–115; Applications for Con-
sent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from Tele-Commu-
nications, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
14 F.C.C.R. 3160, 3197–98 ¶ 75 (1999) (“AT&T-TCI Merger”).
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services,677 the FCC refused to impose multiple ISP access as a merger
condition in either case.678
Because cable operators are subject to municipal as well as fed-
eral regulation, advocates of multiple ISP access pressed their argu-
ments before municipal regulators.  Some of these municipal
authorities turned out to be more accommodating than the FCC, ei-
ther mandating open access by municipal ordinance679 or requiring it
as a condition for the license transfer needed to complete AT&T’s
acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne.680  A series of judicial decisions
holding that municipal franchising authorities lacked the jurisdiction
to compel multiple ISP access soon cut short these municipal
regulations.681
Multiple ISP access advocates were unable to garner sustainable
victories until the merger between America Online and Time Warner.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) order approving the merger
required that AOL Time Warner allow cable modem subscribers the
option of choosing from among at least three unaffiliated ISPs in ad-
dition to its proprietary ISPs, America Online and RoadRunner.682
677 See, e.g., Amendment of Section 64.702 of Commission’s Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 433 ¶¶ 124–127 (1980) (“Computer II
Final Decision”), aff’d sub nom. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d
198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983); Regulatory and Policy Problems
Presented by Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities,
Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270 ¶ 11 (1970), aff’d sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp.
v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).
678 AT&T-MediaOne Merger, 15 F.C.C.R. at 9872–73 ¶ 127; AT&T-TCI Merger, 14
F.C.C.R. at 3205–08 ¶¶ 92–96.
679 See Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp.
2d 685, 686–87 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
680 See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, Va., 257 F.3d 356, 360 (4th Cir.
2001); AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2000). See generally
LATHEN, supra note 612, at 14–15 (describing mandated access proposals in Portland,
Broward County, Florida, San Francisco, and Fairfax, Virginia, as well as initiatives in other
localities).
681 The Ninth Circuit’s decision followed from its conclusion that cable modem service
constituted a “telecommunications service[ ].” AT&T, 216 F.3d at 878–79.  The Fourth
Circuit was more circumspect about the proper regulatory classification of cable modem
service, holding instead that requiring open access violated 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(D)
(2000), which prohibits franchising authorities from requiring cable operators to provide
telecommunications facilities. MediaOne, 257 F.3d at 362–65.
682 The FTC order allowed AOL Time Warner to begin providing cable service in
twenty specifically identified geographic areas, provided that cable modem subscribers had
the option of subscribing to Earthlink and that AOL Time Warner made at least two addi-
tional unaffiliated ISP options available within ninety days. See America Online, Inc., No.
C-3989, slip op. at 6-7 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2000) (Decision and Order), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf.  The order did not condition the initial offering
of services on the availability of Earthlink as an option in any other geographic area.  In-
stead, it simply required AOL Time Warner to provide at least three unaffiliated ISPs
within ninety days of making its own ISP services available. See id. at 8.  The FTC also
authorized the appointment of a trustee to monitor compliance with its order. See id. at
12–14.
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The order also required AOL Time Warner to provide all of these
unaffiliated ISPs with “Access,”683 which the order defined as the right
to interconnect at the same connection points that AOL Time Warner
provided to its own affiliated ISPs.684  In addition, the order required
that AOL Time Warner not discriminate against the unaffiliated ISPs’
content,685 and that all ISP service agreements include a “most fa-
vored nation clause,” allowing unaffiliated ISPs to avail themselves of
the most attractive terms obtained by AOL from other unaffiliated
cable systems.686
Although it had rejected similar arguments in relation to AT&T’s
acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne,687 the FCC abruptly reversed
course, endorsing the FTC’s requirement that Time Warner and
America Online negotiate open access with at least three unaffiliated
ISPs as a condition of their merger.688  Although the FCC claimed that
its decision did not “portend” how it would resolve multiple ISP access
as a matter of general regulatory policy,689 the breadth of its reasoning
suggested that it might approve even more sweeping action in the fu-
ture.690  In fact, AT&T and Comcast voluntarily agreed to undertake a
limited form of multiple ISP access, apparently to boost their chances
of regulatory approval for Comcast’s acquisition of AT&T’s cable
properties.691
Since then, however, the FCC’s initial reticence to impose multi-
ple ISP access seems to have reasserted itself.  For example, the FCC
concluded that cable modem service is an interstate “information ser-
vice.”692  This decision has twofold significance.  First, by rejecting the
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that cable modem services constituted
“telecommunications services,”693 the FCC removed cable modem ser-
vice from the interconnection, unbundled access, and physical collo-
683 Id. at 11.
684 Id. at 2.
685 Id. at 11.
686 Id. at 9.
687 See supra note 678 and accompanying text.
688 See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6568–69
¶ 57 (2001) (“AOL-Time Warner Merger”).
689 Id. at 6569 ¶ 58.
690 See id. at 6581–6600 ¶¶ 80–125.
691 See Julia Angwin, AT&T to Offer EarthLink Inc. on Cable Lines, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13,
2002, at B7; Julia Angwin, Comcast, United Online Set Deal for Internet Service on Cable Lines,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at B4.
692 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet Over Cable and Other Facili-
ties, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4820–32,
¶¶ 34–59 (2002) (“Cable Modem NPRM”).
693 Id. at 4831–32 ¶¶ 56–58.
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cation requirements contained in the 1996 Act.694  Second, the FCC’s
decision placed cable modems in a regulatory category traditionally
associated with nonregulation.  Therefore, the classification of cable
modem service as an information service was generally regarded as a
signal that the FCC was unlikely to mandate multiple ISP access.695
The FCC acknowledged that this remained an open issue and re-
quested comments on the relative merits of imposing multiple ISP ac-
cess,696 as well as on the free speech and takings implications of
compelling such access.697
The order approving Comcast’s acquisition of AT&T’s cable busi-
nesses cast further doubts on the Commission’s willingness to impose
multiple ISP access.698  Notably, the FCC downplayed its role in the
multiple ISP access mandate imposed during the AOL-Time Warner
merger.  The Commission argued that the unaffiliated ISP condition
was imposed by the FTC and that the FCC’s only contribution to the
process was to require that any such access, provided voluntarily or
otherwise, be offered on a nondiscriminatory basis.  In addition, the
FCC argued that multiple ISP access was justified in that case because
the merger brought the nation’s largest ISP, second largest cable op-
erator, and some of the largest libraries of multimedia content availa-
ble under the same corporate umbrella.  The AT&T-Comcast merger
posed no similar risks.  Indeed, Comcast had already made a commit-
ment to support ISP choice and was already bound by contract to al-
low a number of unaffiliated ISPs access to its system.  As a result, the
FCC concluded that any further multiple ISP requirements were
unnecessary.699
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
If the government mandates access to broadband inputs, eco-
nomic analysis indicates that access rates should be based on market
prices.  As we have repeatedly emphasized, this would promote alloca-
tive efficiency by giving both purchasers and providers the appropri-
ate signals for calibrating consumption and production levels.  In
addition, basing access rates on market prices would enhance dy-
namic efficiency by providing the incentives necessary to attract the
694 Interestingly, classifying cable modem service as an information service possibly
subjected it to municipal regulation, as demonstrated by the FCC’s active solicitation of
comments on this specific point. See id. at 4849 ¶ 100.
695 See Yochi J. Dreazen, FCC Ruling Frees Cable-TV Firms from Sharing Wires, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 15, 2002, at B2.
696 Cable Modem NPRM, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4839–41 ¶ 74, 4843–47 ¶¶ 83–93.
697 Id. at 4843 ¶¶ 80–81.
698 Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses from Comcast
Corp. & AT&T Corp., Transferors, to AT&T Comcast Corp., Transferee, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 23246, 23299–300 ¶ 135 (2002).
699 Id. at 22300–01 ¶¶ 135–137.
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investments needed to finance the deployment of the various broad-
band technologies.  As the FCC has repeatedly recognized, issues sur-
rounding investment and innovation are of the utmost importance
when the market involved “is a nascent one.”700
Although at one time market prices might have been difficult to
determine, the emergence of new technologies capable of providing
high-speed broadband services make this task increasingly easy.  As
noted earlier, DSL and cable modem systems are currently competing
vigorously for early dominance of the broadband industry.  Although
both technologies are generally assumed to constitute natural monop-
olies, formal models calibrated on engineering data suggest that as
many as seventy percent of U.S. households may eventually be able to
choose from up to three wireline broadband providers.701  In addi-
tion, communications companies provide broadband services through
a wide variety of wireless technologies, including PCS, MDS, ancillary
and supplemental service provided via digital television, and 3G mo-
bile wireless devices.702  These services are similar in geographic scope
to those provided by cable modem and local telephone systems.  Al-
though these services are still in their nascent stages, when fully opera-
tional they should provide a ready basis for determining the value of
the transmission of services.
In addition, DBS companies provide satellite broadband services
that are beginning to compete directly with cable modem systems and
ADSL.703  These too can provide a market-based benchmark for the
value of network services.  Because DBS is necessarily national in
scope and because the quality of the broadband services may differ,
any direct comparison between DBS and other more regional wireline
broadband services can be complicated.  Nevertheless, these substi-
tutes can provide useful guidance as to the value of services under a
regime of compelled access.
If these alternative technologies are insufficiently developed to
allow direct determination of market prices, economic theory indi-
cates that regulatory authorities should base rates on ECPR, which sets
rates as the sum of the forward-looking incremental cost and the op-
portunity cost associated with providing access.704  The opportunity
cost of providing network access is determined by subtracting direct
incremental costs from the retail price in the final goods market.  The
700 See, e.g., Cable Modem NPRM, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4802 ¶ 5; Deployment of Wireline Ser-
vices Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, First Report and Order and No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 4763 ¶ 2 (1999) (“Collocation Order”).
701 See Gerald R. Faulhaber & Christian Hogendorn, The Market Structure of Broadband
Telecommunications, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 305, 321 (2000).
702 See supra notes 549, 552–53, 652–53 and accompanying text.
703 See supra note 551 and accompanying text.
704 See supra Part I.C.3.
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FCC has been reluctant to allow this method, primarily because the
retail prices supposedly reflected monopoly returns.705  Although this
position is at least arguable in the case of local telephony,706 it is un-
supportable in the case of broadband.  The FCC and the courts have
recognized that vibrant competition exists, and the impending arrival
of additional competitors should only cause it to intensify.707
Indeed, the presence of this competition raises serious questions
whether compelling access to high-speed broadband facilities repre-
sents sensible economic policy.  Access requirements only make sense
if a true bottleneck facility provides a company with a natural monop-
oly.  When competition exists, compelled access at best accomplishes
nothing, because parties who negotiate agreements on other terms
will simply negotiate around access rates that are set too high.708  Ac-
cess rates that are set too low, however, can harm allocative efficiency
by creating the shortages and distortions inevitably associated with
prices that are not calibrated to balance supply and demand.709
Worse yet, compelled access can harm dynamic efficiency by elim-
inating the need for firms to invest in substitute facilities.  By rescuing
those who need alternative means of transmission from having to in-
vest in alternative capacity, access requirements can forestall the emer-
gence of competition by depriving other facilities-based competitors
of their natural strategic partners.710  Access requirements can thus
have the perverse effect of cementing the existing technologies into
place.  The FCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking acknowledges this
by underscoring the importance of taking a more functional ap-
proach711 and recognizing the emergence of multiple options in pro-
viding broadband service, including cable, telephony, wireless, and
satellite.712  Indeed, it was the emergence of this competition that led
the FCC to seek comment on whether access requirements should be
eliminated.713
Thus, there is good reason to question whether the FCC should
compel access to broadband networks.  If it does, it should base the
rates for such access on market prices.  Any attempt to base prices
solely on direct cost, as under the current TELRIC regime, fails to
705 See supra notes 418, 447 and accompanying text.
706 See supra notes 418, 479 and accompanying text.
707 See supra notes 548–54, 653 and accompanying text.
708 This presumes that access rates will follow the model established by the 1996 Act
and, rather than requiring carriers to provide services on a tariffed basis, allow parties to
negotiate their own arrangements.
709 See supra Part I.B.1.
710 See, e.g., supra notes 25, 455–56 and accompanying text.
711 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3023 ¶ 7 (2002).
712 See id. at 3037–38 ¶¶ 36–37.
713 See id. at 3040–42 ¶¶ 44–48.
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acknowledge that market value of network access is determined by the
value of the services sold through the network, not the cost of the
network itself.714  Not only is this appropriate in light of the fact that
networks are capital assets that are not consumed, but it also reflects
the demand-side considerations that underlie economic analysis.  The
presence of substitute facilities should permit market value to be de-
termined through a comparison to actual market transactions or
through the opportunity cost component mandated by ECPR.  The
presence of direct competition makes it unlikely that prices set in this
manner will allow network owners to recover supracompetitive
returns.
3. Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence provides another
reason for requiring that any FCC-imposed access be priced at market
value.  The issues are the clearest with respect to DSL.  Although the
D.C. Circuit vacated the regulations providing that the high frequency
portion of the loop constituted a network element subject to unbun-
dled access under the 1996 Act, it left intact the regulations giving
telecommunications carriers the right to physically collocate DSLAMs
and other routing equipment on the incumbent LEC’s property.715  It
seems clear that such a requirement constitutes the type of permanent
physical occupation held to constitute a per se taking in Loretto.716
Lower court precedent supports this conclusion as well.  In GTE
Northwest, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission,717 GTE challenged a state
regulatory provision similar to the ONA regime created by the FCC in
Computer III.  The key difference, however, was that Oregon’s regime
required local telephone companies to permit ESPs to physically col-
locate on their property.718  After reviewing the relevant takings analy-
sis contained in Loretto, FCC v. Florida Power Corp.,719 and Yee v. City of
Escondido,720 the court concluded that the physical collocation re-
quirement was properly characterized as the type of permanent physi-
cal invasion held to be a per se taking in Loretto.721  In so holding, the
714 See supra notes 27, 322–35 and accompanying text.
715 See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
supra notes 650–55 and accompanying text.
716 See supra Part II.A.2.
717 900 P.2d 495 (Or. 1995).  The litigants in GTE Northwest framed their challenge in
terms of both the Takings Clause and the corresponding provision of the Oregon Constitu-
tion.  The court assumed without deciding that the analysis would be the same under ei-
ther provision. See id. at 501 n.6; see also supra notes 627–28 and accompanying text
(describing ONA).
718 See OR. ADMIN. R. 860-035-0110 (2002); see also supra text accompanying note 635.
719 480 U.S. 245 (1987); see supra Part II.A.3.
720 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
721 See GTE Northwest, 900 P.2d at 502–04.
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court rejected the argument that the prior restrictions on the tele-
phone company’s ability to use its property deprived the company of
any “historically rooted expectation of compensation.”722  As the court
reasoned, “the facts that an industry is heavily regulated, and that a
property owner acquired the property knowing that it is heavily regu-
lated, do not diminish a physical invasion to something less than a
taking.”723  The court also rejected the argument that physical colloca-
tion represented nothing more than a restriction on the use of prop-
erty that was more properly analyzed as a regulatory taking.724
Furthermore, according to the court, the PUC lacked the statutory
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain.  As a result, the
Oregon Supreme Court invalidated the PUC’s collocation regulations
as beyond the PUC’s statutory authority.725
The analysis with respect to cable modem systems is slightly more
ambiguous.  Unless it mandates multiple ISP access as a general mat-
ter, the FCC need not address precisely how and where the intercon-
nection needed for multiple ISP access should occur or how such
access should be priced.726  None of the municipal ordinances requir-
ing multiple ISP access sets forth parameters for interconnection or
pricing guidelines, and no consensus has emerged among industry
participants as to where the interconnection needed for multiple ISP
access should occur.727  Accordingly, the only operative multiple ISP
722 Id. at 504.
723 Id.
724 See id. at 505–06.
725 Id. at 499–501.  Note that provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 explic-
itly give state public utility commissions the right to enforce physical collocation provisions.
47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(6), 252 (2000). See generally Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 676–77 (2001) (“Under the
Telecom Act, state agencies like the Oregon PUC have mandated physical collocation and
other measures that the agencies would not be otherwise authorized to do under state
law.”).  Although this effectively overturned the Oregon Supreme Court’s holding with
respect to the PUC’s authority to enforce physical collocation, it did not in any way under-
cut the court’s conclusion that the physical collocation provisions of the Oregon regulatory
scheme constituted a per se taking under Loretto.
726 See LATHEN, supra note 612, at 36.
727 Id. at 38–39.  Most of these ordinances simply required that cable modem systems
provide nondiscriminatory access by allowing unaffiliated ISPs to obtain carriage on the
same terms as affiliated ISPs.  Although the ordinances in question failed to address the
point, such schemes generally require elaborate accounting and nonaccounting rules to
ensure that the terms of the access agreements with affiliated ISPs does not include any
cross subsidies. See id. at 38 (citing Implementation of Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sec-
tions 271 and 272 of Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, First Report and Order
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905 (1996); Implementation
of Telecommunications Act of 1996: Accounting Safeguards Under Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 17539 (1996)).  Thus, contrary to the sugges-
tion of some advocates of multiple ISP access, see, e.g., Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate
Broadband Internet Access over Cable, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677, 716 (2001), it is likely that
any such scheme would require a significant degree of public utility regulation.
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access requirements are those imposed as part of the regulatory ap-
proval of the AOL-Time Warner merger, which gives certain unaffili-
ated ISPs the right to interconnect at the same points as AOL Time
Warner’s proprietary ISPs.728  As a result, contrary to the suggestion of
some scholars,729 multiple ISP access to cable modem systems will
likely require the type of permanent physical invasion held to consti-
tute a per se taking.  Consequently, cable modem system operators
who are subjected to multiple ISP access requirements would be enti-
tled to fair-market value as compensation.  As noted in the discussion
regarding access to DSL networks, the proliferation of technological
alternatives is in the process of greatly simplifying such a
determination.730
CONCLUSION
There can be little question that compelling access to networks
has tremendous intuitive appeal as a potential regulatory response to
the growing influence of network technologies.  Such compulsion
would seem to increase the number of options presented to consum-
ers and would appear to offer the prospect of lowering the prices at
which network services are available.  It goes without saying, however,
that there is no free lunch—every regulatory effort that seeks to pro-
mote the availability of any particular good necessarily carries costs.
Specifically, direct government intervention in establishing access
rates all too often fosters allocative inefficiency by interfering with the
mechanism through which consumers of network access calibrate
their overall level of purchases.  Interference with market pricing si-
multaneously causes secondary distortions in the markets for substi-
tute inputs by making the regulated input seem artificially attractive.
These effects create further inefficiencies in the production decisions
of entrants and incumbent firms by distorting their mix of productive
inputs.
What is less obvious, but no less important, is how government
regulation of access pricing can impede dynamic efficiency.  Market
728 See supra notes 682–85 and accompanying text.  The multiple ISP access scheme
mandated by the FTC originally anticipated that the unaffiliated ISPs would place their
own routing and backbone access facilities within the cable headend in a manner that
closely resembled physical collocation.  As actually implemented, however, multiple ISP
access bears a greater resemblance to virtual collocation, with all of the traffic exiting the
headend via AOL’s backbone and interconnecting with the unaffiliated ISP’s network at
some location outside the headend.  As we have argued earlier in this Article, this shift
does not take the access regime outside the realm of physical takings, because multiple ISP
access would still require every cable modem system operator to permit unaffiliated ISPs to
establish a physical connection to its network. See supra notes 481–90 and accompanying
text.
729 See, e.g., Chen, supra note 727,  at 716.
730 See supra note 707 and accompanying text.
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prices play a critical role in encouraging firms who need access to
telecommunications networks to make the financial commitments
necessary to deploy alternative network technologies.  Compelling ac-
cess at below-market rates only serves to dampen the price signal that
normally would stimulate investment in additional network capacity.
In addition, by precluding these firms from having to make such in-
vestments, compelled access starves firms seeking to deploy substitute
technologies of the financial resources they need to support the
buildout of their networks.  The arguments that networks are unique
economic phenomena, to which ordinary economic analysis does not
apply, simply do not withstand scrutiny.
Given the economic support for basing access rates on market
pricing, it should come as little surprise that the Supreme Court’s tak-
ings jurisprudence supports the same conclusion.  Policy makers and
the courts have sanctioned the use of cost-based rather than market-
based rates only because the initial lack of competition among differ-
ent network facilities rendered market-based pricing of network access
impossible.  The emergence of technological alternatives capable of
serving as substitutes and the overarching shift in regulatory policy
from rate regulation to access regulation have called into question the
justifications for failing to base access rates on market prices.  Indeed,
our discussion of the current status of local telephone networks, utility
pole networks, and wireline broadband networks identifies the ways in
which technology now provides the external benchmarks needed to
support market-based access pricing.  Of course, sufficient competi-
tion in the provision of network services eventually would suggest reg-
ulatory forbearance in setting access rates and compelling access, with
reliance instead on markets both for pricing of network services and
for assuring the provision of access.
Of course numerous technical obstacles to implementing such a
solution remain.  Many of the technologies to which we refer are only
now in the process of being deployed, and if previous policy making
in other technologies is any guide, numerous technical and account-
ing-related difficulties doubtless still exist.  Nonetheless, the economic
and constitutional validity of market-based pricing of access to net-
works should be sufficient to overcome these administrative costs.
Market-based rates correctly identify both the economic costs and the
just compensation for takings in the “age of access.”
